The Greek Muslim migration : rethinking the role of security and nationalism within the 1923 compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey by Kalayoğlu, Sinan
 
 
 
THE GREEK MUSLIM MIGRATION:  RETHINKING THE 
ROLE OF SECURITY AND NATIONALISM WITHIN THE 
1923 COMPULSORY EXCHANGE OF POPULATIONS 
BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Master’s Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
SİNAN KALAYOĞLU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of International Relations 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Bilkent University 
Ankara 
June 2004 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
To Noam 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
THE GREEK MUSLIM MIGRATION:  RETHINKING THE 
ROLE OF SECURITY AND NATIONALISM WITHIN THE 
1923 COMPULSORY EXCHANGE OF POPULATIONS 
BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences 
of 
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
SİNAN KALAYOĞLU 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
in 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY 
ANKARA 
 
June 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and 
in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
         (Title and Name) 
               Supervisor 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and 
in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
         (Title and Name) 
         Examining Committee Member 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and 
in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
         (Title and Name) 
         Examining Committee Member 
 
 
Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
         (Title and Name) 
              Director 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE GREEK MUSLIM MIGRATION:  RETHINKING THE ROLE OF 
SECURITY AND NATIONALISM WITHIN THE 1923 COMPULSORY 
EXCHANGE OF POPULATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY 
 
Kalayoğlu, Sinan 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor:  Prof. Dr. Stanford J. Shaw 
June 2004 
In my Masters Thesis, I examine the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange 
between Greece and Turkey (CEOPBGT).  Endorsed at a convention in Lausanne, 
Switzerland, the forced transfer of over one million Anatolian Greek Christians from 
Turkey to Greece, and of roughly 400,000 Greek Muslims from Greece to Turkey, 
occurred during a period when Turkey and Greece were actively pursuing nation-building 
projects.  In my theory, I inform about the downside of state-centric security rhetoric and 
ethnonationalism associated with population expulsion.  In my case study, I specifically 
address the Lausanne Convention’s role in "nationalizing" identity and defining who 
belongs and who does not in nationally particularistic ways.  My investigation seeks to 
illustrate that the national territorial narrative produced by the CEOPBGT was in discord 
with how transferees comprehended their own sense of community and place in the 
world.  To this end, I provide evidence such as stories of the Greek Muslim migration to 
show how displacement distorts, challenges and negotiates a migrant’s sense of identity 
and security.  Ultimately, I hope that my thesis may add a unique perspective to the 
current literature seeking to understand sources of the politicized conflict between Greece 
and Turkey, as well as offering general insight into the International Relations discipline 
regarding the phenomenon of forced population transfer. 
 
Key Words:  Population Exchange, Migration, Security, Nationalism, Identity,             
                     Turkey, Greece 
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ÖZET 
 
 
YUNANLI MÜSLÜMANLARIN GÖÇÜ:  YUNANİSTAN VE TÜRKİYE 
ARASINDAKİ 1923 TARİHLİ ZORUNLU NÜFUS MÜBADELESİNDE  
GÜVENLİK VE MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİN ROLÜNÜN YENİDEN 
DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ 
 
Kalayoğlu, Sinan 
Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümu 
Tez Yöneticisi:  Prof. Dr. Stanford J. Shaw 
Haziran 2004 
 
Master tezimde, Yunanistan ve Türkiye arasındaki 1923 tarihli Zorunlu Nüfus 
Mübadelesi’ni inceledim.  İsviçre’nin Lozan kentinde gerçekleşen kongrede onaylanan 
bir milliondan fazla Rum Ortodoksunun Türkiye‘den Yunanistan’a ve yaklaşık 400,000 
Yunanlı Müslümanın Yunanistan’dan Türkiye‘ye zorunlu göçü, Türkiye ve 
Yunanistan’ın aktif olarak millet oluşturma projeleri ile uğraştıkları bir dönemde 
gerçekleşti. Teorimde, devlet merkezli güvenlik retoriğinin ve toplulukların yer 
değiştirmesine yol açan milliyetçiliğin hoş olmayan niteliklerini açığa çıkarıyorum. 
Araştırmamda özellikle Lozan Kongresi’nin, kimliklerin uluslaştırılmasındaki ve 
aidiyetin tanımlanmasındaki rolü üzerinde duruyorum.  Ayrıca, nüfus mübadelesinin 
ürettiği ulusal topraklar söyleminin, göçmenlerin topluluk bilinci ve dünyadaki yerleri ile 
ilgili algılarıyla uyuşmazlık içinde olduğunu savunuyorum.  Bu amaçla, Yunanlı 
Müslümanların göç hikayeleri gibi kanıtlar kullanarak, yer değiştirmenin, göçmenlerin 
kimlik ve güvenlik algılarını nasıl altüst ettiğini göstermeye çalışıyorum.  Bu tezimle, 
Yunanistan ve Türkiye arasındaki siyasi uyuşmazlığı anlamaya çalışan günümüz 
literatürüne farklı bir bakış açısı ekleyebilmiş ve Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinine zorunlu 
nüfus mübadelesi olgusu ile ilgili olarak genel bir anlayış kazandırabilmiş olmayı ümit 
ediyorum. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler:  Nüfus Mübadelesi, Göç, Güvenlik, Milliyetçilik, Kimlik,  
                                 Türkiye, Yunanistan 
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A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY 
 
 
Prof. Stanford Shaw is fond of telling me to look out for “linguistic nationalism” 
in academic writing.  I would say that “linguistic nationalism” is the projection of a 
particular nationalist agenda by defining certain place and identity terms in key ways.  An 
example would be to continue to call Istanbul “Constantinople.”   
To avoid confusion and to avoid being labeled a “linguistic nationalist,” I want to 
clarify some of the geographical and identity terms in my thesis.  I call the landmass that 
Turkey is located “Anatolia” (or Anadolu) and not the Greek equivalent “Asia Minor.”  
Moreover, I will give all city names in Greece and Turkey their Turkish (or, when 
necessary and appropriate, their anglicized) spelling (e.g., İzmir, İstanbul, Selanik, 
Ankara, Dedeağac, etc.).  Please bear in mind that I am Turkish, am writing this thesis in 
Turkey, and am reflecting on the topic of Turkish nationalism, not Greek nationalism.   
With regards to identity terms, Hirschon (2003:  xii) notes that under the Ottoman 
Empire, Orthodox Christians were members of the “Rum” millet and were called Rum.  
The term “Greek” technically refers only to members of the Greek state, which was 
created in 1830.  In the Turkish perspective there are, based on citizenship, two 
categories of Greeks.  Simply put, whereas Greek Orthodox citizens of Turkey are called 
Rum Ortodoks or Rum, citizens of the Greek state are called Yunanlı or Yunan.  I just 
want to elucidate this distinction.   
As for my thesis, I refer to the population that was displaced from Turkey to 
Greece under the 1923 population exchange as “Anatolian Greek Christians” the 
“Anatolian Greek Orthodox population,” or “Rums.”  I primarily refer to the Muslim 
 xii 
population that was displaced from Greece to Turkey as “Greek Muslims” (I have plenty 
more to say about this phrase in chapter 2).  When referring to these populations as a 
whole, I use the terms “exchangees,” “transferees,” and “migrants” interchangeably.  
Finally, despite their slight differences in connotation, I use the terms “population 
transfer,” population expulsion” and “population exchange” interchangeably as well.  To 
try to mitigate any remaining confusion about how I define key and/or “emotionally-
charged” terms, I have included a glossary at the very end of the thesis. 
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INTRODUCTION:  THE GIST OF THE THESIS 
 
 
“The road must be trod, but it will be very hard… Yet such is oft the course of deeds that move the wheels 
of the world:  small hands do them because they must, while the eyes of the great are elsewhere” (262). 
 
J.R.R. Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings (The Fellowship of the Ring) 
 
"Two and two always makes a five." 
 
Radiohead, from the song 2 + 2 = 5 
 
 One method to handle the dilemma of minority ethnic groups within a country is 
the compulsory transfer of national minorities.  A forced population exchange is the 
obligatory uprooting or transplantation of populations from one country to another.  The 
1923 Compulsory Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey (CEOPBGT) 
was an extreme method used to solve the quandary of Greek and Turkish minorities after 
WWI and reestablish peace between Greece and Turkey in 1923.  Ratified by the League 
of Nations in 1923, the Lausanne Convention endorsed and legitimized the exchange of 
over 1,000,000 Greek Christians living in Anatolia and almost 400,000 Muslims residing 
in Greece, playing a paramount role in constructing the primary identities of over one and 
a half million migrants.  To be sure, it had numerous political, economic, demographic, 
social, and cultural consequences for both Turkey and Greece (Hirschon 2003:  xiv).   
The CEOPBGT was the first international transaction of its kind in the history of 
the world, and it remains controversial to this day.  Some observers view the method of 
population exchange as a realistic means of establishing stability and ethnic/religious 
homogeneity, key concepts they argue in a time when Turkey was seeking national 
sovereignty and Greece was seeking to solidify its national boundaries.  These views, by 
prioritizing visions of national security, tend to reflect traditional discourse within 
academic fields such as international relations and political science.   
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Others, however, within disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, international 
law and critical security studies have criticized population exchanges on ethical grounds, 
saying they constitute a violation of human rights (i.e., that individual rights could take a 
back seat to state interests).  These scholars stress that while population expulsion may 
seem to be an attractive short-term course of action, in the long term the process of 
separation gives way to increased cultural ignorance and dangerous national stereotypes.  
In my thesis, I position myself in this “alternative” camp.      
The bulk of my method of inquiry consists of textual analysis.  I critically observe 
numerous historical and contemporary texts (books, journals, newspapers, etc.) to 
discover the importance of things such as statistics and facts of the CEOPBGT, scholars’ 
interpretations of certain events, speeches made by leaders, historical documents, and so 
on.  Most of these sources are in English; a few texts that I looked at are in Turkish.  
Moreover, I looked at the original text of the Lausanne Convention, which is in French.  
In addition to texts, I waded through numerous photographs pertaining to the exchange, 
watched three video documentaries regarding the CEOPBGT, conducted several 
interviews with both living migrants of the CEOPBGT and personal family friends who 
lived through the 1920s, and talked at length with a journalist from The Economist who 
has a keen interest in the CEOPBGT and who is currently writing a 90,000+ word book 
on the subject.         
My Masters Thesis has three main sections:  a theory section and two chapters.  In 
the theory, I explore the concept of population transfer with regard to two interconnected 
levels – what I will call the “security dimension” and the “nationalism dimension.”  My 
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main assertion here in the theory is that population transfer is a self-perpetuating state-
centric and ethnonationalist mode of thinking.   
In Chapter 1, I critically examine the language of the CEOPBGT and the Turkish 
nationalists’ views about the exchange to build on ideas expounded in my theory.   
In Chapter 2, I observe the forced Greek Muslim migration from Greece to 
Turkey resulting from the CEOPBGT to see how settlement in a foreign land affects the 
transferred populations’ sense of security, homeland and identity.   
By the end of my thesis, I will have shown how elitist notions of nationalism and 
security are two intertwined and perilous concepts, and I will have highlighted general 
ethical problems associated with forced displacements.  Throughout the thesis, I promote 
the concept of human security and I advocate moving beyond static conceptions of 
nation, security, homeland and identity to better understand the causes and consequences 
of population exchanges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4  
 
THEORY:  POPULATION TRANSFER, SECURITY AND 
NATIONALISM 
 
 
0.1 .    A Concise Look at the Origins and the Use of Population Transfers in 
History 
  
The causes of forced population movements are inevitably complicated and multi-
faceted.  One point is clear, however:  aggressors throughout history have often resorted 
to the strategy of population expulsion to establish control, be it political, social, 
economic, and/or cultural.  To better understand these means of domination, I want to 
chronologically highlight some important historical mass expulsions until WWII and 
their major trends.  My provided list of population transfers is by no means exhaustive.  
My goal in this section is simply to provide a basic understanding of the phenomenon of 
population transfer.1    
In the past, leaders often used mass expulsions against conquered peoples.  
Schechla writes, “In the ancient world, ample evidence indicates that population transfer 
                                                 
1 For an academic discussion of population transfer in history, see A. De Zayas, “International law and 
mass population transfers,” Harvard International Law Journal 207 (1975).  For reasons of brevity, I 
picked WWII as an arbitrary cut-off point of the population transfer discussion. To be sure, there have been 
numerous sizeable population transfers in the post-WWII period that warrant serious scholarly 
investigation.  To list but four of them (list adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_transfer 
on April 1, 2004), 
 
1) The expulsion of Arabs from Palestine in 1948, and the subsequent Jewish exodus (1948-
1950) into the present-day state of Israel. 
2) The de facto exchange of approximately 200,000 Greek Cypriots and 65,000 Turkish Cypriots 
within Cyprus following Turkey’s 1974 intervention and the subsequent de facto partitioning 
of Cyprus. 
3) History’s largest population exchange - the de facto movement of upwards of 5 million 
Hindus from modern-day Pakistan into modern-day India, and of 6 million Muslims in the 
opposite direction, following the 1947 partition that created Pakistan and India.  Roughly 
anywhere from a total of one to two million Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs died as a result of 
dislocation, which was “regulated” by the New Delhi Accord of April 12, 1950. 
4) The 1991-1999 displacement of Albanians, Serbs, Bosnians and Croats in the former 
Yugoslavia, the most prominent examples including that which took place in eastern Croatia 
and Krajina (1991-1995), in most of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995), and in Kosovo (1999).   
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was carried out as a political tool to weaken, dismember and eliminate the national 
dimensions of subject peoples” (1993: 240).  The Assyrians expelled their populations to 
quell resistance, often the elites of vanquished groups.  The Neo-Babylonian Empire, to 
unify the population, forced the Jews out of Jerusalem and into Babylon.  The Greeks, 
Macedonians, and Romans were motivated to expel slaves to make money (Dark 1998:  
3).     
Following the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, peace treaties gave an ultimatum to 
inhabitants of a conquered territory:  they could either choose to stay in a region and 
become subjects of the new ruler, or they could move to a place and remain under the 
dominion of the old king.  This idea, essentially a right of options clause, was ingrained 
in international politics by the 1900s (Dark 1998:  4).  By this time, lawyers had defined 
international law as a system of rules that dictated relations between states.  National 
territoriality and territorial sovereignty increasingly placed greater emphasis on ethnic 
homogeneity in nation-states.       
Dark (1998:  5) notes two major complementing shifts in the history of mass 
expulsions by the 20th century, two changes that, for the purposes of my paper, underline 
part of the raison d’être of the CEOPBGT.  First, he underscores the wave of nationalism 
and the concept of self-determination that struck Europe in the 1800s and 1900s.  
Population transfers not only came to legitimize (i.e. legalize) a nationalist agenda, but 
the spread of nationalism as an ideology and political action program also increased the 
frequency of large-scale expulsions.  It is no coincidence that, at the height of national 
territoriality in the late 19th and early 20th century, the scale and effectiveness of forced 
migrations increased with the rise of military might and communications.  Second, 
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leaders in the 20th century looked to population exchanges to counter the dilemmas 
associated with ethnic minorities.  For the elite and powerful under a nationalist regime, 
minority groups presented a barrier in the quest for a unified polity.  States and nation-
states in the early 1900s increasingly adopted a mononational formula with regard to 
multiethnic populations.     
Conflict in the Balkans in the 19th and early 20th centuries ushered in an era of 
formally negotiated population exchanges.  In order to “unmix” populations and establish 
security, the diminishing Ottoman Empire had to face the emergence of nation-states and 
self-determination movements.  In the first Balkan War, launched in October 1912, 
Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece crushed the already weakening Ottoman 
Empire (Ladas 1932:  10).  As one result, a convention under the 1913 Treaty of Peace 
between Turkey and Bulgaria allowed for the voluntary exchange of minorities who 
found themselves on the wrong side of the newly created borders.  Significantly, this 
convention redefined identity and subsequently reconstructed “minorities” in new ways.  
Moreover, in 1919 the Peace Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine included a convention 
providing for a “reciprocal voluntary emigration of the racial, religious and linguistic 
minorities in Greece and Bulgaria” (Ladas 1932:  27).  As I will discuss later in my case 
study, the 1923 CEOPBGT, was unique, however, in that it was the first internationally 
sanctioned compulsory population transfer in the world. 
The World War II period also witnessed many population movements.  Hitler’s 
Nazi Germany used treaties to legalize population movements, often inserting a clause 
whereby people could choose either to stay where they were or live under the Reich.  In 
October 1939, Hitler proposed in the Reichstag “a new order of ethnographical 
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conditions…a resettlement of nationalities in such a manner that the process ultimately 
results in the obtaining of better dividing lines” (Barutciski 1998:  5).2  In addition, in 
1940 treaties between Romania and Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, and Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia called for extensive voluntary exchanges of minority populations.  
Ultimately, the greatest example of World War II displacement was sanctioned by the 
Potsdam Protocol, which called for the transfer of German nationals from 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland to Germany (Meindersma 1997:  336-337).  
Between 1944-1949, roughly sixteen million German nationals were forcibly moved 
under violent conditions, under which approximately two million Germans died 
(Barutciski 1998:  5). 
 
0.2. Justifying Population Transfer on the Premise of State Security 
Those in power rationalize population exchanges on many grounds - security, 
politics, culture, economics, the environment, etc. – and these reasons are necessarily 
contingent upon historical context.  With regard to the CEOPBGT, I assert that the main 
thrust of the leaders’ arguments for population transfer lies in the “security dimension.”  I 
contend that leaders at Lausanne were, above all, motivated to vie for population transfer 
                                                 
2 Like Hitler, Stalin admired the tactic of population transfer and used transfer not infrequently to uproot 
“troublesome” minority populations within the USSR.  Among some of the ethnic groups displaced under 
Stalin’s reign include:  Poles (1934), Ukrainians, Jews, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, (1940-1941), 
Volga Germans (1941), Balkars, Chechens, Ingushs (1943), Meskhetian Turks (1944), and Crimean Tatars 
(1945) (list taken from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_transfer, April 1, 2004). 
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in order to promote security at “all levels” – international, regional, national, societal, and 
individual – by privileging the state apparatus.3   
I explore this argument in three parts.  I first succinctly explain (mainly in the 
context of the CEOPBGT) how the notion of population exchange can get securitized.  
Since the nature of this securitization task is, in my view, inherently state-centric and 
statist,4 I then go on to connect my previous discussion to a larger theoretical framework 
of state security.  Third, I challenge the notion of state security by introducing the 
concept of human security to contend that that the traditional emphasis on state security, 
and the related idea of rationalizing population transfer based on a prioritization of state 
security, is theoretically incomplete and otherwise flawed.     
 
0.2.1. Population Transfer as Securitization of the State, by the State 
                                                 
3 There are many interlinked reasons for population transfer.  For instance, those that carry out population 
exchanges might do so to consolidate political power.  Political leaders may perceive exchanging a 
particular ethnic minority group as akin to removing an obstacle to attaining full political sovereignty, 
thereby ensuring political power through a monopoly of coercive force.  As Petropulos notes, these leaders 
see the population transfer as a sacrifice of “some of the interests of the refugees on behalf of the larger 
interest of the nation-state” (1976:  160).  Likewise, culture works alongside political control as a tool in 
advancing the principle of population transfers.  By solidifying national borders and obtaining an ethnically 
homogenous population, a population transfer can serve to unite people of a common ethnic heritage. 
Moreover, in the case of Lausanne, it was argued that population exchanges (especially if compulsory) 
avoid lengthy and strenuous economic crises that would result if no exchange occurred.  For instance, since 
the mass expulsion of Greeks from Turkey created economic problems for both countries, leaders saw a 
prompt exchange of populations as circumventing a catastrophic economic situation.  The logic used at the 
Convention to promote the exchange maintained that the Greek Christian refugees, upon leaving 
employment in Turkey, would have a better chance of finding jobs in Greece if the Muslims left Greece.  
From the Turkish nationalist viewpoint, since the massive Greek Christian exodus (which happened before 
the population exchange was official) had created a huge land vacancy in Anatolia, the Muslims in Greece 
could settle in Turkey and contribute to the Turkish economy.  Hence, leaders can use population transfers 
to bring a demographic situation back into balance.  
 
4 It is meaningful to observe the distinction between statism, “the concentration of all loyalty and decision-
making power at the level of the sovereign state,” and state-centrism, “the focus on states as referents and 
agents without necessarily giving primacy to their well-being.”  Thus, whereas statism is a normative 
enterprise, state-centrism is a methodological preference.  That said, Bilgin contends that in traditional 
security studies, the distinction between statism and state-centrism gets blurred because the bestowal of 
primacy to states (i.e. state-centrism) reinforces statism (Bilgin 2002:  102). 
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Supporters of population transfer argue that the CEOPBGT ended the conflict 
between Greece and Turkey and ensured peace in the Aegean.  According to Nansen, the 
League of Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees, the Great Powers prioritized 
security in the aftermath of WWI.  Therefore, the Great Powers claimed, “To unmix the 
populations of the Near East will tend to secure the true pacification of the Near East” 
(Petropulos 1976:  143).  The world “unmixing” has significant meaning and should not 
be taken lightly.  Supporters of population transfer often view ethnic minorities as a 
threat to internal state stability.  The problem is mainly the “ambiguous loyalty” of ethnic 
minorities to their states, which can erode states’ confidence in their minorities and thus 
make the state “vulnerable.”  The “remedy” lies in a population exchange, which would 
protect the state’s majority population by removing the “deep-rooted” cause of quarrel, 
namely, the ethnic minorities.  In the case of the CEOPBGT, it was argued that over the 
long term, population transfer might reduce “psychological disorientation” (Petropulos 
1976:  135) that would result if conflicting ethnic groups remained under the same 
nation-state.  The delegates interpreted the “minority situation” as dire.  Meindersma, 
quoting from De Zayas, portrays the supposedly desperate atmosphere at the Lausanne 
Convention, “The principle of compulsory transfers was seen by many as a panacea, a 
final solution to the troublesome minority problem” (Meindersma 1997:  350).  In no 
uncertain terms, the Turkish delegation praised the population exchange as a means of 
solidifying the Turkish nation-state and thereby eliminating any anti-Turkish resistance 
within Anatolia.  Greek nationalists by and large had the same type of praise.  Indeed, 
leaders often justify a population exchange on the basis that territorial control over a 
certain area is critical to the state’s “national security” (Diehl, Goertz 1991:  343).   
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Proponents of population transfer argue that its goal is not only to calm tensions 
between nation-states but also to minimize the loss of life.  They basically think that the 
affront to individual human rights that accompanies a population transfer does not 
outweigh the potential for large-scale massacres, should ethnic minorities be allowed to 
remain in their traditional country.  Barutciski captures the essence of the argument, “It is 
better to have a population expelled than murdered en masse” (1998:  12).  Inaction is 
immoral if urgent action is necessary.  By rapidly carrying out a forced migration, drastic 
as it may seem, leaders maintain that they are in truth attenuating the suffering of the 
displaced and thereby increasing levels of security.  
 
0.2.2. Traditional Views of Security:  Looking at Realism and Neo-Realism 
 The above discussion demonstrates that arguments for population transfer are 
overwhelmingly statist and state-centric.  To better understand the roots of such 
perceptions, I think an examination of classical and neo-realist tenets is a good idea.   
Realists believe that humans live in an anarchical world, an international system 
that holds no major central governance.  In a realist paradigm, states assess their interests 
by trying to preserve and increase their power, an end that drives all political action.  
Self-interest is the order of the day.  As E.H. Carr (1945:  30-31) asserts, “[There is] 
overwhelming evidence that modern national governments cannot and will not observe 
international treaties or rules of international law when these become burdensome or 
dangerous to the welfare or security of their own nation.”  
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 Since realists perceive that the state wields the most power in international 
relations, the state is the primary actor and unit of analysis in realist world politics.5  Why 
do states pursue power endlessly?  Power is needed for survival.  According to realists 
such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, under the international system, the 
threat of force is constantly lingering and war is always possible.  Thus, fighting 
insecurity (especially military insecurity) is a cornerstone of realism.  Realists generally 
view a hefty military force, as the US and USSR demonstrated they could create during 
the Cold War, to be a vital method employed by the state to counteract insecurity.  The 
security dilemma, the idea that an increase in State A’s security means a decrease in State 
B’s security, constitutes a hopelessly fixed scenario in a realist world (the consequence of 
this mistrust, Booth [1994:  5] avers, is unending military build-up and insecurity).  
 In realism, securitization constitutes a state task.6  This perspective is central to 
orthodox security studies, a field which claims that security is created by the state and for 
the state.7  States are “discrete and neutral actors” that are superior to domestic political 
conflicts.8  Whether they choose to be or not, citizens are inferior to state power.  The 
security of individuals is thereby a direct consequence of state security.  Put another way, 
realists assume that state security is a necessary and sufficient condition for human 
                                                 
5 The rationality assumption in classical realism claims that the international system should be examined as 
though states were unitary rational actors, i.e., actors that looked at the costs and benefits of every action. 
       
6 As Waltz (1979) claims, states are similar to one another in function, and they use both internal and 
external means to achieve their goals.  For this reason, states are easily comparable in terms of interests and 
balance of power. 
     
7 Walt (1991:  212) claims that security studies “may be defined as the study of the threat, use, and control 
of military force.”  Walt, like many realists, claims an objectivist scientific approach in his selection of the 
parameters of security studies.  
  
8 In classical realism, notions of anarchy, rationality, the state and power are essentialized and fixed in time 
and space (Wilkin 1998:  25). 
 12  
 
security.  Under such a realist system, state interests become "harmonized" with 
individuals’ interests.  What is good for State A __ state survival, military strength, unified 
political action, etc. __ is good and right for all of State A’s citizens.  Such a doctrine 
hence almost automatically creates the view that national security is superior to any other 
form (s) of security. 
   Realism and its twin neo-realism contend that security and freedom are on 
opposite sides of a spectrum.  Kenneth Waltz, an ardent neo-realist, claims, “States, like 
people, are insecure in proportion to the extent of their freedom.  If freedom is wanted, 
insecurity must be accepted” (1979:  63).  To ensure security, realists assume that states 
have the right to use violence.  This idea reflects the Weberian notion that states are what 
they are because they have a monopoly over the use of force.  Since the government 
usually possesses the highest means of physical power, realists presume that citizens of 
State A believe that they are protected while living under State A (Booth 1994:  5). 
 Wyn Jones (1999:  95) correctly articulates that realism perpetuates the normative 
and statist perspectives that states are the only truly significant actors in the international 
political system.  He says that realists assume that states have inherent value, and that 
they idealize these units as homogenous and coherent entities where justice and order 
prevail (1999:  98).  Under the realist model, the main security threat to State A comes 
from other states.  This is because in an anarchical world, neighboring State B or even the 
far-away State C is potentially calculating its interests and waiting for the proper moment 
to weaken State A.  Realism’s characterization of “security” presumes that interstate war 
is the gravest threat to freedom and personal safety.  According to most realists, 
therefore, almost all problems of security can and should be solved within the framework 
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of national/military security.  Hence, realists believe that broadening the security agenda 
to include nonmilitary, non-state based issues undermines both the theoretical and the 
policy-based coherency of the concept of security (Wyn Jones 1999:  106).  Such 
incoherence, in a neo-realist view, disrupts the parsimony of the neo-realist model by 
creating the cankerous prospect of indirect forms of violence and threats of violence. 
Ayoob, a self-proclaimed “subaltern realist” (i.e., a realist who supposedly writes 
for the “downtrodden masses”), advocates a definition of security based upon state 
control and legitimacy.9  Even though Ayoob criticizes traditional western notions of 
security, he ironically ends up endorsing a statist conception of security.10  Ayoob thinks 
the concept of security should firmly remain in the political realm and in no other, lest the 
notion of security lose intellectual vigor.  He writes, “Variables from the ecological to the 
economic may impinge on the security arena but their influence must be filtered through 
the political arena in order to become part of the security calculus” (Ayoob forthcoming:  
26).   
The idea is clear - broadening the security agenda suggests a broadening of the 
threat agenda, which is obviously dangerous for a realist, neo-realist, and/or statist.  
Ayoob’s term “adequate stateness” captures the sentiment well because, above all, Ayoob 
                                                 
9 Ayoob’s allegiance to state making is the reason why I discuss his views in this section.  To be fair, 
nevertheless, Ayoob elsewhere (especially in chapter 2 in Neuman 1998) criticizes neo-realist discourse on 
many accounts.  First, he believes it neglects domestic variables as sources of intrastate and interstate 
conflict in the Third World, thus hampering the theory’s ability to explain, predict and remedy regional 
conflict.  Second, he believes neo-realism is faultily ahistorical in its analysis.  Third, Ayoob claims that 
neo-realism focuses on relations between the G7 countries at the expense of altogether shunning the Third 
World, a major part of the existing international system.  Ayoob’s “sub-altern realism” is an attempt to 
return to the roots of classical realism.  
 
10 Ayoob (1995) says that the Western assumptions are two-fold:  that most threats to state security arise 
from outside the state, and that most threats to state security are military in nature. 
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fears state collapse and subsequent societal disintegration.11  Ayoob and other critics of 
human security agree that the best way to “operationalize” the security of humans is 
through the state, “The security of individuals, who by necessity form part of a political 
community, cannot be guaranteed unless the security of the entire political community is 
first ensured” (Ayoob forthcoming:  42).          
Genuine securitization, in Ayoob’s view, requires an acceptance and legitimating 
of the Hobbesian social contract, which puts authority in the control of an agreed-upon 
entity.  In modern times, this entity is the leviathan (i.e. the state).  With power 
(effectiveness) and consent (legitimacy) in hand, the state is best quipped to take on both 
external and internal threats to security.  As it is, Ayoob strongly believes that domestic 
and international security will be established only though a strengthening of the state 
apparatus. 
                                                 
11 He points to the phenomenon of modern-day “failed states” (examples include Liberia, Somalia and 
Sierra Leone) to underscore the need to prioritize the state apparatus and state sovereignty. 
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Figure 1:  In my diagram of Ayoob’s worldview, state security constitutes the core from which (3rd 
World) state behavior should radiate. 
 
Ayoob might hence say that, in the Third World, the question “who should be the 
primary referent of security?” should take a back seat to an even more important question 
“who is to provide security?”  The argument here is that the developing world does not 
have the developed world’s luxury of partitioning out security at different levels of 
interaction (human, societal, national, etc.).12  Thus, in Ayoob’s view, proponents of 
human security - NGO’s, development agencies, etc. – hamper the Third World state 
                                                 
12 The general idea is that, in the developing world, everything is a mess and there is little security to be 
partitioned out in the first place.  Indeed, Ayoob (1995, 2002) spills a lot of ink on the idea that Third 
World states are caught in a web of having to hurriedly build an adequate state within constraining 
international norms. 
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formation process.  The moving human security “goal-posts,” norms that Western Europe 
did not have to deal with by and large during its state-building period, serve only to “de-
legitimize” state building.  Ayoob thinks proponents of the human security model thereby 
miss the “existing realities of the international system” (Ayoob forthcoming:  29).      
  Like Ayoob, Barry Buzan (1991) claims that the state is the most powerful 
instrument for ensuring security for the individual.13  Writing through the medium of neo-
realism, Buzan says that the international system of anarchy make states the dominant 
units of analysis.  Paralleling Ayoob, Buzan advocates “strong states” (i.e. states that 
embody strong “political and social cohesion”) to combat insecurity.  Thus, as in 
Ayoob’s writings, the state remains the primary referent object of security for Buzan, 
“Although individual security does represent a distinct and important unit of analysis, it is 
essentially subordinate to the higher-level political structures of state and international 
system” (1991:  54).  The key word here is “subordinate.”   
Although Buzan does recognize that states can create dangers for its citizens, and 
while he does acknowledge grave inadequacies in certain state systems, the problem for 
him is not the institution of statehood per se but rather that certain states are behaving 
improperly.  Buzan claims that the state is not the only or even the primary source of 
oppression against individuals.14  Like Ayoob, Buzan thinks that the state model is the 
historically “best option” for ensuring security for everyone.  Buzan and other advocates 
                                                 
13 To be accurate, Buzan (1998 and elsewhere post-1991) does tone down his state-centric views a bit by 
expanding upon the idea of societal security.  I still believe, however, that “Buzanian” views of security 
continue to reflect a top-down (read:  state-to-individual) notion of securitization, and this is why I take 
from his 1983 work People, States and Fear, which was updated in 1991. 
   
14 Indeed, for Buzan, states must remain the primary actors in international relations and state behavior 
should not automatically be chastised from the outset of every security dilemma.  Similar to Thomas and 
Tow (2002:  379), Buzan inevitably discards the presumption that states are the key agent of human 
insecurity.  These three authors stress that state security is not inherently antithetical to human security.  
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of state-centricity claim that their arguments for prioritizing the state are, above all, 
pragmatic.  A withering-away of the state in security matters is dangerous, especially in 
places where insecurity prevails.  Buzan’s state-centric focus is boosted by the fact that 
the concept of human security presently lacks a clear, unanimous definition.  Defining 
human security is not only tricky theoretically, its broadness makes it hard for 
policymakers to prioritize goals in the agenda setting process (Paris 2001:  87-88).15  
Given human security’s far-reaching scope, it is difficult for anyone not to be ethically in 
favor of the concept.  Therefore, both Ayoob and Buzan might argue that simply claiming 
that humans need security is stating the obvious and gets us nowhere.  They fear that a 
prioritization of human security will make individuals increasingly insecure if the state 
looses its power to control its population. 
 
 
         0.2.3. An Anti-Traditional View of Security:  Human Security and Critical     
             Security Studies 
 
I think that privileging the state over the individual is an approach that is skewed, 
deficient and potentially deleterious to the individual and society at large.  My primary 
aim in this section is to counter state-centric discourse by providing evidence to assert 
that human security is of the utmost importance in its own right.  This discussion will 
examine human security through the lens of Critical Security Studies (CSS).  
In the previous section, I explained traditional notions of security predominantly 
through a realist and neo-realist viewpoint.  In this section I explicate CSS, a useful 
                                                 
15 Acharya (2001:  3) says of this discussion, “[Disagreements about human security] reflect genuine 
differences on philosophical and practical grounds.  Broadly stated, the debate about human security 
concerns the separation of direct physical violence from ‘structural violence.’ ” 
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starting point of analysis to counter realist/neo-realist rhetoric and capture the essence of 
the human security side of the State Security/Human Security debate.16  To begin, I 
summarize Wyn Jones’s useful schematic that contrasts orthodox views of security with 
CSS (1999:  165-166).  On the one hand, traditional security studies: 
   
1) Generally perpetuate the status quo through its promotion of scientific 
objectivism 
2) Are a-historical and resist change due to its state-centrism 
3) Ignore meaningful assumptions about the workings of politics as related to 
security issues 
4) Narrowly focus on the military aspects of security 
5) Privilege the state’s normative position above all others 
 
On the other hand, CSS:  
 
1) Captures security’s deeper assumptions about the nature of politics. 
2) Broadens the notion of security to include non-military features as potential 
security threats 
3) Treats individuals, not states, as the ultimate referents 
4) Centers its analysis on emancipation as the means by which security should be 
achieved  
 
                                                 
16 To be sure, there are many different types of radical assessments of the concept of security.  Smith (1999:  
80-96) lists, in order of most traditional to least traditional, seven “schools” of non-mainstream thought 
regarding the notion of security:  Alternative Defense and Common Security, The Third World Security 
School, Buzan and the “Copenhagen School,” Constructivist Security Studies, Critical Security Studies, 
Feminist Security Studies and Post-Structural Security Studies.  I choose to align myself with Critical 
Security Studies for at least three reasons.  First, having reviewed much literature on unorthodox views of 
security, I agree with Smith that “Critical Security Studies is the most sustained and coherent critique of 
traditional security studies” (1999:  88).  Second, I believe that Critical Security Studies and its clear 
emphasis on the concept of emancipation offer the most compelling framework for the idea of human 
security.  In this way, the Critical Security Studies perspective will allow for an excellent analysis of the 
1923 plight of refugees and subsequent human suffering caused by population transfer.  Third, it is 
imperative that I give this paper direction.  If I consider all the schools that attack traditional notions of 
security, I run the risk of losing coherency and writing for quantity rather than quality.   
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CSS emerged in the post-Cold War era as a forceful reaction to the inadequate 
traditional conceptualizations of security.  Importantly, CSS does not claim to reject 
military security altogether.  Instead, CSS wants to move beyond the traditionally narrow 
military concentration of security, stressing that even though the state is well equipped to 
provide certain aspects of security, the state should not be privileged over other crucial 
realms of security analyses.  CSS challenges the mainstream view that external military 
threats are mostly to blame for internal insecurity. 
  CSS makes no qualms about the fundamental paradox of traditional security 
paradigms.  The school of thought asserts that states, the so-called master protector of 
individuals, are far too often the perpetrator of evil-doings against individuals.17  
Unfortunately, the instances of unlawful state aggression in the world, both domestically 
and internationally, are almost innumerable.  Holsti outlines several common 
state/government patterns of abuse, which I summarize below (taken from Neuman 1998:  
115-116): 
 
1) The state excludes citizens of access to decision centers 
2) The state draws resources from society to enrich itself 
3) The government takes land from people and forcibly moves people 
4) The state prohibits certain groups from attaining economic and social 
opportunities 
5) The state directly attacks certain groups using the military, the police, 
legislation, etc. 
 
                                                 
17 Take, for instance, evildoing done by the USA.  Noam Chomsky, a renown contemporary nation-state 
critic and anti-war intellectual, has written extensively about persistent US government-sponsored terrorism 
and US government-approved terrorism conducted by foreign governments in many countries:  Vietnam, 
Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines, Cuba, Palestine, Turkey, Nicaragua, Columbia, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Panama, Israel Haiti, Honduras, Chile, East Timor, the Former Yugoslavia, the Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Iran, Italy, Greece, Japan, Germany, and so on (this partial list only comprises US government-influenced 
violence at an international level). 
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The central theme is clear:  states are not simply neutral, rational actors - they 
habitually practice objectives that are malevolent and non-rational.  This must be 
remembered.  Domestic and foreign policies reflect the special interests of those who 
create them.  CSS recognizes that state elites and others in power, to protect their 
international “credibility” and interests, often cloak their misdeeds using the rhetoric of 
“national security,” thus perpetuating lies and injustice (Booth 1994:  5).  CSS discards 
realism and neo-realism’s “fetishization of the state” (Wyn Jones 1995:  310).  CSS 
draws from Gramsci, an early 20th century Italian Marxist who contends that hegemonic 
discourse is a cyclical self-serving project.  Such rhetoric makes it appear as though the 
hegemon’s power is legitimate and natural (in Ole Waever’s terms, this process of self-
legitimating is called a “speech act” – saying something “makes it so”).  CSS admirably 
represents disenfranchised, voiceless, poor individuals who have been marginalized by 
prevailing hegemonic discourse.  CSS counters us/them discourse and seeks referents 
beyond the state as focal points for security analysis within the framework of four 
fundamental questions (Wyn Jones 1995:  309): 
 
1) What is security? 
2) Who is being secured by the prevailing order? 
3) Who or what are people being secured against? 
4) By which agents and through which strategies should security be attained?      
 
 A good way to examine the above questions is by explicating Ken Booth’s 1991 
article “Security and Emancipation.”  Through his understanding of security as 
emancipation, Booth (a former realist himself) puts forward a broader, more constructive 
view of security.  Booth counters neo-realist and realist conceptions of security, which 
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necessitate a lack of freedom.  One of his main arguments is that security is freedom and 
vice versa.  When individuals are liberated from human and physical constraints (i.e., 
freedom), they are free from threats (i.e., security), creating a paragon in which “security 
and emancipation are two sides of the same coin” (Booth 1991a:  319).  Moreover, Booth 
writes that individuals should be treated as ends and not as means.  This point is crucial.  
In turn, states should be seen as means and not as ends.  Humans, not the artificial 
construct of the state, should be the ultimate referent of security.  Booth (1991a:  320) 
offers three reasons, which I summarize below, why states are problematic primary 
security referents: 
  
1) Some states are clearly unreliable sources of security.  National security in 
State A may mean human insecurity in State A, national insecurity in State B, 
environmental insecurity and economic insecurity in State C, and so on.  Non-
cohesive nation-states are unsuitable candidates to reliably ensure collective 
national security (Booth 1994:  5).    
2) It is illogical to privilege the state over the individual in a security analysis 
when the primary referent should be the individual.   
3) States are not, to take Waltz’s (1979) phrase, “like units.”  States are overly 
diverse in character to be logical primary referents of security.      
 
 Booth underscores what realists and neo-realists shy away from – namely, that 
seeking state security is a process that can hamper and indeed paralyze human security.  
By arguing that individuals should be the ultimate referents, Booth does not neglect the 
importance of an individual’s broader social context (as some mistakenly claim).  Rather, 
by countering a state-centric security analysis, Booth avers that multi-faceted expressions 
of identity (ethnic, national, local, regional, global, gender-based, etc.) all contribute to 
the security calculus.  Security means different things in different contexts for different 
people.  Booth’s aim of broadening the security agenda raises the profile of issues such as 
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economic development and human rights, thus potentially benefiting those individuals 
whose rights have been trampled upon by political and social elites.  He opens the door 
for alternative units of security analysis: 
 
 To agree to broaden the concept of security…is not simply an intellectual act; it 
also involves a shift from a status quo political perspective to one that conceives security 
in terms of change.  Indeed I would argue that to broaden the security agenda is to accept 
- perhaps without realising it – that human security is ultimately more important than 
state security [italics mine] (Booth 1994:  3). 
 
 I concur that human security, with its emphasis on both individuals and 
community, is probably more crucial than state security in the final analysis.  I think the 
security agenda must be broadened, and I see a broader and deeper notion of security as 
problematizing a state-centric view of security for the better.  As Thomas (1998:  4) 
writes, human insecurity is not inevitable.  Rather, human insecurity directly stems from 
existing power structures and predominant discourse.  CSS’s expansion and 
reconstitution of a security paradigm entails a meaningful rethinking of the morality and 
ethics of security.18 
Along these lines, I find it difficult to align with Buzan’s underlying assumption 
that individual security can almost automatically be equated with state security.  For 
instance, strong states may not provide certain kinds of security to marginalized groups 
such as minorities and women.  Likewise, Caroline Thomas (1999:  4) succinctly 
                                                 
18 Bilgin (2002:  105) notes that there are agents other than states (e.g., NGOs, individuals, social 
movements, transnational corporations, etc.) who can aptly fill a security void.  States are not always 
competent or equipped to fight off non-state threats, especially with regards to issues of individual security.  
Bilgin cites Palestine as an example of a region where social movements (e.g., women’s networks 
contributing to the rise of the Intifada) have been especially crucial instruments of change (2002:  111).  
Indeed, CSS seeks to re-conceptualize agency altogether and think of non-military and non-zero-sum 
methods to deal with a new and flexible security agenda (Bilgin 2002:  105). 
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counters the “strong state” argument by contending that strong states often stay strong at 
the expense of weak(er) states, hence creating social inconsistencies across local, 
national, and global levels.19  The irony of Buzan’s book, Bilgin notes, is that while 
Buzan wants to move beyond statist conceptions of security (he speaks of broadening the 
concept of security), he endorses such a broadening through a state-centered analysis 
(Bilgin 2002:  103).20  
Ayoob, in my view, puts too much faith in the Hobbesian social contract and too 
little faith in non-state actors.  I therefore agree with Bilgin’s criticism of Ayoob’s statist 
conception of security, in which she cautions that the state-building process has the 
dangerous side-effect of boosting hegemonic discourse, stifling individual expressions of 
freedom, threatening economic insecurity and alienating non-state actors such as NGOs 
wholesale (2002:  107).  Bilgin also points out that there is no assurance that encouraging 
the formation of strong states in the Third World would create democratic and secure 
governance, as Ayoob expects the end result to be (Bilgin 2002:  108).  
The concept of human security, by expanding the security agenda to address 
global problems in more depth, creates an increasing global awareness and fosters state 
accountability.  With its links to human rights, environmental stability, etc., human 
                                                 
19 Furthermore, I tend to agree with Bilgin on the point that Buzan’s collaborative effort with Waever and 
de Wilde (1998) does not constitute a strong departure from state-centric thinking.  The authors continue to 
marginalize non-state actors with regards to these actors’ ability to take concrete securitization measures 
(Bilgin 2002:  109).  
          
20 Along these lines, McSweeney (1999:  61) makes the intelligent point that Buzan, while contending that 
individuals are irreducible objects of security, does not actually propose that the human security is an 
obligatory precondition for state security.  Rather, McSweeney thinks that Buzan is saying that the state 
should be secure unconditionally and that the necessary precondition for state security is the “absence of 
threat to the state” on behalf of the people (1999:  61).  In this way, McSweeney believes Buzan only 
actually considers two levels of analysis with regards to security:  the state and the international system 
(1999:  62). 
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security offers measures for reducing important domestic and international threats (e.g., 
diseases like AIDS, malaria, SARS) to people worldwide.  It is crucial to not simply gloss 
over important literature on human security.  Such a cursory examination creates the 
portrayal of proponents of human security as people who undertake an indiscriminate, 
Euro-centric, individualistic, liberal-democratic normative sweep of everything state-
based, and do so without offering any concrete alternatives about how to deal with 
security predicaments.  The depiction is inaccurate and dangerous.  At its core, human 
security examines the balance between the individual’s need for freedom and need for 
safety.  Human security goes beyond securing basic human rights.21  Not only does it 
stress human dignity, human security unfolds measures to counter threats to human safety 
and strategies to create institutions and other governance structures.22  Despite debate on 
how best to approach human security or how best to conceptualize threats to human 
security, the three aforementioned aspects of human security have a crucial common 
reference point:  the interests of people.  This “human” framework is a principal reason 
why, with regards to understanding security, I advocate a CSS perspective over a 
traditional security perspective.     
 
 
0.3. Population Transfer as Ethnonationalism 
 
                                                 
21 Ever since WWII, scholars and policy makers have expanded the literature on human rights.  There is, in 
my view, a growing consensus within international law as to what constitutes basic human norms (e.g., the 
UNHDR is a fundamental expression of these rights).  This discussion is important, and the IR discipline 
would do well to follow it closely. 
    
22 See the 1994 UNDP’s Human Development Report, which contains a section on human security, for a 
broad yet solid classification of human security and its implications.   
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The language of state security is often cloaked in nationalist rhetoric, and vice 
versa.  Moreover, the method of population transfer often has an underlying harmful, 
ethnonationalist and elitist agenda.  By exploring subjects entitled “Land,” 
“Ethnonationalism and Exclusion,” “Nations and States,” “Power,” “Identity,” and 
“Displacement,” I seek to get at the heart of how population exchanges (and those who 
use them) truly conceptualize notions of nation, homeland and identity.  In so doing, I try 
to critically re-analyze some elemental assumptions of a state-centric view of security. 
 
0.3.1. Land 
In considering the motives of population exchanges as a means of establishing 
security between and within nation-states, I think it is best to begin by exploring the 
significance of land and territory.  Above all, nationalism is associated with the 
acquisition, control and expansion of land.  Let us not forget this.  The function of land 
as the foundation of cultural and national identity depends upon, among other things, 
territoriality and the movement of persons to new places.  According to Gottmann, 
territory has dual functions, “[Land] serve[s] on the one hand as a shelter for security, and 
on the other hand as a springboard for opportunity” (Mach 1993: 175).    
People, according to Williams and Smith, often distinguish land by its objective 
units (e.g. terrain, climate, boundaries, etc.) and subjective characteristics (e.g. homeland, 
nation-building, etc.).  Williams and Smith hypothesize that national elites, to advance 
their agenda, seek to shift the emphasis away from land’s objective nature and towards its 
malleable, subjective nature.  Manipulation of the environment is one trend that Williams 
and Smith offer to support their argument.  They paraphrase from Rowntree and Conkey 
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(1980), “The land and its resources have been appropriated…for the sake of an abstract 
vision of the way in which populations ought to relate to their environment” (Williams 
and Smith 1983:  512).  For nationalists, a core component of the environment is its 
social composition.  Williams and Smith note that since the 1700s, elites have increased 
their ability to manipulate their environment.  Population exchanges symbolize 
enterprises whereby national elites redefine the environment as a political territory and 
ethnic space, and whereby they can fulfill their abstract visions.  National elites employ 
population transfers to dictate how populations associate with their environment and to 
take advantage of political and social conflicts.   
Since the building block of every nation is its population, nationalists must find a 
way to justify their actions to reshape the environment.  One such justification is 
primordialism, a theory of nationalism that argues that, like animals, humans are 
biologically determined to define their territory and protect it against harmful strangers.  
Gottman writes, “Civilized people…[have] always partitioned the space around them 
carefully, to set themselves apart from their neighbors” (Mach 1993:  172).  Gottman is 
offering us at least two insights on primordialism.  First, primordialists propose that 
humans are biologically wired (the idea being that “it is in our blood”) to preserve and 
gain land.  Second, if we extend this argument to the nation-level, primordialism implies 
that the nation is historically rooted in one place and one place only. 
Similarly, Ratzel’s late 19th century organic theory of the state gives useful 
background to understand how nationalists might rationalize land acquisition and 
expansion.  Ratzel, a German political geographer, envisioned boundaries as living 
membranes and states as living organisms capable of expansion and contraction.  A 
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competitive intrastate atmosphere could necessitate expansionism.  To stay strong, 
superior cultures could conquer inferior cultures.  Ratzel’s organic theory is relevant to 
the CEOPBGT because it was organized by Europeans influenced by early 20th century 
nationalist discourse stressing that the nation could create the homeland, and by rhetoric 
claiming that the world was engaged in a perpetual struggle for land (Kaiser 2001:  7-8). 
 
0.3.2. Ethnonationalism and Exclusion 
Since ethnicity often fuels national movements, ethnonationalism is undoubtedly 
a potent form of nationalism.  Indeed, Hennayake writes that almost all nation-states 
practice majority ethnonationalism, a process that can intensify when decline or demise 
resulting from internal/external forces threatens the majority nation.  In this way, national 
security becomes increasingly defined in global terms.  For Smith, ethnonationalism 
artificially constructs an ethnonational identity to bind individuals to a chain of memories 
spanning several generations, and to a place through those memories.  Usually, 
ethnonationalism associates a specific land to an ethnic homeland.23  For 
ethnonationalists to structure an ethnonational identity, they must first define themselves 
according to a particular land.  Ethnonationalist assertions to a particular ethnic homeland 
also become a mode of cultural organization.  Conflict often becomes entrenched in the 
ideology of homeland, especially when ethnic minorities reside within a state that is 
striving for ethnic homogeneity.  Population transfers, by reconstructing social space as 
                                                 
23 The Turkish word for motherland/fatherland is vatan.  As Lewis points out, “Vatan is a Turcicized form 
of watan, a classical Arabic word meaning place of birth or residence.  A man’s vatan might be a country, a 
province, a town, or a village, according to context” (1961:  328).   
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national territory, seek to eliminate this conflict and solidify ethnonational identity.  As 
Lewis says about Atatürk, 
 
[Atatürk’s purpose] was to teach the Turks that Anatolia – Turkey – was their true 
homeland, the centre of their nationhood from time immemorial, and thus to hasten the 
growth of that ancient, intimate relationship, at once mystical and practical, between 
nation and country that is the basis of patriotism in the sovereign nation-states of the 
West (1961:  354).  
      
Although there may be positive aspects to the ideology of a homeland (e.g. benign 
attachment to a land), ethnonationalism can be highly negative in that it seeks exclusive 
rights to a particular land. Group A has its own land and Group B may have its own, but 
Group A’s land is for Group A alone.  Ethnonational territoriality is a socially 
constructed process that partitions space into “our” land versus “their” land.  
Ethnonationalists mythologize their attachment to the land through contested terms as 
homeland, fatherland, motherland, native land, sacred land, Promised Land, sacred soil, 
and so on (Connor 1986:  16).  Ethnonationalists present history in a way that best serves 
their ethnonationalist interest, for they argue that they alone should control the homeland, 
their nation’s geographic birthplace.  Malkki suggests that ethnonationalists perceive the 
homeland and the nation as a big genealogical tree, whereby it is “impossible to be a part 
of more than one tree” (1992:  438).  The tree metaphor posits the idea of territorial 
rootedness.   
Ethnonationalists employ mechanisms of separation whereby they can 
successfully territorialize space.  For instance, maps employ artificial borders and 
boundaries in the process of ethnonational territoriality to distinguish between one’s own 
land and that of others.  To this end, Paasi cites the social construction of borders and 
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boundaries as a factor strengthening state territoriality, “Enmity creates and sharpens 
group boundaries and serves to mobilize the members of a group so that they become 
aware of their ethnic or national unity” (1996:  51).  Ultimately, Paasi offers at least two 
points relevant to population exchanges.  First, ethnonationalism typically identifies 
ethnonational identity and its construction with state boundaries.  Second, modern nation-
states have heavily invested trying to make territorial markers appear natural when in fact 
they are dynamic and historically contingent.  The motivation for ethnonational 
territoriality among indigenes derives in part from a wish to solidify national boundaries 
and establish a new golden era for current and future members of the nation.  The nation, 
according to ethnonationalists, cannot afford to leave its destiny in the hands of 
“outsiders,” so the nation must restrict who can live within its state boundary and 
exercise political power.  Ethnonationalists bestow upon themselves alone the power to 
territorialize.   
Paralleling discourse about ethnonationalism, population exchanges can be 
perceived as a method to procure a land for a particular ethnic group.  Population transfer 
hence encourages nationalists to insist that nations dominate their own “homelands.”  
According to Kaiser, “The nation’s sense of spatial identity provides the historic 
justification for the development of a nationalistic ‘sense of exclusiveness’ regarding the 
indigenous nation’s standing in its own homeland” (1994:  21).24  The point about 
exclusivity is critical to understand how ethnonationalists validate population exchanges 
                                                 
24 Consequently, population transfers articulate a sense of common fate and encourage international 
separation alongside intranational cohesion.  Kaiser, in discussing the conditions that activate ethnonational 
territoriality, writes that a primary catalyst is the perceived threat posed by non-indigenes toward the 
security of the homeland.  Population exchanges, by “unmixing” the populations, seek to address this 
challenge against the homeland.  Population transfers thus advance ethnoterritoriality, and visa versa 
(Kaiser 1994:  21). 
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in the name of promoting peace.  Though the point may be obvious, it is worth stressing - 
The hallmark of population exchanges is separatism.  “Unmixing” the populations 
supposedly creates amity, both within and between nation-states.   
 
0.3.3. Nations and States  
As I mentioned in the “Land” section, population exchanges specifically endorse 
an ethnonational elitist agenda.  Not surprisingly, politicians and diplomats sent by 
government leaders generally settle all legalized population transfers.  Thus, at one level, 
a population exchange can be defined as an ethnonationalist movement generated 
primarily from above against local minority populations.   
A bilateral international population exchange, such as the one Lausanne endorsed, 
engages and concerns two nations (hence the term “bilateral”).  International law assumes 
that nations, like individuals, have inviolable rights.  Within a population exchange, 
ethnonational elites treat nations as inherently real entities.  To this end, Brubaker cites 
primordial, modernist, and constructivist literature on nationalism that view nations as 
individuals or actors that have the capacity for collective and coherent action.  However, 
Brubaker himself sees nations as representative of a dynamically changing “category of 
practice” (1997:  15).  To imagine the nation as real, nationalists employ the powerful 
myth of political independence and self-determination.  National self-determination, as 
embodied in Wilson’s famous “fourteen-point” speech, holds that every distinct group of 
people has the right to sovereignty and autonomy.  An ethnicity-focused interpretation of 
self-determination suggests that national entities be vested within a particular ethnic 
community.  Consequently, by citing the principle of self-determination, ethnic groups 
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may justify their struggles for territorial sovereignty and radical demographic changes 
(i.e. population exchanges, ethnic cleansing, genocide, etc.).  
Elites typically incorporate national elements into the state’s dominant ideology.  
Every state is a part of the international system of states, and each state has intranational 
and international policies that constitute its hegemony.  The state may use population 
transfers as a form of territoriality on the international scale.  According to Paasi, “It is 
internationality that creates a world in which the maintenance of armies and weapons 
appears to be natural and where the arts of violence are regarded as the summit of human 
solidarity” (1996:  41).   
The combination of the nation and state, the nation-state, is widely accepted to be 
the only viable unit of political rule and the core element in contemporary international 
politics.  Nationalists claim that the nation-state’s strengths are internal and external 
political, social and economic cohesion.  Others completely disagree, claiming that the 
nation-state has practically no virtues at all.  Take, for instance, Noam Chomsky’s words 
in an interview, 
 
Well, in my view what would ultimately be necessary [for global political 
emancipation] would be a breakdown of the nation-state system – because I think that’s 
not a viable system.  It’s not necessarily the natural form of human organization; in fact, 
it’s a European invention pretty much.  The modern nation-state system basically 
developed in Europe since the medieval period, and it was extremely difficult for it to 
develop:  Europe has a very bloody history, an extremely savage and bloody history, with 
constant massive wars and so on, and that was all part of an effort to establish the nation-
state system.  It has virtually no relation to the way people live, or to their associations, or 
anything else particularly, so it had to be established by force.  And it was established by 
centuries of bloody warfare (Mitchell and Schoeffel 2003:  314).     
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0.3.4. Power 
As mentioned earlier, a cardinal feature of population transfer is separatism, 
whereby national elites distinguish themselves from the transferees.  Separatism is built 
into the network of social institutions and power, as ethnonationalists generally practice 
separation and exercise power consciously and systematically.  Power, as the feminist 
Marilyn Frye puts it, is a double-edged sword.  First, power is about access, “Differences 
of power are always manifested in asymmetrical access.  Total power is unconditional 
access; total powerlessness is being unconditionally accessible” (Kolmar, Bartkowski 
2000:  285).  This phrase is a smart one and relates well to the method of population 
transfer, in which transferees are unconditionally accessible to politicians and leaders.  
The other side of power is the ability to name terms and define experiences.  The 
powerful are often the people who do the defining.  A minority ethnic group, due to 
isolation and powerlessness, cannot simply label themselves differently and make that 
definition stick at a political level.  Importantly, Frye thinks there is nothing “natural” 
about institutional power – it instead represents a socially constructed arrangement of 
patterns of access.  Similarly, Michel Foucault’s understanding of power rests in deep-
seated yet artificially constructed mechanisms of discipline and self-surveillance.  
Foucault sees power as polymorphous and “located everywhere” (Kolmar, Bartkowski 
2000:  44).  A population exchange, through Foucault’s perspective, can be viewed as an 
ultimate form of control used by elites against a civilian population.  Foucault would 
probably say that population exchanges make individual agency futile because the 
existing patterns of power in institutions and throughout the social body are too strong for 
an individual to overcome.   
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0.3.5. Identity 
One may talk about a multiplicity of identities:  of ethnic group, nation, family, 
race, gender, religion, class, region, and so forth.  It is useful to generalize, however, that 
people construct their identities as a relation to something (e.g. an array of groups, scales, 
places, etc.), based upon the interplay of difference and unity.  For instance, on the 
national scale, each nation is defined by its relation to other nations.  As mentioned 
earlier, Paasi is concerned with the construction of socio-spatial identities.  His basic 
claim is that all identity is boundary making, that the notion of identity is inseparable 
from geographical, cultural, and social boundaries (and thus inseparable from the process 
of “othering”).   
In the process of social contact, a group often accepts its own identity as 
constructed by its partners, especially if these partners are stronger in economic, political, 
or cultural relations (Mach 1993:  8).  Almost always, unusual social contact - created for 
example by the movement of certain persons to a foreign land - may cause the formation 
of a group identity on a level that previously did not exist.  Mass movements can thus 
fully marginalize individual identity (accordingly, Foucault believes that individual 
intentions and motivations count for little/nil in the scheme of social reality.  For him, 
individual identity is a social construct grounded on a discourse far beyond individual 
control) [Kolmar, Bartkowski 2000:  234].       
In this paper, I want to consider what happens to identity when Group A perceives 
Group B as a threat to Group A's culture, existence, or critical interests.  Conflict often 
helps to define the images of groups in absolutist terms:  good versus evil, civilized 
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versus primitive, and so on (if it helps, think of President George W. Bush’s diction when 
discussing the “war on terrorism”).  When referring to ethnicity, for instance, the process 
of "othering" may involve labeling others in biological terms:  a “pollution on homeland 
and nation,” “dirt,” “vermin,” and the like.  Of this exclusionary terminology Sibley 
writes, “Spaces which are homogenous…can be termed pure in the sense that they are 
free from polluting elements and the purification of space is a process by which power is 
exercised over space and social groups” (1992:  114).  Sibley, who is concerned with the 
outsider’s social construction, says that nationalists perceive the minority group as being 
beyond the boundary of society.  The point is critical because the “other” can define who 
or where the ethnic majority is not.  Exclusion is both social and spatial.  Likewise, Paasi 
notes that it has been common to construct representations of national identities by 
“depersonalizing” the members, in other words, by assuming stereotyped collective 
features that are common to all members of a group.  Stereotypes are simplified beliefs 
that are discursive and dynamic, “Stereotypes are time and space specific and can change 
drastically during periods of change in economic and political conditions” (Paasi 1996:  
60).  
 
0.3.6. Displacement   
The ‘”function” of land can depend heavily upon the movement of persons to new 
places.  The motives and conditions creating this movement play central roles in 
identifying how people adjust to a foreign land.  Significantly, Mach (1993:  177-184) 
raises seven conditions that he thinks may favor migration and settlement.  First, 
similarities between the old and new land (e.g. a familiar natural landscape, vegetation, 
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topography, culture) diminish the sense of alienation that migrants might feel upon 
arrival to their destination.  Second, migrants may benefit from entering a new territory 
and sensing that others have not previously culturally organized it.  Otherwise, the 
migrants must first assimilate to the new community in order to adapt to the foreign land.  
Third, migration and settlement are facilitated if the established people are willing to 
accept the newly arrived.  If this acceptance occurs, then the newcomers will make a 
considerable effort to assimilate.  Fourth, a successful migration makes the migrants feel 
that the new land is their legal property.  Fifth, migrants need to feel that the new living 
arrangement is stable and permanent.  The sixth factor favoring a successful migration is 
dissatisfaction with former living circumstances, the idea being that a lack of emotional 
attachment to the former land would help a person to enjoy their new living conditions.  
Thus, many successful migrations occur when groups of people, motivated by economic 
reasons, migrate to another community and assimilate. 
  The final condition reflects the above six conditions and is crucial to 
understanding the differences between voluntary and forced migrations.  The seventh 
factor favoring a successful migration and settlement is that the migrants choose to move.  
A voluntary migration improves the migrants’ capacity to demonstrate creativity and 
adapt to different circumstances in the new land.  Mach puts forth this condition 
cognizant that it is often difficult to feel at home in a foreign land, despite how and why 
the movement occurred.  He stresses that a successful migration hinges upon the 
migrants’ ability to reconfigure their identity within a foreign territory.  Even if 
haphazard living conditions coerced the migrants to move away, under a voluntary 
decision the migrants would be more willing to reconstruct their life in a new land.  A 
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fulfilling voluntary movement suggests that the people are prepared and willing to leave 
their old land. 
By using Mach’s framework, therefore, I contend that compulsory displacement 
severely distorts a migrant’s sense of homeland, security and identity, and I seek to test 
this hypothesis based on the narratives of migrants in chapter 2.  I aver that terms such as 
“displacement,” “dislocation,” or “deportation” better reflect the nature of a forced 
movement than solely the term “migration.”  McCarthy underscores the severity of 
forced displacement, “Deportation is an act of desperation.  In war, it can only be 
justified in the most perilous circumstances, because it punishes so many of the innocent” 
(1995:  289).  Under a forced migration, people are ill prepared to rearrange their lives in 
a foreign place.  Compulsory movements inhibit choice - they usually force migrants to 
settle in a land that they have not chosen, whereas migrants are more likely to choose 
their destination under voluntary migrations.  Choice is meaningful to the migrant on 
numerous grounds.  One important reason is that if people are unable to choose where 
they live, they might feel repressed by external, superior forces and perceive the new land 
as alien and hostile.  Choice empowers migrants - under a compulsory exchange, they 
might suffer from prolonged culture shock and remain passive and indifferent to the new 
environment.25  
                                                 
25 Barutciski (1998:  15) argues that the issue of voluntary or compulsory exchanges is divisive not 
necessarily because the issue is whether people should be forced to leave their homes, but whether the 
expellees should be permitted to return to their original homes.  This is because in most population 
exchange agreements, people have already evacuated their homes by the time elites sign the international 
treaty concerning the exchange (as in the Lausanne population exchange).  For instance, Barutciski cites 
that while Germans were supposed to officially be transferred to Germany following the Potsdam 
Conference of July 17 - August 2, 1945, most Germans had already been systematically banished from 
their homes prior to the conference.  Therefore, Barutciski’s point is that the controversy lies in the 
permanency of a compulsory population exchange, which becomes an affront to individual rights and 
human security. 
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Malkki, who has studied refugee migration stemming from ethnic conflict in 
Rwanda, examines traditional and nationalist ways of thinking about identity and 
displacement.  According to Malkki, nationalists often view culture as a “territorialized” 
concept - nationalists tend to believe that people without land are “people without 
culture.”  Malkki goes on to connect nationalist notions of nation and the territorialization 
of identity to the concept of sedentarism.  Sedentarism is powerful and appealing to 
nationalists because it neatly divides the world into practical spatial units of control.  
Since refugees and migrants defy sedentarism, the term “displacement” often gets a 
negative connotation, “Our sedentarist assumptions about attachment to place leads us to 
define displacement…as an inner, pathological condition of the displaced” (Malkki 1992:  
443).  Popular discourse often sees displacement as a negative event, as though 
homelessness is somehow characteristic of a lack of morality.  
  Feelings among diasporas about homeland and identity vary tremendously.  Since 
each diaspora must be placed within its proper historical context and examined at 
different scales, I think it is difficult to attach a theoretical significance to displacement 
and diaspora.  If I may generalize, however, I would venture that transfer makes 
transferees feel “out of place” upon resettlement.  Leaving home and being subject to the 
nationalization and territorialization of identity in a new land can intensify feelings of 
confinement and encourage de-territorialization and re-territorialization.  This ebb and 
flow is directly associated with the notion that a population living in diaspora experiences 
a “stretched-out” sense of homeland.  By setting up similar local homelands and local 
places in the new settlement, diasporas are attempting to recreate the old homeland.  
Migrants weigh the traditional homeland against the contemporary homeland, as 
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networks of social relations connect both homelands.  Furthermore, I want to note that 
territorialization and identity formation depend not only on the diaspora, but also on the 
host society and environment.  The more welcoming the host society, the more likely the 
diaspora will experience a decreased sense of homeland towards the place of origin and 
participate in homeland-nationalism. 
 
0.4. Final Remarks 
At its simplest level, my goal in the theory has been to explain and then challenge 
the statist, state-centric and nationalist perceptions of security and population transfer.  
On the security issue, I have offered CSS as a means to counter the traditional security 
framework and to generate a more complete understanding of security.  While I do 
acknowledge that the concept of human security needs to be better defined, perhaps more 
narrowly, to neglect wholesale the individual dimension of security is ethically 
reprehensible.  Turning a blind eye to grave human security dilemmas, as was the case 
for instance in Rwanda and East Timor, perpetuates global insecurity.  Casting aside 
human security as too broad, elusive, immeasurable and hence unworkable (as do many 
realists and neo-realists) is indolent and nonsense.  Human security must be a 
fundamental goal.  The mission is honorable, timely and worth taking because human 
security seeks to protect all social groups (ethnic minorities, children, women caught in a 
war-town area, etc.) from persecution and death (Acharya 2001:  3).  It is paramount to 
not restrict ourselves to traditional conceptions of security such as national independence, 
arms development and territorial integrity.  While these are significant, notions of 
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security must also include threats such as forced migration, poverty and disease.26  I 
concur with Paris (2001:  102) that the concept’s strength rests in its inclusiveness and 
holism, and I agree with Acharya (2001:  3) that the human security ethos is not 
antithetical to non-Western societies.  Differences about certain principles within the 
notion of human security, or definitions about what exactly constitutes human security, 
are reconcilable and worth the undertaking.  As the late 19th century British philosopher 
James Allen put it, true success is measured by the effort put into a particular task, 
however difficult attaining the desired goal may be.      
True security, in my view, can only be achieved only after fundamental needs of 
humans (food, clothing, shelter, freedom from direct threat, etc.) are secured.  Taking this 
humanist perspective as my starting point, I firmly believe that human security is both an 
individual and a collective duty.  Human security should be built from both the top-down 
and the bottom-up.  Furthermore, human security and state security should not be 
dichotomous concepts.  Yes, human security does require a shift away from overly state-
centric dogma, and yes, it also necessitates an overcoming of obstacles that the state 
poses towards human security.  That all said, I do believe that human security does not 
suggest a complete supplanting of national/state security.  Ideally, they are mutually 
reinforcing.  Indeed, to protect its people and thus to help ensure human security, I feel 
that the state must be strong and be actively involved in social processes.  I do not 
advocate a full withering-away of the state because I think the relationship between the 
state and the individual is integral.  Ayoob (forthcoming:  28) misreads the position of 
                                                 
26 For instance, a global human security framework has the mighty potential of creating a potent political 
coalition by restructuring North-South relations and resuscitating the World Bank, IMF and UN to 
increasingly focus on human development. 
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many human security proponents – in my view, most of these advocates often do not 
want a “weak” or “ineffective” state.  Some states are better at providing security than 
others, but few states are completely useless in this endeavor. 
Critics of my paper might say that the concept of human security, having gained 
steam in the 1990s and thus essentially a post-Cold War subject, has little or no 
applicability to 1922-1923, the time of my case study.  Studying 1922-1923 in the context 
of human security is an anachronistic endeavor, they may assert.  Critics might claim that 
it is unfair and unreasonable to transplant contemporary notions of international norms 
into a period when these norms had not yet been codified in international law.  It can be 
argued that back in 1922-1923, international law did not fundamentally proscribe forced 
displacement, for the prevailing notion of human rights in international law was codified 
only in specific treaties and was thought of as a collective (rather than individual) issue.27   
Moreover, skeptics may make a fatalistic argument, pointing to the upsurge of 
nationalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries as creating an inevitable basis for action in 
1923.  Put in this way, elites had no choice but to opt for population transfer in the 
aftermath of war.  
 These are some important questions (there may be others, of course) that I think 
need to be addressed.  While comparing the present with 1922-1923 does constitute an 
anachronism of sorts, I do believe that my case study has considerable relevance for CSS 
and the idea of human security.  First, I see an overlap in content between the post-Cold 
War era, as expressed through the concept of human security, and 1922-1923.  The post-
                                                 
27 As support of this argument, Meindersma (1997:  347) writes, “No system of general application for the 
protection of minorities existed at the time of the League [of Nations].”  Whatever protection did occur was 
almost exclusively the concern of state (as opposed to individual, societal or international) actors. 
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Cold War era witnessed an upsurge of nationalism and ethnic strife, and a restructuring of 
the existing order of international power.  These were major reasons why certain scholars 
believed traditional modes of thinking about security needed to be adjusted.  Likewise, 
1922-1923 was a period of incredibly heightened nationalism, ethnic conflict and 
migration and, only two to three years after WWI, a time of drastic change in the 
international political arena.  Given such a massive transformation in the early 20th 
century and so many intriguing parallels to the post-Cold era, I argue that IR scholars 
should examine the various causes and effects of the project of nation-building, a concept 
that fueled both WWI and the 1923 CEOPBGT.  After all, the insistence upon state-
centric notions of security began not with the Cold War, as some mistakenly claim, but 
rather much earlier - with the origins of the state and the nation and later the nation-state.  
History matters.  Critical Theory looks extensively into history, beyond the present post-
Cold War period, to bolster claims for the need for individual emancipation.  Early 
Critical Theory scholarship on the Holocaust is one such example.28  The 1923 
CEOPBGT should be another.    
Finally, I believe it is imprudent to claim that notions of fundamental human 
rights did not exist in 1922-1923 and, therefore, that ethnonational elites could treat their 
citizens as strategic pawns.  While I do agree that international norms are more concrete 
and widespread now than they were eighty years ago, it is worth remembering that the 
idea of respect for human rights arguably extends to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia (which 
                                                 
28 The founders of Critical Theory were German Jews in the 1920s and 1930s who were forced to flee 
Germany due to Nazi persecution.  
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erected the modern state system),29 and conceivably much earlier.  The conception of 
“rights” dates back to the founding of the modern democratic state and, again arguably, 
Western liberal ethics.  Furthermore, the idea of basic safety for people can be found in 
many places – some examples include the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906, the 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the founding of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross in the 1800s (Hampson et al. 2001:  16-25).  Turkey and Greece created 
the Lausanne agreement within the backdrop of existing European norms and rules.  
Many European delegates (from France, England, Italy, etc.) were present at Lausanne, 
and the League of Nations took official records of the negotiations.  Thus, Greek and 
Turkish elites were undoubtedly aware of notions of central human norms.  It is within 
this foundation that I assert that ethnonational elites at Lausanne had the legitimate 
choice of prioritizing individual security, but instead chose not to do so.          
Related to the topic of securitization, I have also established in the theory a 
framework to understand how population exchanges conceptualize notions of nation, 
homeland and identity.  Ethnonationalists assume fixed ideas of homeland, and ethnic 
movements (such as that created by a population exchange) often originate from a 
contested homeland.  By separating peoples, a legalized population transfer legitimizes 
the nation-state under the guise of self-determination.  In the final analysis, I maintain 
that we should consider a population exchange as an ethnonational, elitist and security 
discourse, which carries historical, institutional, and social structures of categories, 
beliefs, and terms.       
                                                 
29 Note the irony:  the formal recognition of human rights "coincided" with the emergence of the modern 
state system, a source of incredible anguish for human security.   
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In the theory, I had argued that territorial expansion and subsequent migrations of 
people to different places inevitably causes changes to perceptions of ethnic identity.  
Ethnic identity has three components:  how the group views itself, how outsiders view the 
group, and how the two views strike a medium (Andrews 1989:  19).  A large-scale 
forced migration of ethnic “others” can exacerbate ethnonationalism and ethnic othering, 
which in turn can foster feelings of disconnection and isolation among the displaced.  To 
this end, in my theory I briefly discussed Mach’s conditions of migration (in no particular 
hierarchy of importance) within his generic theoretical model.  My goal here was to tease 
out key differences between voluntary and forced migrations and to examine why and 
how these differences are important.  My case study, by examining the forced transfer of 
Muslims, can be seen as serving as a test case of Mach’s conditions.  Finally, I looked at 
the significance of terms associated with displacement in order to shed additional light on 
the impact of population transfers on the transferred.   
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CHAPTER 1:  ANALYZING THE LAUSANNE CONVENTION 
AND TURKISH NATIONALISM 
 
 
In chapter 1, I essentially examine how Turkish national elites helped to construct 
the CEOPBGT.  Rather than analyze how all the different delegations at Lausanne 
approached the CEOPBGT, in this section I focus on the language of the Turkish 
delegation and the views of Turkish nationalists (when needed, however, I do refer to the 
Greek delegation and the Allied delegations).  I want to keep the discussion focused 
mainly on expressions of Turkish nationalism (and less, say, Greek nationalism or the 
nationalist tendencies of the Allied powers) mainly because in chapter 2, I explore the 
migration of Greek Muslims to Turkey and examine how transferred Muslims responded 
to elite-based nationalization and territorialization attempts within Turkey.          
I proceed in six sections.  First, in order to provide historical context for the 
CEOPBGT, I offer a very brief background to the exchange.  Second, I succinctly explain 
what the Lausanne Convention was.  Third, I characterize the Turkish rationale at 
Lausanne regarding the population transfer.  Fourth, I present a textual analysis of article 
1 of the Lausanne Convention.  Fifth, I examine how Turkish nationalists perceived the 
implications of the Lausanne Convention.  Sixth, I offer some concluding remarks.   
 
1.1. A Brief Background to the CEOPBGT  
Before the Balkan wars (1912-1913), World War I (WWI, 1914-1918), and the 
Greco-Turkish war (1919-1922), the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire hosted a relatively 
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peaceful environment within which ethnic Turks and Greeks coexisted. 30  Indeed, the 
Ottomans had allowed the existence of Christian denominations since the beginning of 
their empire.  According to McCarthy, “no particular attempt was made to integrate the 
members of each religion into a ‘nation’… Christians might eat the same foods, live in 
the same-style dwellings, even speak the same language as the Muslim Turks, but they 
worshipped and believed separately.  The Ottomans received little credit for their long 
and unique tradition of religious toleration” (1995:  7).  As the multiethnic Ottoman 
Empire began decline in the 1800s, former Ottoman provinces in Eastern Europe began 
nationalizing and gaining Ottoman territory.  The creation of modern nation states 
persisted into WWI.  One major consequence of WWI was that treaties were frequently 
used to divide conquered territories, as political leaders increasingly invoked the principle 
of national self-determination.  Once such treaty, the Treaty of Sèvres (August 20, 1920), 
permitted Greece to push into Anatolia.  This treaty, however, was annulled a year after 
the Greek army imprudently began a battle campaign with Turkish forces in the interior 
of Anatolia and began to kill Turkish locals.  Mustafa Kemal Atatürk led a national 
liberation movement that countered and suppressed these foreign interventionist 
elements.  He perceived that the Republic’s future rested in Turkey's sovereignty within 
Anatolia, not in Turkish irredentist claims against neighboring countries such as Greece 
(Schechla 1993:  246).  Turkish forces eventually pushed back Greek armies and 
                                                 
30 İzmir was a city that captured the Ottoman theme of ethnic coexistence.  İzmir was an economically 
advanced, cosmopolitan Western Anatolian city with a minority Greek population that lived in considerable 
affluence.  While most Muslims worked in agriculture or in the civil service, Orthodox Greeks 
predominately controlled commerce and the services sector. 
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penetrated İzmir and Eastern Thrace, regaining areas where a sizeable minority Greek 
population lived.31   
The rout of the Greek army in the summer and fall of 1922 created a massive 
Greek Christian evacuation from Turkey, whereby Atatürk oversaw (but, as Stanford 
Shaw notes, did not directly order) the exodus of roughly one million Anatolian Greeks 
onto Greece’s shores. 32  In I was Sent to Athens, Morgenthau wrote of the 1922 exodus, 
“If ever the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse rode down upon a nation it was when this 
appalling host appeared upon the shores of Greece, that was trampled by the flying hoofs 
of their chargers and scourged by the spectral riders of War, Famine, Pestilence, and 
Death” (1929:  49).  The sheer number of Anatolian Greek refugees must be underscored, 
for by November 1922 Greece was mired in a humanitarian crisis that sparked emergency 
international assistance.  Over 80% of all the Greeks from eastern Thrace and Anatolia 
had already entered Greece by November 1922 (Yıldırım 2002:  141).  Moreover, most of 
İzmir was destroyed by fire, much of western Anatolia was in ruins at the end of the 
Greco-Turkish war, and losses were considerable on both Turkish and Greek sides.  
Diplomatic measures were hence needed to confront this ruinous de facto situation.   
 
1.2. What the Lausanne Convention was 
                                                 
31 For a thorough account of the Greco-Turkish war, see Stanford J. Shaw’s five-volume book From 
Empire to Republic:  The Turkish War of National Liberation: a Documentary Study (Ankara:  Türk Tarihi 
Kurumu, 2000). 
  
32 My grandmother, Bedriye Kalayoğlu, recalls well as a young girl how the Rum departure created 
tremendous sadness in her town of Isparta. 
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After the Greco-Turkish war, the Greek and Turkish sides were asked by the 
Allied states of Italy, France and Great Britain to attend an international peace conference 
in Lausanne, Switzerland on November 13, 1922.  Sponsored by the League of Nations, 
which was represented by Fridjof Nansen, the High Commissioner for Refugees, the 
peace talks lasted from November 20, 1922 to July 24, 1923 (leaders at Lausanne did 
suspend the conference, however, from February 5, 1923 to April 23, 1923, due to 
disagreement over several issues).  The official list of participant countries at Lausanne 
was Turkey, Greece, Great Britain, Italy, France, Romania, Japan, and the Kingdom of 
the Serbs, Slovenes and Croats (Yıldırım 2002:  65).  Beyond Lausanne’s main peace 
treaty, which included 143 articles, the conference encompassed one agreement, four 
declarations, six protocols, a Final act, several explanatory letters and five special 
conventions (Koufa, Svolopoulos 1991:  280).  One of these conventions was the 
“Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations.”  This 
convention ratified and endorsed the CEOPBGT; therefore, the Lausanne Convention is 
our chief concern.33   
Signed on January 30, 1923, the Lausanne Convention comprised an international 
bilateral agreement between Turkey and Greece and served as the initial annex of the 
Lausanne Treaty (Yıldırım 2002:  43).  It created the exchange of most of the Greek 
Orthodox population in Turkey and most of the Muslim population in Greece.  Before the 
                                                 
33 In chapter 1, I focus on the Lausanne Convention, not the Lausanne Peace Treaty.  This differentiation is 
key because the Lausanne Peace Treaty raises issues (territorial definitions, reparations, etc.) that this paper 
does not directly address.  While both the convention and the treaty had underlying images of the 
relationship between homeland and nation, I am only examining the CEOPBGT and its consequences 
because this frame of reference best relates to the overall phenomenon of forced migration, one of the main 
topics of my thesis (Hirschon 1998:  4). 
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Lausanne Convention began, 1,100,000 Greek refugees from Anatolia had arrived in 
Greece and 32,511 Muslims living in Greece had landed in Turkey.  Under the auspices 
of the Lausanne Convention, between 1923-26 an additional 189,916 Anatolian Greek 
Christians moved to Greece and 355,635 Muslims transferred to Turkey (Meindersma 
1997:  346).34  
Leaders divided the Lausanne negotiations into three main commissions, and each 
commission was presided over by a delegate of one of the three Allied powers:  France, 
Great Britain and Italy.  Between December 1, 1922 and January 27, 1923, the Territorial 
and Military Commission was presided over by Lord Curzon, the leading British delegate 
and Britain’s foreign minister from 1919-1924.  This commission was the chief 
commission at the Lausanne Conference, and it was responsible for debating the merits 
and nature of an exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey (Yıldırım 2002:  
68).  Delegates from both Greece and Turkey were national elites representing their 
respective nationalist governments - General İsmet Paşa (handpicked by Atatürk) of 
Turkey led the Turkish delegation, and Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos of Greece 
led the Greek delegation. 
 
1.3. The Turkish Delegation’s Rationale during the Negotiations   
The Turkish delegation was from the outset in a relatively precarious position.  
İstanbul was still under Allied occupation in late 1922, and the Allies were basically 
                                                 
34 The Lausanne Convention was essentially treated as a minor part of the Lausanne Conference.  The issue 
of population transfer received less attention by Turkish nationalists than questions regarding the status of 
the straits, national borders, the Mosul question and the issue of capitulations.  For example, during the first 
two months of the Lausanne peace talks, only once did the Turkish Parliament discuss the topic of an 
impending population exchange (Aktar 1998:  10-11). 
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united in their goals at the negotiation table.  They believed that since they had won 
WWI, they were entitled to dictate diplomacy and formulate the peace terms with Turkey 
regarding the areas of former Ottoman rule.  The Allies averred that the Turks should 
have a conciliatory attitude.  To add to the Turks’ difficulties, Venizelos was a skilled 
and experienced politician who enjoyed close ties in European diplomatic circles (despite 
Greece’s traumatic defeat during the Greco-Turkish war and subsequent economic 
chaos).  Moreover, in 1922-1923 public opinion in Europe and the US opposed the idea 
of a compulsory population exchange (and, for what it is worth, I would imagine that 
public opinion world-wide continues to oppose population transfer right up till the 
present).  Many abhorred the idea that leaders would take it upon themselves to forever 
exchange some of their own citizens without consulting the citizens involved.  In theory, 
international public opinion might impede a process of “unmixing” and nation-building.  
However, such was not the case at Lausanne.   
 While the Greeks and Turks disagreed about many of the details of a population 
transfer (e.g., the status of the Patriarchate in İstanbul, the liquidating of properties, etc.), 
both delegations supported the general idea of forced displacement.  This raises the 
question:  who first proposed the idea of a population exchange?  Was it the Greeks, the 
Turks or the Allies?  The truth is that, given the immense controversy surrounding the 
population exchange, the different sides of the Territorial and Military Commission tried 
to evade responsibility of proposing the notion.  Ultimately, the question is elusive and 
requires an exhaustive examination of the historical documentary record.  I therefore do 
not want to discuss the question here in detail.  Suffice it is to say that the notion of a 
population exchange had been raised at different times by both the Turks and the Greeks 
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stemming back to the Balkans wars, and that Nansen’s diplomatic efforts made the 
population exchange a reality.35   
I believe that a much more pertinent question to a discussion of nationalization 
and securitization is:  who supported the idea of a compulsory population exchange, and 
why?  All three parties – the Allies, the Greeks and the Turks – supported the concept 
mainly because they believed there was little alternative.36  Lord Curzon, essentially the 
spokesperson of the Allied position, said he preferred an obligatory exchange because he 
feared a voluntary exchange would create a strenuous and lengthy process.37  Venizelos 
consented to Curzon’s “pragmatic” arguments and endorsed a compulsory movement 
because, in his mind, the immediacy of the Anatolian Greek refugee crisis in Greece 
necessitated a firm and irreparable reaction, i.e., the expulsion of Muslims from Greece to 
Turkey.38 
                                                 
35 Different scholars cite different people regarding the proposal of the exchange.  See Yıldırım (2002:  73-
79) and Dark (1998:  15-19) for an examination of the origins and nature of the population exchange 
debate. 
   
36 As Hirschon (2003:  6) rightfully notes, altogether contradictory trends regarding the concept of 
population transfer were at play in Lausanne.  On the one hand, Turkish and Greek elites expressed an 
idealistic vision of nationhood and peace.  On the other hand, to achieve such a “vision,” these elites used 
realpolitik justifications and worked behind the scenes to maximize pragmatic gains.  
    
37 Time, in Curzon’s view, was crucial for two reasons.  First, he wanted the Muslim and Christian farmers 
to migrate as soon as possible so that they might till the soil early in the year and contribute to their 
respective economies.  Second, a quick population exchange would better ensure Greece’s accommodation 
of the mass refugees pouring in from Anatolia.  While his reasoning has some merit, Curzon did have 
underlying intentions for a population transfer.  I suspect that, vis-à-vis a massive relocation of minority 
populations, Curzon’s ultimate motive was to establish a new world international order, with Great Britain 
and the Allies on top (Meindersma 1997:  340-341).   
    
38 Since roughly 400,000 Muslims lived in Greece at the time of late 1922, the rationale was that if these 
Muslims moved to Turkey before all the Greeks were evacuated from Turkey, then there would be a better 
chance of adequate housing for the incoming Greeks.  Winter was approaching in 1922, and the problem of 
housing was even more acute than the problem of feeding the refugees.  As Venizelos explained it, “The 
Lausanne Convention is not really a convention for the exchange of Greek and Moslem populations and 
properties, but rather a Convention for the departure of the Muslim population from Greece, because the 
Greeks were driven out from Turkey.  That is a real fact.  What the government must do for the refugees is 
 51  
 
Like the Greeks and the Allies, the Turks wanted a compulsory population 
exchange, but for different reasons.  The Turkish delegation’s motives are rooted in the 
Turkish nationalist world-view of 1922-1923.39  For Turkey’s nationalists, the period of 
1922-1923 was, despite its many hardships, essentially a major success since it came on 
the heels of the victorious War of Independence.  Seen in this light, İsmet İnönü wanted 
at Lausanne to use the Greco-Turkish victory to bolster Ankara’s credibility among 
Turkish public opinion and within international diplomatic circles.  İnönü believed that 
since the Turks had won the Greco-Turkish war and had pushed the Allied powers out of 
Anatolia, they should be held at the least on an equal diplomatic footing with the Allies 
and the Greeks.  İnönü’s opening remarks at the Conference displayed this desire.  Here, 
and not infrequently throughout the Lausanne Conference, İsmet Paşa provided a 
condensed history of Turkey’s war of national liberation and repeatedly referred to 
Turkey’s suffering population.  He said Turkey would defy the Ottoman Empire’s 
capitulatory agreements and would seek “a homogenous, unified homeland; within it, 
freedom from the obligations imposed by foreigners and from privileges of a nature 
                                                                                                                                                 
to divide among them the existing property available in Greece” (Ladas 1932:  465).  Given Greece’s 
immense social and economic problems in late 1922, therefore, Venizelos sought an expulsion of Greece’s 
Muslim population (thereby conveying his endorsement of a population exchange).   
 
39 By 1922-1923, heightened nationalism had altered the relationship between Muslims and Christians in 
the Aegean Basin and Anatolia and created much controversy regarding interpretations of the Greco-
Turkish war.  Hirschon has looked at how many citizens of Turkey and Greece look back upon the events 
of 1922-1923 completely differently.  She calls this phenomenon an “asymmetry of experience” (2000:  4).  
As I mention in my text above, the Turks generally view 1922-1923 as a major nationalist success.  In 
contrast to the Turkish experience, many Greeks call the period between 1922-1923 the “Asia Minor 
Catastrophe,” a defeat comparable or even larger than the defeat at Constantinople in 1453.   After 1923, 
Greek nationalists could no longer realistically hope to attain a Hellenic empire in Anatolia, known as the 
Megali Idea.  In the words of Petropulos, Venizelos had to “go out of his way to demonstrate that Greece 
would no longer be a disruptive force in the Near East as an exponent of Greek irredentism” (1976:  142).  
Hirschon notes that the 1922 uprooting of Greeks did not create a sense of repatriation for these people 
since Anatolia constituted their homeland.  Rather, the forced movement of Greek Christians from Anatolia 
to Greece was an exodus to a foreign land (Hirschon 2000:  2).  
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creating a state within a state” (taken from Yıldırım 2002:  60).  This quote has 
underlying meaning.  One of the Turkish nationalists’ goals at the Lausanne Peace 
Conference was to create a collective cultural identity vis-à-vis a shared memory of 
Turkish independence and common destiny.  With the conclusion of the Greco-Turkish 
war, Atatürk could finally make the homeland accessible to all ethnic Turks, “delivering” 
Anatolia to its rightful owners.  Atatürk desired a public Turkish culture, and the Anadolu 
“homeland” was to be a powerful unifying symbol for displaced Turks worldwide. 
Atatürk could achieve his nationalist vision with a political victory at the 
Lausanne conference.  His practical aims were to solidify Turkey’s borders within the 
boundaries created by the 1918 Mudros armistice and ensure the state’s freedom from 
foreign intervention (Hirschon 2003:  9).  The implications of Atatürk’s desire for 
geographical consolidation are worth noting.  Take the following quote, for instance.  
Speaking on behalf of Atatürk, İnönü had argued after the Greco-Turkish war had ended, 
“Turkey has been reduced today to the lands on which only Turks reside.  In the same 
way that Greeks in Marseille would not think of establishing a Greek country in 
Marseille, the same applies for the Greeks and Armenians who have chosen to stay in 
Turkey” (Özel 1993:  47).  This image – that Greece is where Greeks live, Turkey is 
where Turks live, and that is the way it is – promotes a conventional and homogenous 
world map of nation-states.  Such a worldview had caught on like wildfire in the 
aftermath of WWI.  For Turkish nationalists, Anatolia was to become a recognizable, 
fixed geographical entity on a map, something Turkish citizens all across the world could 
regard as their home and revere.  The idea was that those non-members remaining in the 
homeland have “chosen” to stay and they, therefore, must accept the “reality” that ethnic 
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homogenization entails.40  Turkish nationalists believed that in order to create national 
security and national sovereignty, the emerging Turkish nation-state required a removal 
of “hostile” minority populations.  As I mentioned earlier, Turkish elites were fixated 
upon the idea that the Republic of Turkey be free from irredentism, be it economic, 
political or social.  This Turkish nationalist apprehension of being “enslaved by 
foreigners” is a theme that is crucial to reflect upon, for it has been a dominant feature of 
Turkish foreign policy and national security discourse right up until the present day.41   
Though most of international public opinion opposed the idea, that the method 
population transfer was a “viable” solution to Turkey’s question of minorities was a 
position enthusiastically supported by most of the Turkish public (as expressed in major 
rallies and in newspapers) and by many members of the Turkish parliament, who spoke 
of non-Muslims as heavily contributing to Ottoman deterioration (Yıldırım 2002:  111).  
Many Turkish parliamentarians said that Greek mercenaries repressed innocent Muslim 
civilians in Macedonia, Crete and Thrace (especially Western Thrace) throughout the 
Greco-Turkish war, and that many religious/ethnic minorities had sought to destroy the 
                                                 
40 Turkish and Greek ethnonationalists were enforcing what Gupta and Ferguson call a “difference of 
places” (1997:  47). 
   
41 With its repeated references to national sovereignty and self-determination, the Turkish National Pact 
(Misak-i-Milli) of January 28, 1920 is a text that guides Turkish foreign policy.  It explicitly stated that the 
Turkish nation opposed capitulations and privileges that would imply any sort of differential treatment.  
Therefore, an important offshoot of these ideas in the text is economic nationalism, a type of rhetoric 
popularized during the government of the ruling Committee of Union and Progress (CUP).  The CUP elites 
essentially favored Muslim businessmen and enterprises over non-Muslim ones, the idea being that Turkish 
economic freedom would be assured once ‘troublesome’ minorities and Ottoman capitulations were 
overcome.  External provocation was to be denied and stifled.  (At Lausanne, however, the Allied powers 
and Venizelos criticized the Turkish delegation regarding its economic nationalist stance.  They observed 
that Anatolia’s Christian population had made formidable economic contributions to Turkish society.  
İnönü, while recognizing that Anatolia’s non-Muslim population had indeed been a valuable asset to the 
Ottoman economy, replied that non-Muslims were not altogether superior in the economic sphere and, 
significantly, that Turkey needed to sacrifice some of its foreign elements for the sake of the nation-state).  
    
 54  
 
“spirit” of the Turkish nation.42  Atatürk himself expressed his desire that the idea of a 
population exchange be discussed at the conference (Yıldırım 2002:  106).  Ultimately, 
pressure from civil society and nationalist currents from the state undoubtedly influenced 
and helped to “securitize” the Turkish jingoist position at Lausanne regarding non-
Muslims and the exchange.  
The historical record shows that the Turks arrived at Lausanne wanting to forbid 
the already-expelled Rums to return to Turkey, and to expel the “leftover” Rums in 
Turkey to Greece.  They jockeyed on this jingoist objective at the negotiation table.  On 
December 12, 1922, İnönü expressed his concern during the negotiations that minority 
populations might be used as pawns of foreigners that promote sedition.  İnönü noted that 
in the past the Great Powers had often used non-Muslim minorities as an excuse to 
interfere in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire.  The remaining Greeks of 
İstanbul constituted such a pretext of interference.  Given the fact that some of the Rum 
minority population and the Patriarchate had collaborated with the occupying Greek 
armies during the Greco-Turkish war, the Turkish delegation believed that the remaining 
Greeks in İstanbul were a potent national security threat to the Turkish nation.  Hence, 
İnönü declared Ankara’s desire to transfer all the Anatolian Greeks to Greece, including 
the Greeks of İstanbul (Yıldırım 2002:  110-113, 117-119).  
With these December 12 comments, İnönü had provoked the ire of the members 
of the Territorial Commission, Lord Curzon especially.  On December 13, İnönü slightly 
revised his previous speech and narrowed the scope of his argument for a population 
exchange.  What was so contentious?  On the issue of the Greeks in İstanbul, the Allies 
                                                 
42 Turkish elites saw non-Muslims (gayri-Müslim) as constituting an obstacle to the nation-building project, 
which had gained tremendous momentum and popularity in the Balkans by the end of WWI.   
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had persistently demanded that they be excluded from the exchange.  Both the British and 
American public kept a watchful eye on the issue, as many news articles in England and 
the US criticized the Turkish position on the Greeks of İstanbul.  The official reason 
Venizelos gave for wanting to keep the Greeks in İstanbul was that so many Greek 
refugees had already entered into Greece in the fall of 1922 that there was no way for the 
Greek government to take in the 100,000 plus Rum population from İstanbul.  The more 
significant reason, as Oran (2003:  99) notes, is that Venizelos would have a 
tremendously difficult time selling the idea to the Greek public that the Greeks in İstanbul 
were expelled.  İstanbul was “the Second Rome” and the seat of the Holy Phanar Rum 
Orthodox Patriarchate.  Seen in this light, İstanbul was incredibly symbolic for both the 
Greek state and the Greek Orthodox Church, and “losing it” in full vis-à-vis the transfer 
of the Greeks from İstanbul to Greece would signal the destruction of the Megali Idea.   
On December 12, Curzon proposed the following:  should the Turkish 
Government allow for the Greeks Orthodox population to remain in İstanbul, then the 
Greek government would not expel the Muslims of Western Thrace.  The Muslims of 
Western Thrace thus became a bargaining chip for Venizelos and İnönü, who both 
accepted Curzon's proposal.  By giving in to the Greeks and Allies on this contentious 
issue, İnönü was able to facilitate discussion in his favor on some of the other aspects of 
the population exchange.  Nonetheless, İnönü did have to compromise on one other 
important issue pertaining to the population exchange:  the status of minorities.  
Interestingly, the Allies pressured the Turks on this matter on the basis of the pre-
conditions of the Mudanya Armistice (which declared the end of the Greco-Turkish war) 
and the Turkish National Pact.  These texts both averred to grant rights to minorities upon 
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declaring allegiance to the Turkish state.  Take the National Pact, for instance.  Written 
during war time, the National Pact stated in article five that the Turkish government 
would determine the rights of minorities in Turkey on the basis of treaties settled between 
the Entente powers and their adversaries.  Given this wording, Turkey was asked by the 
Allied powers at Lausanne to sign a minority treaty with the League of Nations, which 
would imply that Turkey was conforming to the principles of the League of Nations on 
the minority issue.  The Allies insisted that the Turks honor their agreements and 
international law regarding the definition of minority rights.  Feeling intense Allied 
pressure at the conference over this “minority matter,” İsmet Paşa announced that the 
Turkish Government would indeed honor article five of the National Pact and would 
eventually join the League of Nations (which it did in 1932).  Ultimately, by pledging an 
allegiance to the League of Nations, İnönü placated the Allies on the issue of minorities 
and facilitated the dynamics of the discussions at the conference (Yıldırım 2002:  121-
123, 139).   
 
1.4. Article 1 and the Problematic Wording of the Convention 
The Lausanne Convention, written in French and entered into force August 25, 
1923, the date of its ratification, consisted of nineteen articles and a protocol (see 
Appendix A for the full text of the convention).43  Briefly, the convention defined who 
the transferees were, it laid out the conditions for transferring property and compensation, 
and it created a Mixed Commission to oversee the emigration and property liquidation 
                                                 
43 The transfer remains, to take Barutciski’s words, “an example of perhaps the crudest expression of state 
power over the individual” at an international scale (1998:  10).  
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(Hirschon 2000:  3).  Article 1 is the main feature of the Convention, for it outlines those 
subject to the compulsory displacement.44  Those included in the exchange had to leave, 
nor could they return to their homes.  They had no choice in the matter, 
 
As from 1 May 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish 
nationals of the Greek orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek 
nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory.    
These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the 
authorization of the Turkish Government or of the Greek Government respectively 
(Appendix). 
 
According to the text, the key political factors determining exchangeability were 
religion and nationality.  The chief religions were Islam and Orthodox Christianity, and 
the chief ethnic nationalities were Turkishness and Greekness.  Article 1, at best, 
reflected “idealized” notions of identity.  The title of the Convention, “Concerning the 
Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations,” lends itself in my view towards banal 
nationalism - that Greeks living in Turkey move to Greece, and Turks in Greece move to 
Turkey.  Bernard Lewis explains that a dilemma of identification pervades the wording of 
article 1,   
 
What took place was not an exchange of Greeks and Turks, but rather an 
exchange of Greek Orthodox Christians and Ottoman Muslims.  A Western observer, 
accustomed to a different system of social and national classification, might even 
conclude that this was no repatriation at all, but two deportations into exile - of Christian 
Turks to Greece, and of Muslim Greeks to Turkey (1961:  348-349). 
                                                 
44 Of course, article 1 is not the only important article of the Lausanne Convention.  Indeed, each article is 
significant in its own way.  Some of the more noteworthy articles include article 2 (which exempted from 
exchange most of the Orthodox population of İstanbul and most of the Muslim population from Western 
Thrace), article 3 (which stipulated that Muslim and Greek Orthodox populations who had left Turkey and 
Greece since October 18, 1912 were prohibited from returning to their homes under the exchange), and 
articles 8-10 (which described the conditions of property transfer).  Given the scope of this thesis, however, 
I want to basically only consider article 1 and its implications.        
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 Article 1 created a distorted and vague characterization of religion and 
nationality, thereby engendering controversy among diplomats at the Lausanne 
Convention.  Two examples of debates at the Convention illustrate this contention:  the 
Turkish claim over the meaning of Greek Orthodoxy, and questions over the status of 
Albanian Muslims in Greece.  By going through these debates, I seek to provide insight 
into the impact of underlying factors such as ethnonational and religious territoriality that 
pertain to article 1 and the CEOPBGT.          
First, the interpretation of Greek Orthodoxy sparked intense debate between 
Turkish and Greek delegates.  The question was whether religion should be interpreted 
literally equivalent to faith, or whether it should incorporate national elements.  The 
Turks argued for a literal, faith-based interpretation of the Greek Orthodox religion.  
They considered all persons of Greek Orthodoxy as potential transferees (i.e. all 
Russians, Syrians, Armenians, Arabs, etc. of the Greek Orthodox religion living in 
Turkey).  This view has epistemological grounding in the Ottoman millet system, an 
administrative structure that characterized identity in terms of religious affiliation 
(Hirschon 2003:  8).  According to Ladas, a scholar of the CEOPBGT, Atatürk’s 
intentions were not to exchange a particular religious group, but rather to remove persons 
potentially supporting Greek irredentism and other forms of separatism in Turkey (1932:  
379).45  
                                                 
45 Indeed, Lord Kinross says of Atatürk’s fierce nationalism, “To the patriotic Turk, the expulsion of the 
foreigner from his doorstep availed little without his expulsion from within his house” (1965:  408).  
Nonetheless, Atatürk’s fears of Greek irredentism were not necessarily unfounded, for scholars estimate 
that one and a half million Anatolian Turks had been expelled or had died in the region of Greek 
occupation during the Greco-Turkish war (McCarthy 1995:  303).    
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On the other hand, the Greek delegation opposed a massive influx of people into 
Greece.  They argued that Russians, Armenians, etc. had no affiliation with Greece - only 
those persons that were Greek as well as Orthodox (hence Greek Orthodox), they said, 
should be potential exchangees.  The Greeks contended that an all-encompassing notion 
of religion would have contradicted Lausanne’s bilateral spirit to remove each other’s 
national minority group.   
Who won the debate over the interpretation of Greek Orthodoxy?  Ultimately, the 
neutral delegates sided with the Greek delegates, claiming that only Greek members of 
Greek Orthodoxy were to be exchanged because only they had a “Hellenic 
consciousness” (Ladas 1932:  382).  But this claim itself is still too vague, leaving much 
room for interpretation.  As a result of article 1’s lack of clarity, nationalists in Turkey 
continued to loosely interpret the term “Greek Orthodox religion” to characterize all 
populations of orthodox faith.  Moreover, the rest of the Sub-Commission on Minorities 
did side with the Turkish delegation on the point that “non-Muslim” (gayri-Müslim) was 
an appropriate term to categorize minority populations living in Turkey. The Turkish 
delegation designated the term “non-Muslim” to categorize the Anatolian Greek Christian 
population to be exchanged (Yıldırım 2002:  186).  Rıza Nur, a member of the Turkish 
delegation, was especially adamant that “minorities” be referred to as “non-Muslims.”  
The Turkish delegation did not want Muslim groups in Turkey such as Circassians, Arabs 
and Kurds to be granted national minority status based on language or ethnicity.  The 
Turkish delegation hoped to diminish ethnic status.    
The case of the Albanian Muslims in Greece underscores the dilemma of 
ascertaining a national consciousness.  Throughout the negotiations, the Turkish 
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delegation designated the Muslim population to be transferred as both “people of Islam” 
(ahali-i Islamiye) and “Turkish” (Türk), using these terms interchangeably (Yıldırım 
2002:  186).  Unlike “Greek Orthodoxy,” the term “Muslim” has no national element.46  
Therefore, it was problematic that the Convention initially asserted that all Muslims in 
Greece had a Turkish national consciousness and should thus be included in the 
exchange.  In response, many Albanian Muslims living in Greece, specifically those 
residing in Epirus in northwestern Greece, claimed exemption from the transfer.  They 
felt, by and large, that their Muslim identity did not necessarily equate with a Turkish or 
Greek identity, but rather with an Ottoman and/or Albanian identity.  To determine 
Albanian identity, the Lausanne Convention’s Sub-Commission chose place of birth as 
the main criterion.  By and large, only persons who proved that they were born in Albania 
were said by the local authorities to be exempted from the exchange.  As it was, 
birthplace became an index of origin, whereas crucial cultural artifacts such as language 
and tradition were seen as of lesser importance.  The result was that some ethnic 
Albanians living in Greece, simply because they were born there, were transferred to 
Turkey.  Others, to be sure, were granted a special status vis-à-vis bilateral agreements 
between the Turkish and Greek delegations during the second part of the Lausanne 
Conference (Yıldırım 2002:  191).  Thus, with Lausanne there was a misuse of the term 
“Muslim.”  The Muslim population in Greece suddenly had to migrate to a place where 
they were assumed to feel ethnically affiliated, just because they were Muslim and the 
                                                 
46 Like “Greek Orthodox,” the phrase “Greek nationals of the Muslim religion established in Greek 
territory” could also be viewed as ambiguous - it could apply to Arabs, Bosnians, Serbs, Romanians, and 
other coreligionists established in Greece who have no ethnic affiliation with the Turkish nation-state.  
Indeed, due to the loose definition of the religious criterion, Pomaks (Slavic-speaking Muslims) and Cretan 
Muslims (who hardly knew any Turkish) were subjected to exchange.  For a more detailed discussion of 
the Albanian Muslims of Greece, see Ladas pp. 384-390 and Yıldırım pp. 190-192.  
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emerging Turkish state was (and is today) predominantly Muslim (Ladas 1932:  384-
390).  
To reiterate:  article 1 privileged religion over elements such nationality, 
ethnicity, language or race.  Both the Turkish and the Greek delegations agreed that 
religion was the safest way to distinguish ethnic groups in the multi-ethnonational 
Eastern Mediterranean region.  In Ladas’s analysis of the use of religion, “Religion was a 
safe criterion less as a demarcation between the followers of two different faiths than as a 
sharp dividing line between two ethnic and to a certain extent political entities” (1932:  
378).  What this means is that delegates sought to use religion as an instrument to 
determine a person’s national consciousness.  Put bluntly, religion determined national 
identity.  As Hirschon (2003:  8) rightfully observes, an acceptable alternative criterion 
for exchange could have been language, which, under the very terms of the CEOPBGT, 
would have prevented Turkish-speaking Christians from leaving Anatolia and Greek-
speaking Muslims from leaving Crete.  Overall, Andrews believes that both Greek and 
Turkish delegations were effectively misled because their labeling distorted the identity 
of ethnic groups,   
 
Categorisation…can so easily lead to misattribution.  The authorities responsible 
for the population exchanges based on the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 made religion the 
sole criterion for the allocation of communities, with absurd results.  Greeks in Turkey 
who had become Protestant or Catholic were denied permission to leave, on the grounds 
that they were not Orthodox, while a group of Orthodox Arabs in Cilicia were expelled to 
Greece; long negotiations were required to prevent the mass deportation of Albanian 
Muslims from Greece, and of Orthodox Rumanians, Bulgars, and Yugoslavs from Turkey 
(1989:  30).   
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That the Lausanne Convention was compulsory meant that those in power, not the 
locals but the elites, got to decide religious (and subsequently national) affiliation.  
Lausanne, without taking into account the wishes of the persons affected, determined 
who was a Greek Orthodox, who was a Greek Muslim and who was neither.  In this 
sense, nationalists at Lausanne took on the power to redefine identity and subsequently 
reconstruct the meaning of “minority.”  The convention also created an us/them 
framework:  the national elites became the superior subject that could dictate policy with 
impunity, whereas the migrants and refugees became inferior objects - pawns to be 
moved and traded at the mercy of the nationalist will.   
In looking at why such an exchange occurred, Koufa and Svolopoulos mark a 
conflict of identity,    
  
If one looks for the underlying reason which led Greece and Turkey to the 
compulsory exchange, it appears that this act was intended to resolve a problem that was 
growing constantly more acute, in that the two nations, while implying completely 
different methods to cope with it, were both moved by a mutual concern to attenuate the 
centrifugal trends inside them and to assist the process of national integration.  More 
specifically, almost half a millennium of Greek Orthodox and Turkish coexistence within 
the Ottoman Empire had all the characteristics of the juxtaposition of two different 
national identities (1991:  277)  
 
 Koufa and Svolopoulos recognize that a major source of the problem was the 
politicized clash between what it means to be Turkish and what it means to be Greek.  
Through objectification, the Lausanne Convention used religion and nationality as a 
pretense to deconstruct the transferees’ identities upon transfer (i.e. perceiving persons as 
tradable objects), and then to reconstruct those identities upon resettlement.  (Article 7 
deals with this reconstruction of national identity, saying that immigrants would 
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automatically get the nationality of the country of their destination.  Upon arrival to that 
country, they would lose the nationality of the country that they were leaving.  Persons 
who had already departed were to obtain the nationality of the country of destination on 
the date of the signing of the Convention).  As it was, one major implication of the 
CEOPBGT was that a few national elites took on the authority to determine the 
nationality of roughly one and a half million people, creating sources of confusion for the 
migrants regarding their identity.47  İnönü, Curzon and Venizelos all fell into the 
nationalist conceptual trap of oversimplifying identity politics.  Take, for instance, 
Venizelos’s speech to the Greek Parliament in June 1930 regarding his reasoning behind 
the population exchange, 
 
I sought…an agreement with Turkey on the following basis:  let it recognize the 
cessation of the islands to Greece and I would agree…to advise a part of the Greeks in 
Turkey, whose presence in Turkey was considered as dangerous by the Turkish 
government, to consent, if possible, to exchange their homes in return for those of Turks 
in Greece (taken from Aktar 2003:  83).   
  
Venizelos is reducing ethnic affiliations to just “Greek” and “Turk.”  The 
underlying implication of this nationalist message is that, under the 1923 CEOPBGT, 
transferees were essentially “repatriating” to their homeland.  This was not the case at all.  
As I will consider in depth in chapter 2, a considerable number of the “Turks” of Greece 
that Venizelos is referring to spoke hardly a word a Turkish upon their forced migration 
                                                 
47 Arı notes that some Rums remained in Turkey by changing their nationality, or came back to Turkey 
through foreign passports (1995:  87). 
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to Turkey, and they often did not “feel at home” in Turkey for several generations after 
their transfer.48 
   
1.5. How Turkish Nationalists Viewed the Consequences of the Lausanne 
Convention 
 
Atatürk transformed Anatolia, taking the decrepit Ottoman Empire and turning it 
into a modern Republic.  According to most (Turkish) history texts, Atatürk “liberated” 
Turkey by pushing out the Greek Army.  For example, the Turkish Ministry of Culture 
writes, “Lands of the country which had been under occupation of the enemy for years, 
suffering slavery and torture, were freed…the victory was the greatest reward of success 
to the Turkish nation” (Özel 1993:  9).  The Turkish Ministry of Culture also provides a 
powerful sense of how many Turkish nationalists perceived the consequences of the 
Lausanne Convention, asserting that, 
    
[The Lausanne Convention] brought an end to the difficulties of the two groups 
living together and ensured peace and calm…with this contract being put into force, 
Anatolia became free of Greeks and unity and solidarity was established as part of the 
prerequisites of a national state [italics mine] (Özel 1993:  52). 
 
This nationalist text portrays “Greeks” and “Turks” as two ethnic groups that live 
in complete opposition to one another.  Ethnonationalism operates as such.  One problem 
with a socially constructed dichotomy is that it inherently negates opportunities for 
successful ethnic/national affiliation with more than one country.  A positive definition of 
                                                 
48 Hirschon also underscores that the CEOPBGT did not result in a sense of repatriation for the migrants.  
She says regarding the Orthodox Christians of Anatolia who were expelled to Greece, “the exchange was 
experienced as a harsh exile, and was expressed through decades of yearning for ‘lost homelands’ after 
their relocation to Greece” (2003:  8).   
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“Turkishness” rests on the negation of “Greekness,” which gets portrayed as antithetical 
to it, and vice versa.  Turkish and Greek nationalists have historically depended on binary 
oppositions relative to a particular history to promote their agenda.  By ridding Anatolia 
of followers of Greek Orthodoxy, Turkish nationalists saw themselves as doing the 
Turkish nation-state its biggest favor.  This is the type of ethnonationalist mindset that 
prevailed at the Lausanne Convention.   
  Examples of Turkish nationalist rhetoric regarding the CEOPBGT are abundant.  
Take, for instance, İnönü’s words in a speech in İstanbul after the Lausanne Convention, 
“The primary motive for this desire for national independence is the sense of rebellion 
felt against our invaders [italics mine]” (Özel 1993:  75).  Since İnönü represents a 
powerful political figure, his nationalist rhetoric goes relatively unchallenged and 
becomes the Turkish status quo.  The public then conventionally perceives a “Greekless” 
Anatolia as a necessary precondition for a unified Turkish nation-state - unity is ensured 
only when the “invader” is battled and defeated.  İnönü’s comments about invaders, 
probably directed against the Greek army, can become easily misconstrued among the 
public as representing all ethnic Greeks.  (Undoubtedly, the same effect can occur in 
Greece among Greek nationalist politicians when they discuss Turkish “invaders.”  For 
instance, in a time of economic and national chaos, Muslims in Greece became 
scapegoats and were viewed by Greek leaders as obstructing a purely Greek and 
independent Greece).   
Many Turkish nationalists after Lausanne defined identity as static, the idea being 
that if one is born a Turk, one will always be a Turk no matter where he or she resides  
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(Atatürk’s nationalist vision was based on citizenship).  In his speech in İstanbul, İnönü 
pushes this static nationalist theme,  
  
Even if we separated and went our own way in the world, each one of us would 
come together like a colony of ants, uniting towards a major and purposeful nation.  This 
is a peculiarity of our nation.  Our nation has acquired this asset.  This is what brings us 
success (Özel 1993:  76).  
  
To ground and collectivize place and identity, the nation distinguishes itself by 
playing up its own “unique” virtues.  Here, İnönü is saying Turkey is unique and superior 
in that Turks are well equipped to answer the call of the nation and lay down their lives 
for its cause.  With regard to the Lausanne Convention and the subsequent CEOPBGT, 
many Turkish nationalists perceived the Muslims in Greece, though they spoke little to 
no Turkish, to be included in such a “sacrifice” for the sake of the Turkish Republic.  Not 
surprisingly, therefore, many Turkish nationalists claim their involvement in Lausanne 
had in mind only the best intentions for humanity.  The Turkish Ministry of Culture 
writes, “[The Turkish nationalists’] wish was for all humans to live together in universal 
harmony, friendship, and solidarity” (Özel 1993:  52).   Nationalists view a welcoming 
environment to be one where people are separated and reside in their “proper” country.  
Turkish nationalists felt that Muslims migrating to Turkey resulting from the CEOPBGT 
would not impinge an emerging Turkish national identity, but rather become a part of it.  
Consequently, with Lausanne and the birth of the Turkish Republic, borders were 
redrawn and Atatürk dominated over a predominantly homogenous (ethnically and 
religiously speaking) population.  To this end, one could make the argument that the 
Turkish delegates at the Lausanne Convention idealized the “Anadolu homeland” to be an 
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unchanging continuity stretching back into a distant past - indeed, as far back as the 
diffusion of Mongols to Anatolia.  Under this nationalist interpretation, Brown sees 
Lausanne in a favorable light, “The unyielding attitude of the Turks at Lausanne is not 
difficult to understand:  in fact, it commands considerable sympathy and respect” (1923:  
292).  With the formation of the Turkish nation-state, nationalists could fully realize and 
consolidate Turkey’s distant past. 
It is revealing that a July 2003 video documentary on NTV called The Eightieth 
Year of Lausanne (Lozan’ın 80. Yılı) provides only scant information about the 
CEOPBGT.  The documentary, which contains interviews with scholars such as Prof. Dr. 
Baskın Oran, Prof. Dr. Erdal İnönü and Prof. Dr. Zafer Toprak, provides an altogether 
nationalist picture of the Lausanne Conference.  The fifty-six minute video delves into 
certain issues (e.g. capitulations, the Mosul question, the Turkish Straits, Ottoman debts) 
in relatively good length, but it is lacking when it comes to issues such the CEOPBGT 
(indeed, the CEOPBGT clip is less than three minutes total).  In the few sentences about 
the CEOPBGT, all that really gets discussed is the fact that Greek and Turkish 
delegations debated over the meaning of minority, and that since Turkey won its war of 
national liberation it sought to impose its own definition of minority.  The documentary 
passes the judgment that the CEOPBGT was altogether a good thing for the security and 
health of the Turkish nation.  Nothing gets said in the video about the plight and the 
security of the transferees.  Yıldırım (2002:  330) puts it well, “Like many historical 
developments behind the making of the Turkish nation-state, the Exchange could not 
secure itself a place in the newly written biography of the Turkish nation.  The new 
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political leadership tended to "forget" many historical occurrences that they considered 
irrelevant or potentially threatening to their national project.”     
 Before I conclude chapter 1, I think it might be important to ask:  was there 
significant intra-national contestation in Turkey around the time and in the aftermath of 
the Lausanne Convention?  Did Turkish nationalists resist Atatürk’s vision; did Turkish 
nationalists have different versions of the idyllic Anatolian homeland?  Aktar provides a 
glimpse of the Turkish Parliamentary debates surrounding the CEOPBGT.  Based on his 
work (among others), I contend that Atatürk’s vision in 1923 was the predominant 
nationalist vision.  Atatürk was a strong authoritarian leader.  On the whole, what Atatürk 
said in Turkey, İnönü and the other delegates did and argued for at Lausanne.  Aktar 
makes it clear that most Turkish parliament members were unanimous in their support of 
a population transfer.  The main contention in parliament was, rather, between what I 
simplify as mainstream Turkish nationalism (Kemalism and Republicanism are two 
variants of this) and ardent Turkish nationalism (pan-Turkic sentiments, etc.).  For 
instance, extreme nationalist Hamdullah Suphi Bey criticized the lack of a linguistic rule 
in the articles of convention.  His fear of the settlement of Greek Muslims in Anatolia and 
the subsequent infiltration of the Greek language exemplified xenophobia, 
 
 They settled the Greek speaking masses right across the sea from the islands.  A 
grave mistake!  Soon, when peace truly reigns and if relations between the islands and 
our shores pick up and the Greek islanders and the Greek speaking masses reestablish 
contact, then it will be impossible to eradicate this foreign language (Aktar 1998:  12).         
  
 All I want to emphasize here is that the Muslims from Greece are made out to be 
“impure,” for “their” settlement in Western Anatolia would destroy ethnic and cultural 
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homogeneity in Turkey and generate pan-Hellenism.  This minority strand of Turkish 
nationalism did not win out.  Instead, the majority of the Turkish political elite in the 
1920s adopted Atatürk’s state policy, which endorsed that non-Muslim minorities 
essentially be left out of the Turkish national community.  The Muslims from Greece, by 
virtue of their religion, were to become Turkish citizens under the population exchange.  
In the context of the Lausanne Convention, the Turkish nationalist slogan of “Turkey for 
the Turks” highlighted a policy seeking to incorporate Muslims in Greece under the 
unconditional supremacy of Turkish ethnic identity.   
As an aside, to take issue with Atatürk’s nationalization project, I think a strong 
argument could be made that the appropriation of Greek Muslims into Turkey actually 
made Turkey more ethnically heterogeneous in the short term.  In the long term, these 
migrants became - like it or not - a part of the dominant Turkish public culture.  As I 
discuss in chapter 2, Rums had much more in common with ethnic Turkish Muslims than 
did the arriving Greek Muslims, (one could argue) simply because Rums and Turkish 
Muslims had coexisted in Anatolia for literally thousands of years.   
 
1.6. Final Remarks 
There is little doubt most nationalists in both Greece and Turkey endorsed the 
Lausanne Convention.  One question to ask, therefore, is what kind of consequences 
nationalism essentially produced.  The answer depends on one’s point of view; one can 
easily make positive and negative assessments of the Lausanne Convention.  The major 
positive assertion is that the convention put a symbolic end to the heavy conflict between 
Greece and Turkey in the aftermath of the 1919-1922 Greco-Turkish war.  Dark, 
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supporting this positive contention, sees the Turkish government as having acted in a 
pragmatic and responsible manner, 
 
The Greco-Turkish population exchange was not so much a creation of 
nationalism as a reaction to it.  The Turkish government and the international community 
sought the exchange to fulfill two goals:  to end the threat of Greek irredentism and bring 
peace to the region, and to provide a pragmatic solution to the refugee crisis.  The desire 
of Turkey to construct an ethnically homogenous Turkish nation, while evident in the 
negotiations, was secondary (1998:  24).     
 
Dark is inclined to believe that the Turkish removal of minority groups was a pre-
meditated response to Greek irredentism.  Thus, he believes the ends (two relatively 
“homogenous” nation-states, i.e., Turkey and Greece) justified the means (a compulsory 
exchange of populations).  Implicit in Dark’s explanation is recognition of what I 
describe as nationalism’s “two faces”:  On the one hand, nationalism can ensure security 
(depending, of course, on how a nationalist defines security); on the other hand, 
nationalism is exclusionary and has the potential to generate violent outcomes such as 
ethnic cleansing.   
In chapter 1, I contend that the CEOPBGT was both a creation and a product of 
nationalism’s “second face.”  Underlying factors directly associated with elite-based 
ethnonationalism spurred and drove the Lausanne Convention, which was itself the 
outcome of hurried diplomatic negotiations (Yıldırım 2002:  143).  To this end, in chapter 
1 I tried to expose some nationalist rhetoric and sought to present the emergence of 
homeland making as a dominant aspect of national identity formation.  I wanted to show 
how Turkish nationalists presented their arguments endorsing a transfer as “truths.”  
Assigned the position of objective knowledge, these “truths” served a powerful 
legitimating function because they seemed to be beyond dispute.  Without doubt, Turkish 
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and Greek nationalists effectively took on the authority to influence and manipulate 
minority populations.  In part, therefore, the Lausanne-endorsed population exchange 
exemplified what Smith says is “the dark side of nationalism, its capacity for division, 
destabilization, and destruction” (1995:  159).   
Following the breakup of the great Empires, Lausanne created strife for the 
transferees at the call of the nation-state by indiscriminately targeting whole communities 
for removal.  Brubaker provides an insightful review of the possible cause(s) of such a 
massive uprooting.  He describes war, fought under conditions of tremendous 
ethnonationalism, as the main thrust behind ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, 
  
To underscore the centrality of war to mass migrations of ethnic unmixing in the 
Balkans between 1875 and 1924 is not to suggest that it was as such responsible for these 
migrations.  It was rather a particular kind of war.  It was war at the high noon of mass 
ethnic nationalism, undertaken by states bent on shaping their territories in accordance 
with maximalist - and often fantastically exaggerated- claims of ethnic demography and 
committed to molding their heterogeneous populations into relatively homogenous 
wholes.  Not all wars entail the massive uprooting of civilian populations.  Wars fought 
in the name of self-determination, however, where the national “self” in question is 
conceived in ethnic rather than civic terms, but where the population is intricately 
intermixed, are likely to engender ethnic unmixing through migration, murder, or some 
combination of both (1997:  154-155). 
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CHAPTER 2:  THE GREEK MUSLIM MIGRATION AND 
SETTLEMENT 
 
 
In chapter 1, I gave an overview of the CEOPBGT and discussed the Turkish 
nationalist reasoning behind the exchange.  I now want to turn to the transfer itself.  In 
chapter 2, I examine the forced Muslim migration as a result of the Lausanne Convention 
in order to observe how settlement in a foreign land transforms a migrant’s sense of 
homeland and identity.  I want to demonstrate the extent to which the Muslim migrants 
identified Greece or localities within Greece as the homeland and Turkey as foreign 
territory.  I will show how the Muslim displacement was a construction of ethno-national 
“othering” and a deconstruction of human security.  I will examine the degree to which 
Muslim migrants were branded and viewed themselves as a community “out of place” 
from within and outside of Turkey.  Whereas I had considered primarily the views of 
political leaders in chapter 1, in chapter 2 the focus is on the perspective of the individual 
(i.e., the Muslim migrant).  The goal is to bolster my argument that human security 
essentially be privileged over state security.49  
I will proceed in five basic parts.  First, I will seek to define the term “Muslim” 
under Ottoman times and then briefly explain Muslim life in Greece before migration.  
Second, I give some facts regarding the Greek Muslim transfer.  Third, I outline 
important structural components regarding the Muslim transfer and the ensuing 
resettlement regime.  Fourth, and probably most significant for my purposes in this 
                                                 
49 Due to the limited scope of my thesis, I do not investigate the already well-researched 1922 Anatolian 
Greek Christian exodus and its role in the subsequent exchange.  I choose just to look at the Muslim 
transfer, and I refer to the Anatolian Greek Christian plight only when comparison of the two migrations 
clarifies key themes in my paper. 
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chapter, I survey different migrant narratives of the migration and settlement process.  
Fifth, I put forth some final remarks.  
 
2.1. Defining “Muslim” and Explaining Muslim Life in Greece before the 
Exchange 
 
If we are to truly understand the Muslim migrant experience and get a sense of the 
transferees’ identity/security crisis within Turkey in the post-exchange period, we must 
first grasp how Muslims in Greece identified themselves and lived in the pre-exchange 
period.  This task requires a brief examination of how Muslims were identified (and how 
they identified themselves) under the Ottoman Empire because the Ottoman legacy left a 
strong identity imprint on the Muslims in Greece.   
In its conception and early years, the Ottoman Empire contained religiously 
defined nations, or millets, within which each religious group enjoyed autonomy.  In the 
Empire, Greek and Armenian and Jewish millets were religious communities, not ethnic 
entities per se.50  Ottoman elites taxed and counted Ottoman nationals based on religious 
affiliation, overlooking ethnic divisions among its population (McCarthy 1995:  3).51  For 
the Muslim, a sense of brotherhood depended only on the Koran (i.e., not on country, 
race or language), as the universal Islamic community reinforced the cohesive social 
                                                 
50 Lewis writes, “The word millet, from the Arabic milla and perhaps ultimately of Aramaic origin, occurs 
in the Koran with the meaning of religion.  It was later extended to mean religious community, especially 
the community of Islam” (1961:  329).  For an account of millets in the Ottoman Empire, see Stanford 
Shaw’s two-volume History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge; New York:  
Cambridge University Press, 1976-1977).  
  
51 However, ethnic identity is still a significant consideration.  For instance, Muslim Turks, Muslim Kurds, 
and Muslim Albanians had different experiences in WWI and subsequently experienced different 
migrations. 
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nature of Islam.  An Ottoman became Muslim by declaring Muhammad as Allah’s 
Prophet.  Therefore, the ultimate marker of identity within the Ottoman Empire was 
religion (a point that I alluded to in chapter 1) in that it provided a framework for 
everyday life.     
A long history of Ottoman Muslim migration in the Aegean region preceded the 
CEOPBGT.  Ottoman elites continually encouraged Balkan Muslim immigration so as to 
enlarge their empire.  Immigration patterns during Ottoman decline indicate a trend 
towards identification vis-à-vis national identity.  Accordingly, when the Empire began to 
decline, immigration began favoring ethnic Turkish Muslims from the Balkans (Brubaker 
1997:  156).  Why did immigration become increasingly selective?  With nationalism’s 
upsurge in the 1800s and subsequent Ottoman deterioration, nationalist groups 
increasingly perceived Muslims as national enemies.  For instance, the 1821 Greek 
revolution killed over 25,000 Muslims (McCarthy 1995:  12).  The Balkan Wars 
especially dealt a significant blow to many Muslim populations in the Balkans, creating 
large-scale migrations to Anatolia.  As McCarthy writes, the concept of nationalism was 
threatening Muslim existence in the Balkans, “Creating a nation by expelling Turks and 
other Muslims was a principle that was to be followed by Bulgarians, Russians, and 
Armenians” (McCarthy 1995:  13).  Coupled with religion, nationality gradually became 
a hallmark of identity in the Balkans.   
Around the early 20th century, certain people within the Ottoman Empire began 
merging Muslim and Turkish elements.  They called themselves the Young Turks (there 
is abundant historical literature regarding this national identity transformation within 
Anatolia and its hinterlands, so I only want to scratch the surface here).  The Young Turk 
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regimes of 1908-1918 introduced programs that promoted the modernization of the 
Ottoman Empire and a new spirit of Turkish nationalism.52   Many of these young 
intellectuals still held on to their Islamic roots, but they were unmasking a new identity – 
a Turkish national identity.  To have a Turkish national identity meant you embraced the 
idea of an emerging Turkish nation, which was distinct from the Ottoman state.53  By the 
time of Lausanne, the concept of the Turkish nation-state was becoming a reality, as 
ethnonationalists in both Turkey and Greece fortified their efforts to exclude Christians 
from the Turkish nation-building project and Muslims from the Greek nation-building 
project.  
I want to consider this question:  since the transferees from Greece under the 
CEOPBGT were indeed Muslim, did Turkish nationalists hope that the task of 
Turkification – what I will call the attempt of incorporation and indoctrination of both 
internal and external elements into predominant Turkish public culture - would be 
simplified?  I think the answer is yes.  My sense of it is that Turkish ethnonationalists did 
not simply view the influx of the Muslims in Greece as a price to pay for getting rid of 
Anatolia’s Greek population.  Bringing in Ottoman Muslims from Greece vis-à-vis a 
population exchange, hence, can also be seen as an attempt by Turkish ethnonationalists 
of unifying the peoples of Islam and Turkey and thereby constructing a “great Turkish 
nation.”  Turkish nationalists in 1923 were very insecure about their identity.  Turks felt 
                                                 
52 This movement, coupled with the decline of the Ottoman Empire, fuelled the ideal of “Turan,” a vision 
of union of all ethnic Turkic groups in one state.  This vision by and large died out with the ultimate defeat 
of the Ottoman Empire. 
   
53 To be sure, most “Turks” in the early 1900s had no sense of what this emerging Turkish nation was to be 
like.  Lewis writes, “The Muslim Turks of Turkey might classify themselves as Muslims - by faith and law; 
or as Turks - by language and real or imagined descent; they had not yet thought of defining themselves as 
the people of a country - of Turkey” (1961:  346). 
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confused about their newborn Turkish nation and what it would stand for.  Interestingly, 
in many Turkish parliamentary discussions and within most Turkish national and local 
newspapers, the common discourse regarding the CEOPBGT was that the Muslims in 
Greece favored the idea of population transfer.54  (This is factually incorrect – most 
Muslims in Greece did not favor the idea.  The nationalist misinformation is almost not 
worth noting, because nationalists misinform and mislead all the time).  For instance, in 
July 1923 the Turkish newspaper Ahenk wrote, “Our brethren, a part of whose lives has 
been corroded and torn away with violence every day for many years, can no longer stay 
there.  They would not want to stay [in Greece]” (taken from Yıldırım 2002:  184).    
We should remember that many in Turkey in 1922-1923 were still loyal to 
religious and dynastic communities.  For instance, under Atatürk’s early rule religion 
designations appeared on official documents, identity cards, and the like.  Moreover, the 
designation “Türk” was commonly restricted to Muslims - other religious groups could be 
known as Turkish citizens but never as “Turks.”  As it was, whether they equated the 
migrants’ religion with being Turkish or whether they stereotyped the migrants as infidels 
because their home was not Anatolia, Turkish nationalist attitudes towards the Muslim 
migrants from Greece were fueled by their own insecurity of identity (Lewis 1961:  350-
351).  Despite Atatürk’s secular nation-building project, the idea that Muslim equals 
Turk, and that non-Muslim equals non-Turk, was comfortable.  Atatürk himself was said 
to have been a fairly religious man.  Turkish nation was to comprise the Muslim 
                                                 
54 Although, according to actual Muslim sentiment in Greece, this was by and large not the case since many 
Muslims of the CEOPBGT did not actually see Turkey as a “kin-state,” even though many other Muslims 
migrating to Turkey preceding the CEOPBGT may have. 
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population of Anatolia (keeping in mind, to be sure, that Atatürk resolutely wanted to 
abandon any pan-Turkist dream of expanding the Anatolian core itself).    
In the pre-exchange period, most Muslims in Greece spoke Greek and few spoke 
or wrote Turkish, and a strong argument can be made that these Muslims had, simply 
based on geographical proximity, culturally more in common with Christians in Greece 
than with Muslims or Christians in Anatolia.  Taking this claim for what it is worth, I 
hereafter call a Muslim inhabitant of Greece a “Greek Muslim,” “Ottoman Muslim from 
Greece” or sometimes just “Muslim” when appropriate.  I do not think it is wholly 
accurate to call the Greek Muslim migrants “Turkish Muslims” because they, technically 
speaking, were not Turkish until after they came to Turkey, officially lost their Greek 
nationality and gained Turkish citizenship.  It strikes me that most scholarship that I have 
looked at on the CEOPBGT misses this point.  I do suppose, however, that it might be 
accurate to call the Muslim migrants under the CEOPBGT “Turkish” either when we are 
referring to the migrants from Western Thrace, who by and large identified themselves as 
ethnically Turkish, or when we are specifically talking about the Muslim migrants after 
they came to Turkey, obtained their Turkish citizenship, and settled down in the 
country.55  At any rate, an important part of this thesis is ascertaining how the Muslims 
identified themselves and how they felt about leaving their homelands.  These themes are 
in themselves the true markers of human security.       
                                                 
55 Intriguingly, Andrews (1989:  372) raises the point that it is hard to clearly distinguish between Muslim 
immigrants from Greece (usually referred to as "Selanik expellees") and Greek-speaking Muslim 
immigrants.  This is because scholars are not sure if the language the Selanik expellees spoke was Greek.  
Having said this, for clarity I will generalize that all Muslims living in Greece had a working knowledge of 
the Greek language:  hence I use the ethnic group “Greek Muslims” instead of the ethnic group “Greek-
speaking Muslims.”  
 
 78  
 
Prior to the CEOPBGT, the Muslim population in Greece and their Greek 
Christian neighbors lived together peacefully, as the relationship was fostered over many 
generations under the Ottoman reign in the Balkan region.56  It is meaningful to note that 
within Greece, the Greek Muslim minority and the Greek Christian majority enjoyed 
equal protection under the law (Ladas 1932:  726).  Roughly 90% of the transferred 
Greek Muslims were cultivators and peasants (Meindersma 1997:  347).  Given their 
altogether simple yet decent and comfortable life in Greece, Greek Muslims became 
“highly aroused” as discussions of the Lausanne Commission’s hearings about a possible 
exchange to Turkey became known (Ladas 1932:  340).57  Most narrative accounts 
confirm that the Muslims in Greece were relatively content with their lives in the pre-
exchange period, and that most Greek Muslims fiercely protested the notion of never 
returning to their homes (Köker and Keskiner 2003:  197).  The Greek Muslims learned 
of the exchange from several sources:  the Greek authorities, members of the Turkish Red 
Crescent (Hilal-i Ahmer) who were visiting religious leaders (müftüs), and of course the 
wave of Rums who by and large entered Greece in the last four months of 1922 and told 
the Greek Muslim locals of their plight.   
 
2.2. Some Statistics of the Greek Muslim Transfer 
                                                 
56 Many Greek Muslims and Rums who had been expelled from Turkey to Greece lived together in Greece 
for roughly a year.  Aktar (1998:  9) writes that the two migrant communities coexisted peacefully, 
although he does report that the Greek government did unlawfully seize some Greek Muslim property and 
livestock to give to the swelling newcomers while the Muslims continued to reside in Greece. 
 
57 Yıldırım (2002:  180) asserts that during the Lausanne Convention, many would-be transferees officially 
changed their faith in order to avoid the exchange. 
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With the onset of the CEOPBGT, Muslims in continental Greece, Crete (officially 
incorporated into Greece in 1913), and Macedonia (parts of which were incorporated into 
the Greek state in 1912) were deported to a foreign country with which they were only 
religiously, and thus supposedly culturally and ethnically, affiliated.  As I had mentioned 
in chapter 1, 32,511 Muslims living in Greece landed in Turkey right before the Lausanne 
Convention began.  Between 1923-26, the Lausanne Convention transferred 355,635 
Muslims to Turkey.  Thus, the total exchanged persons to Turkey from Greece as a direct 
result of the CEOPBGT numbered 388,146 (Meindersma 1997:  346).58   
___________________________________________ 
Place of Origin Number of Muslim Transferees 
                              Macedonia                       329,098 
                  Old Greece                5,910 
                  Epirus                 1,133 
                  Crete               23,021 
                  Nea Aigaiou                9,184 
                  Other               19,800 
                  Total             388,146 
___________________________________________ 
 
Table 1:  The number of Muslim transferees to Turkey under the CEOPBGT, by place of origin 
(adapted from Yıldırım 2002:  153).   As the chart shows, most Muslims came from Macedonia.   
   
As a result of losing so many Muslims, Greece’s minority Muslim population 
diminished from 20% to 6% (Hirschon 2000:  5).  Although the exchange was officially 
to begin on May 1, 1923, the first transfer of Greek Muslims was a ship that left Selanik 
                                                 
58 The total of 388,146 neglects thousands of Greek Muslims who left Greece for Turkey by their own 
volition.  Considering these extra thousands of peoples, Ladas totals the Greek Muslim immigrants at 
roughly 400,000 (1932:  711).  In addition, Yıldırım (2002:  153) importantly notes that 130,000 Muslim 
refugees had entered Anatolia from Greece during the Greco-Turkish War, thereby making the total 
number of Muslim refugees subject to the Lausanne Convention (see article 3 in Appendix A) at 518,146.  
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on December 19, 1923 (Aktar 1998:  9).  The Greek Government rushed the departure of 
some Muslims, since it needed to shelter the massive influx of Rums, and the Turkish 
Government rushed the settlement somewhat so that the Muslims farmers could arrive 
quickly enough to harvest crops.  The main thrust of the Greek Muslim migration 
happened during the first eight months of 1924 by ship, although rail and wagon did 
move some transferees (Aktar 1998:  9).  The transfer was not intended to boost Turkey’s 
economy, although the Turkish Government sought to settle the Greek Muslims in a 
manner to at least compensate for the loss of the productive Rum professionals.59  Thus, 
Turkish nationalists transferred most immigrants to villages and homes evacuated by 
Greek Christians.   
On November 8, 1923, the Turkish state created a Ministry of Exchange, 
Reconstruction, and Resettlement (Mübadele, İmar ve İskan Vekaleti), a huge 
bureaucratic body that made important decisions concerning the settlement and 
represented the previous Ottoman institutional framework regarding refugees.60  This 
ministry divided settlement regions into ten major territorial administrative divisions 
(vilayets).  Most vilayets were located in Eastern Thrace and coastal Western Anatolia, 
where the majority of Greek settlements had been.  Overall, Eastern Thrace and coastal 
Western Anatolia absorbed approximately 80% of the Greek Muslims.  The largest 
Muslim settlements occurred, rightly enough, in many of Turkey’s largest cities and 
                                                 
59 For a detailed treatment of the Muslim settlement procedure, see Ladas (1932:  705-719). 
   
60 For a detailed account of how this Ministry operated, see Yıldırım (2002:  293-298). 
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towns:  Balıkesir, Bursa, Çanakkale, Edirne, İzmir, İstanbul, Kirklareli, Kocaeli, Manisa, 
Niğde, Samsun, and Tekirdağ (Ladas 1932:  707-713).61  
 
Figure 2:  A generic flow-map that I made illustrating the relative distribution of Greek Muslim 
transferees within Turkey.  The statistics of this map are based on Ladas’s calculation of 400,000 
Greek Muslim immigrants.  Note:   this map does not seek to provide an accurate portrayal of where 
the Greek Muslims came from (this information is provided in table 1), but rather where they went 
                                                 
61 My great-grandfather, Dr. Behçet Uz, settled in İzmir in 1923 and became its mayor from 1931-1942.  
Working under Atatürk, he fought hard for İzmir’s urban health and environment, all the while receiving 
the Greek Muslim migrants following İzmir’s massive Rum exodus. 
 82  
 
to.  In addition, the labeled Turkish cities are, in a few instances, not geographically situated with 
100% accuracy, nor are the vilayets depicted with the utmost precision.  
 
      
2.3. Outlining Some Structural Problems of the Greek Muslim Migration 
 
As I stated earlier, much literature has focused on the Christian exodus from 
Anatolia to Greece (see, for instance, Hirschon 1989, Petropulos 1976 and Morgenthau 
1929) and has essentially neglected inquiry into the Muslim expulsion from Greece to 
Turkey.62  One primary justification in Western academics for accentuating the Christian 
displacement is that the Christian exodus was much more “severe” than the Muslim 
expulsion.  While over twice as many Christians were uprooted than Muslims, I think that 
it would be foolish to think the forced Muslim migration was without pain and human 
desecuritization.  A solid moral argument can be made that in terms of suffering, numbers 
are truly meaningless.     
I claim that the Turkish case of resettlement was just as wrought with problems as 
was the Greek case, creating an immediate and acute human security dilemma for the 
Greek Muslim migrants.  Like the Greek government, the Turkish government faced 
problems of transferring, sheltering, feeding, clothing and compensating the Greek 
Muslim migrants.  There are almost innumerable reasons for the problems associated 
with the Greek Muslim settlement.  I do not want to painstakingly detail the various ways 
in which the Turkish government failed to live up to certain articles of the Lausanne 
Convention; explaining the technicalities such as the operation of liquidation of refugee 
properties and indemnification are better left to a doctorate thesis or a legal brief.  
                                                 
62 Arı (1995) provides a detailed survey of the settlement, progression and overall success of the Greek 
Muslim migration. 
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Instead, all I intend to do here is talk about a few of the structural dilemmas associated 
with the problematic Greek Muslim settlement.     
First, after the massive Greek exodus, Turkey became a space of empty 
settlements and abandoned countryside.  That is not to say the exchanged Greek 
Muslims, fewer in number than the Anatolian Greek Christian refugees, seized abundant 
Greek Christian property and lived happily ever after.  In truth, the Greco-Turkish war 
ravaged Turkey both politically and economically, especially in regions where the 
retreating Greek army literally burned the countryside as an act of vengeance against the 
Turkish nationalists.63  Many of the Rums and Armenians that had fled Turkey in the fall 
of 1922 constituted the backbone of much of Turkey’s professional and financial sectors, 
thus making economic life extremely difficult for the Turkish state.  After the Christian 
displacement, many homeless Turkish locals seized abandoned Christian properties, 
looted Christian property and dwelled in Christian homes.  The extended period between 
the Rum exodus (fall 1922) and the Muslim immigration (mainly between January and 
August 1924) facilitated pillage.  Tiles, window frames, doors, and iron bars of former 
Rum houses were either sold in the open market or used to repair damaged local Turkish 
homes and villages caused by the Greco-Turkish war (Aktar 1998:  10).64   
Moreover, not only did the incoming Greek Muslims face competition for homes 
and property among Turkish locals, but also from some Kurds who had been displaced 
                                                 
63 Those who had witnessed their houses being burned by the Greek Army’s forces are called harikzedeler 
in Turkish.  The Yeni Gün newspaper of December 1922 notes that these fires reportedly destroyed 20,000 
houses.  Many of these people had to forsake their old homes; many ended up migrating to İzmir and taking 
over the Rums’ and Armenians’ abandoned properties. 
   
64 In contrast to Anatolia’s houses, Greece’s houses and industries were mostly intact since its lands went 
unscathed by the Greco-Turkish war. 
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from Eastern Anatolia into Western Anatolia.  Yıldırım (2002:  157-158) asserts that 
since the nascent Turkish government had basically adopted Ottoman displacement 
policy regarding Eastern Anatolia’s tribal peoples, some Kurds were forcibly moved (on 
the pretense of national security) to Anatolia’s western provinces.  Additionally, some 
members of the Turkish army, local refugee resettlement commissions and even the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly got into the act of taking property that formerly 
belonged to the Rums.  In fact, after the 1922 Anatolian Greek Christian exodus, the 
Turkish government was witnessing so much intense struggle over the vacated properties 
that it passed a resolution in 1923 to appease the public.  The resolution essentially said 
that Turks could seize and hold on to what they could get, provided they pay a small 
amount of rent for the property.  In short, the Turkish parliament was overly focused on 
the situation of the abandoned properties and lost sight of effectively implementing its 
part of the Lausanne Convention (Yıldırım 2002:  157-159, 165-169).  
Second, Atatürk’s policy of economic protectionism and non-intervention made 
life extremely difficult for the immigrants.  The Turkish delegates at Lausanne opposed 
the notion of an independent commission to deal with minority affairs on the basis that 
such an organization would intrude upon Turkey’s national sovereignty and security.  
The Turks made the issue of the Greek Muslim settlement an internal issue and dismissed 
the idea of large international loan packages as a way of facilitating refugee resettlement.  
In the end, the Turkish government spent less than one twentieth of the cost of settlement 
than did the Greek government (McCarthy 1995:  302).  In complete contrast to the 
Turkish government, the Greek Government received international aid for the population 
exchange and benefited from an immense public relations campaign spearheaded by the 
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League of Nations and Greek lobbying groups.  As McCarthy puts it, “The proper 
question was not which country [Greece or Turkey] had a larger population or which had 
taken in more refugees, but whether the country could care for the refugees that arrived.  
If that question is asked, it is obvious that Turkey was much less prepared than Greece to 
support the immigrants” (1995:  302).    
Third, we must recall that Turkey was already dealing with an existing refugee 
problem prior to Lausanne.  The incoming Greek Muslim migrants actually constituted a 
relatively small number of Turkey’s total refugees, most of whom had entered Turkey 
prior to the CEOPBGT.  As Yıldırım (2002:  156) notes, “The decade of 1912-1922 
marked the apogee of the refugee influx [into Turkey].”65  These refugees had come from 
the Balkans and elsewhere, and many of them had faced what is called temporary 
settlement (İskan-i adi or tali İskan).  This meant that the Ottoman government had 
intended for these refugees to return to their homelands once the Ottoman Empire 
reclaimed their lost territories.  The Ottoman refugee bureaus (muhacirin müdüriyetleri) 
were, for the most part, incapable of turning the refugees into productive workers.  This is 
despite the fact that the Ottoman government did do its best to support the refugees with 
emergency relief and basic shelter programs.66  Most refugees were not fully 
compensated for properties left behind in their homelands and they thus contributed to 
economic and social disorder within Anatolia.  Preoccupied with a standing “refugee 
                                                 
65 A striking statistic that Yıldırım (2002:  157) provides is that between 1912-1922, approximately 25% of 
Anatolia and Thrace’s population had had what he calls a “refugee experience.” 
   
66 Shaw outlines Ottoman governmental assistance to the influx of Muslim refugees between 1918 and 
1923, and he observes that these Ottoman policies were embodied in the Lausanne Convention.  See 
Shaw’s “Resettlement of refugees in anatolia, 1918-1923,” Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, 22 (1) 
(Spring 1998), pp. 58-90. 
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problem,“ the inchoate Turkish government waited too long before addressing the unique 
conditions of the Greek Muslim transfer under the CEOPBGT (Yıldırım 2002:  156).        
Fourth, and related to the above paragraph, the Turkish government lacked 
information about the Greek Muslim immigrants, even basic statistics about livelihood 
type.  Without population censuses, good maps or agricultural and industrial surveys, the 
Turkish Government resorted to informal information at the seaports upon arrival of the 
Muslims.  Fifth, Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction, and Resettlement had little 
money.  Incompetent, retired army officers filled many empty positions within the 
Ministry.  Inadequate funding led to disorganization, which in turn led to serious 
mistakes in transfer and created a de facto government policy of trial and error.  For 
instance, many Greek Muslim tobacco cultivators from Eastern Macedonia were settled 
in vine districts along coastal Western Anatolia (Ladas 1932:  714).  Costly trial and error 
taught the Muslim immigrants that tobacco could not be cultivated in those areas (leaving 
behind economic and environmental problems).  As another example, Turkish 
nationalists forcibly settled some wheat harvesters in olive grove regions.  Unfamiliar 
with olives, these farmers merely cut down olive trees and burned them in their stoves, in 
their place planting barley and wheat (Aktar 1998:  12).  These relocation mistakes came 
despite calls by Kazim Karabekir, the head of the Economic Congress in İzmir, for the 
Greek Muslim migrants to be settled by a commission in places according to “their skills 
(kabiliyet), physical habits (bünyelerine), properties (mülk), specializations (ihtisasat) and 
natures (mahiyyetlerine)” (taken from Yıldırım 2002:  169).       
The Ministry transferred the Greek Muslims to their settlement destination 
immediately upon arrival.  Lausanne forced the displaced Muslims to accept expulsion 
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and its terms (e.g., location of settlement).  Repatriation was beyond dispute.  
Significantly, nationalists moved the immigrants to a variety of locations rather than 
concentrating them in a few large refugee camps.  Since the Greek Muslim immigrants 
were very much dispersed, I maintain that there was little chance they could maintain a 
separate identity, consolidate, and effectively pressure the Turkish state to return to 
Greece.67  In theory, however, each Greek Muslim migrant would not need to rebel, for 
the Ministry was to grant everyone enough land to ensure an adequate life.  Sadly, 
however, conditions for many Greek Muslim migrants in Turkey were all but pleasant.68  
  
2.4. Narratives of the Greek Muslim Plight 
Hitherto, I have essentially discussed only the structural problems of settlement.  
Now I want to turn to the social problems associated with the Greek Muslim transfer and 
settlement by offering narratives of the Greek Muslim plight.  This section of the thesis is 
perhaps the most important, for narratives not only reinforce the economic and physical 
problems with settlement that I discussed in the previous section, but they also shed light 
on how transferees felt about their new situation, surroundings and identity.  Actual 
migrant stories of transfer and settlement are an excellent way to gauge whether 
                                                 
67 This lack of a truly preserved, cohesive social identity among most Greek Muslim migrants is in 
complete contrast with the Anatolian Greek Christian refugees, who were cramped together in refugee 
camps in Greece and accordingly maintained a strong social refugee identity. 
        
68 Many Greek Muslims entered a place with few industrial jobs since war all but destroyed the 
manufacturing power of the Turkish state (McCarthy 1995:  302).  The incoming Greek Muslims were 
peasants who were forced to leave much of their agricultural equipment in Greece, thus problematizing 
both their lives and the government’s settlement agenda.  On the positive side (if there is one), Petropulos 
notes that since the Greek Muslims were not rushed into the exchange like the Anatolian Greek Orthodox 
population was, many Greek Muslims took with them considerable moveable wealth (livestock, plants, 
etc.) (1976:  155). 
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transferees felt more or less secure upon exchange.  Significantly, we are now going after 
the individual perspective, not the national elites’ perspectives.   
In terms of methodology, I subdivide this section into five parts based on the 
different sources I use.  Part one is Keskiner and Köker’s field work about a Muslim 
community which migrated from Macedonia to Turkey; part two consists of Yalçın’s 
interviews with various living Greek Muslims from the CEOPBGT; part three is a 
succinct literary analysis of a fictive novel regarding the Greek Muslim migration; part 
four is my own interview of a Greek Muslim migrant; part five is a video documentary 
regarding the CEOPBGT.  The goal throughout is to use diverse sources to strengthen my 
paper’s themes of nostalgia, displacement and identity, and to underscore the need for 
human security. 
 
2.4.1. Keskiner and Köker’s Case Study   
Keskiner and Köker’s case study concerns Muslims migrating from Greek 
Macedonia mainly to Muradiye, a small town ten kilometers west of Manisa in Western 
Anatolia.  The authors discuss the migration, subsequent identity formation and 
difficulties in adapting to a foreign environment.  The authors base their evidence on 
interviews conducted of living family members and friends from Muradiye who had 
experienced the transfer.   
According to Keskiner and Köker, almost all the Muslims in Greece lived happily 
alongside the Christian majority prior to the exchange.  The Muslims, recalling the arrival 
of Rums in 1922, were compelled to share their crops and open their homes.  The authors 
claim the Muslims treated the Rums so well that Greek Christians advised them where to 
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settle in Turkey if they were to go, and even told the Greek Muslims where they hid their 
gold coins in their home.  Interestingly, the authors suggest that Anatolian Greek 
Christians might have been kind to the Greek Muslims because Greek leaders forced 
them to.  According to local narratives, Atatürk purportedly warned Greek officials, 
“Should I hear you resort to any cruelty to a Turk, without taking off my military boots 
off I’ll be in Selanik” (1998:  9).69  I want to point out that in this story Atatürk labels the 
Greek Muslims “Turkish,” even though they have not yet migrated to Turkey. 
In time, all the muhacirs (“expellees,” “refugees”) were transported to the ports to 
be shipped to Turkey.70  They received only a rushed notification of the CEOPBGT, since 
Turkish and Greek delegates at Lausanne wanted the transfer to happen as quick as 
possible (one reason for the rush was in order not to create disruptions in the agricultural 
season).  The deportation took anywhere from several days to six weeks.  The muhacirs 
were not moved as one big collective but rather as social units unfamiliar with one 
another, which inevitably created a loss of previous social networks and social identities.  
The official number of deaths of muhacirs aboard ship is low, partly because the distance 
across the Aegean is minimal (in interviews the muhacirs claim it took them two days at 
most to reach İzmir).  That is not to say the conditions aboard ship were easy.  One 
muhacir, İsmail Özcan, recounts his tightly packed ship, 
                                                 
69 It is important to recall that Atatürk was not born in modern day Turkey, but rather in Selanik (which is 
in Greek Macedonia).  Kinross (1965:  8) suggests that Atatürk’s nationalist feelings may originate in part 
from his birthplace, a “restless world, beset by internal upheavals and external threats from the foreigner.” 
   
70 The term “muhacir” comes from the Arabic root word hijra, which means migration.  Hijra, while it can 
just mean immigration, can also suggest a forced movement from the days of the Prophet Muhammed.  The 
term “muhacir” has a connotation of flight.  Muhacirs generally have their Muslim faith as their sole 
unifying factor.  Andrews (1989:  27) notes that those immigrants who entered Turkey before 1939 were 
broadly known as muhacirs, and those immigrating after 1939 are popularly called göçmens (hence, the 
term “goçmen” did not exist at the time of the CEOPBGT).    
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It was a big ship.  They had boarded nine villages onto it, animals and everything.  
They had carried the animals with machines.  They had tied belts around the animals and 
lifted them up to the ship.  It was so crowded they had to put some of the people down in 
the ambar; we stayed on the very top, on the deck (1998:  10). 
 
They landed in İzmir and its hinterlands (e.g., Urla), remaining there for a while 
as the Red Crescent Association of Turkey vaccinated the muhacirs and provided limited 
health care (recall that there was no international agency to help the Muslims once they 
left Greece for Turkey).  Turkish officials at the ports apparently had two resettlement 
criteria:  where the migrants came from and the type of farmers they were.  Despite 
efforts at categorization, in reality Turkish officials relocated the muhacirs almost 
randomly.  Most migrants destined for Muradiye were unfamiliar with its climate and 
agriculture.  For instance, the muhacirs cut down many of Muradiye’s olive trees because 
they were unaccustomed to the olive oil laden local diet.  As another problem, the 
muhacirs received less than the equivalent of their possessions back in Greece, even 
though the Lausanne Convention specifically states that exchangees would “receive 
property of a value equal to and of the same nature as that which had been left behind” 
(Meindersma 1997:  344).   
The interviewees claim that Turkish Government provided little support to them, 
even though Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Resettlement was supposed to 
provide financial assistance for farming tools and animals.  Take, for example, Ahmet 
Kumrular’s description about his arrival in İzmir and subsequent disappointment, 
 
We came here with our documents.  We couldn’t find what we had expected.  We 
stayed in the tents here.  We came here very miserable; one mattress, one sheet.  The 
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locals had occupied the houses.  We stayed in the tents ten, fifteen days while the houses 
were evacuated.  Who had the bread to give to whom?  Turkey was shattered.  They were 
creating a new order.  The government [only] helped some.  It distributed the houses, two 
dönüms [one dönüm = approx. 25% of an acre] of vineyard and two dönüms of field per 
person (1998:  13). 
 
The Muslim muhacirs entered looted homes.71  A hostile local environment 
exacerbated their malcontent.  Interviewees remember locals calling them “bitli” (lousy), 
“pis” (dirty), and “çıplak” (naked) (1998:  14).  A railroad line in Muradiye bisected the 
two communities, whereby locals and muhacirs generally did not visit each other’s 
houses.  Interestingly, İsmail Özcan recalls how some locals openly wished the muhacirs’ 
ships had sunk upon leaving Greece, obviously so that the muhacirs would not have 
settled in Turkey and take the abandoned Anatolian Greek Christian property.  In all, the 
muhacirs believed the locals acted like cold, unwelcoming people because the locals 
supposedly disliked “misafirs” (visitors, houseguests).  According to Keskiner and 
Köker, many muhacirs believed that the locals viewed them as a filthy lot, as “others.”  
In her interview, Sakine Günaydin said, “[The locals] were so clean they lived in their 
kitchen.  They thought the misafirs would dirty their homes” (1998:  15).  Ultimately, as 
a result of such hostilities and differences, some families and communities ended up 
separating - some muhacirs left Muradiye to find a better place to live, to farm more 
profitable land.72   
                                                 
71 Muhacirs typically described their new houses as “four walls, that’s all” (in Turkish, “dört duvar, o 
kadar”) (1998:  13).  
  
72 In my interview with Şükrü Postacıoğlu, a lifetime native of İzmir, he suggested that some Greek 
Muslims moved from the villages to İzmir and worked in mercantilism.  However, since İzmir was still 
coping with losing so many Greek Christian professionals and rebuilding itself after the Greco-Turkish 
War, Postacıoğlu thinks İzmir provided few good opportunities for the Muslim refugees.      
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Furthermore, the muhacirs, through an inadequate resettlement regime, lost their 
old social networks and hurt the environment.  For instance, Alev Akçasoy-Köker claims 
that, of the Muslims from Kayalar and Eleviş (towns in Macedonia), half went to the 
Black Sea area and half went to the western Aegean region.  Central Anatolia, the Black 
Sea coasts and the Aegean basin all have unique habitats.  The muhacirs, lacking local 
environmental information, could not help but flood grazing lands, deplete water reserves 
and deforest the countryside.  New networks also undoubtedly distorted the muhacirs’ 
sense of place; without the support of locals (or really of the Turkish government, for that 
matter), the muhacirs faced their hardships alone.  Repeatedly, Keskiner and Köker refer 
to an erosion of “social capital” that resulted from migration (1998:  21).  Some muhacirs 
claim, of those who were born in the Greek memleket (country, homeland) and came to 
Anatolia and died early in life, the cause of death was “the misery [of a] broken heart” 
(1998:  19).  Forced migration had squandered old opportunities and friendships for a 
new life that offered little but heartache.       
 Keskiner and Köker’s main point is that the CEOPBGT was a failure because, for 
the most part, the immigrants (at least the ones they examined in the Muradiye case 
study) never fully assimilated within Turkish society and the environment.  This 
disappointment with settlement and living conditions is why some of the living migrants 
continue to call themselves muhacirs and not Turkish.  These muhacirs felt that the 
migration to Turkey never fully compensated for Greece, and never will; this perpetual 
dissatisfaction created a glorification of past life in localities within Greece, the previous 
“homelands.”  Ahmet Kumrular conveys a utopia, 
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We were farmers.  The land was so fertile.  You could grow anything.  There was 
an abundance of everything.  There were two lakes, one on the West and one on the East.  
My uncle was a hunter:  Geese, ducks, their eggs, fish.  There was an abundance of food.  
Here, we found nothing.  There, we had a lot of food (1998:  18).   
  
Kumrular juxtaposes the local in Greece with the local in Turkey:  ‘Whereas my 
previous home was fantastic, the current home is nowhere near as dear to my heart.’  
Identity, for the muhacir farmer, is rooted in the local environment, the land.  The idea is 
that ‘the soil provided for us back home, but the soil here in Turkey does not produce.’  
Property seems to solidify identity:  the more land (and wealthier land) you have, the 
stronger your identity.  The notion makes sense considering the muhacirs had given up 
big farming lands in return for much less.  Intriguingly, upon further questioning, 
Kumrular admits his Turkish land resembled his old Greek land.  His new land eventually 
became productive, yielding olives, figs, and other vegetables and fruits.  Consequently, 
Kumrular seems to be exaggerating the differences between his old and new home in 
order to articulate his nostalgia more effectively.   
At any rate, Keskiner and Köker are suggesting that the perception of the 
“homeland” is the most important thing.  For example, some discontented muhacir 
communities still sing Balkan tunes, or “memleket havaları” (songs of the homeland) 
(Keskiner, Köker 1998:  26).  However, nostalgic homelands are not real - migrants must 
cope with this reality at some point.  The authors suggest that since Kumrular and other 
Greek muhacirs came to Turkey unwillingly, many would (even after eighty-odd years) 
jump at the chance to return to Greece.  Sadly, few if any of the muhacirs ever do return.  
For those muhacirs fortunate enough to make the journey back, visits to the homeland 
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create the sense of a ‘”lost homeland” - an unattainable state of satisfaction.  Local 
homelands, in this way, become even more difficult to forget.   
Consequently, I think the Muradiye case study represents a situation where 
migrants did not successfully construct a new homeland in Turkey because a struggling 
Turkish economy, poor resettlement plans, and other structural problems did not allow 
for it.  The muhacirs’ sense of place and identity were disfigured - the migration seemed 
to limit opportunities.  Ultimately, turning minorities into migrants did not translate into 
an ethnically homogenous Turkish population. 
 
2.4.2. Kemal Yalçın’s Book of Interviews   
Similar to the Keskiner and Köker case study, Yalçın’s stories depict the 
frustrations and adversity stemming from the population exchange.73  Yalçın’s book 
consists of interviews of both Anatolian Greek Christian migrants and Greek Muslim 
migrants. I only want to examine excerpts from his discussions with Greek Muslim 
migrants.  To my knowledge, no scholar has yet translated the insightful stories in 
Yalçın’s book into English (Yalçın 1998:  159-282).74     
 Yalçın’s talk with Murtaza Acar (born 1909) from Kastrolu in Greece parallels 
Keskiner and Köker’s interviews.  Acar says leaving home upon the transfer command 
was extremely difficult.  He had to sell his sheep and goats, but Greek officials forbid 
                                                 
73  To add credibility to my overarching argument that Greek Muslim muhacirs were disappointed upon 
arrival to Turkey, Keskiner in her footnotes says she read Yalçın’s work and found striking similarities 
between Yalçın’s Greek Muslim interviewees and her own. 
   
74 Another book similar to Yalçın’s in style and quality is İskender Özsoy’s Iki Vatan Yorgunları:  
Mübadele Acısını Yaşayanlar Anlatiyor (İstanbul:  Bağlam Yayınları, 2003). 
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him to sell his house or his land.  Turkish officials did not honor the documents given to 
Acar in Greece to declare equivalent goods in Turkey.  Acar’s actual journey was tough - 
he spent twenty days in Selanik waiting for a ship that boarded 10,000 people.  He and 
his family faced difficulties immediately upon arriving to Honaz, a village near İzmir.  
There was little to eat or drink.  The language barrier, he remarks, was particularly 
difficult.  Apparently, the locals complained about the proliferation of the Greek language 
in their town so much that Atatürk supposedly made a declaration on the subject, 
 
We [the Turkish Government] are trying to teach your [the migrants’] children the 
Turkish language in school.  The language makes the person.  In time, the refugees and 
the locals will learn Turkish in their daily routine.  The majority here is Turkish.  When 
you ask their grandchildren a question in Greek, they will reply in Turkish.  Have no fear! 
(My translation of Yalçın 1998:  188). 
 
Many nationalists presumed that those speaking Greek in Turkey were naughty, 
stubborn and ignorant.  In time, Atatürk advises the muhacirs, they will learn the 
“proper” language.  Atatürk is undoubtedly trying to incorporate the migrants into his 
nation-building project, a system where only Turkish can reign.  Interestingly, Acar goes 
on to say that he thought Atatürk to be a knowledgeable, bright-eyed, tolerant man. 75  I 
think this is mostly because Acar's terrible conditions compelled him to place his trust in 
the new land, his new leader.  Towards the end of his interview, Acar sings a song about 
returning to Samnotisa, a town in Greece, 
 
When are you going back to Samnotisa? 
When are you going back to Samnotisa? 
I’m going to throw flowers at Samnotisa 
                                                 
75 In interviewing my grandmother, I learned that a popular slogan among the public during settlement was 
the rhyme “Long live Mustafa Kemal" (Mustafa Kemal Paşa çok yaşa).    
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I’m going to throw flowers at the sea 
I’m going to throw flowers at the sand. 
Oh, my love! 
Even with black belongings 
Even with dirty belongings 
Even with your holiday clothes I love you. 
Oh, my love! 
I would die for you (My translation of Yalçın 1998:  192). 
 
The song is about how much the individual loves the homeland, what that 
individual would do for the homeland.  Here I think the migrant can easily imagine the 
homeland to be a living person, a lover.  In this way, Acar attempts to make the Greek 
homeland more tangible, more real to himself.  Indeed, the theme of heartbreak 
dominates almost all of Yalçın’s interviews with Greek Muslim muhacirs.  Some 
interviewees broke down and cried about how difficult a migrant's life was, and still is.   
Like Acar’s case, the Yavuz family’s ordeal exemplifies the transfer’s stark 
reality.  The family had to sell their animals, and when they got to İzmir they were 
dismayed by how little land they were to receive in the villages.  The transformation was 
shocking to Muhittin Yavuz, 
 
[Upon arrival] we could not insist on our rights.  We came as refugees.  We were 
bewildered.  Some of us believed we could go back to where we came from…We 
experienced a shock.  Our minds weren’t working properly.  What’s going to happen, 
what are we to do?  We didn’t know… (My translation of Yalçın 1998:  199).   
 
Like Acar, Mr.Yavuz settled in Honaz and experienced tremendous uncertainty 
about his future.  Mr.Yavuz says many people were poor, without work, and lacking the 
effort to look for jobs.  Mr.Yavuz’s wife, Sabiha Yavuz, comes off as incredibly 
pessimistic in her interview.   
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Figure 3:  The Yavuz family (Yalçın 1998:  144-145). 
She provides the viewpoint of an old housewife who experienced few pleasures in 
life.  Her desires, as the wife in a farming family, are simple - she wanted a nice garden 
and pleasant home upon settlement in Honaz.  Mrs.Yavuz blames the foreign land for her 
misery.  After many decades, she still considers herself a foreigner in Turkey.  The main 
idea explicit in Mrs. Yavuz’s speech is ‘if only I could go back home, my life would be 
so much better,’   
 
My age is now 90.  I have not learned a single thing from this world.  We lived 
through poverty.  We experienced loneliness.  We came here and lived here alone.  The 
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men at least went out to grind coffee.  We [the women] always stayed at home.  The 
women suffered more… I wish that we [the family] could go and see our old home…we 
really miss it, we’d really want to see it.  The people that live in our old home should take 
care of it…keep it clean…We used to have many flowers- the people should water the 
flowers often… (My translation of Yalçın 1998:  200).             
 
Mrs. Yavuz, like many others, were deprived the possibility of return.  She and 
her family never returned to Vraşnolu, her previous hometown in Greece.  However, 
some interviewees did repatriate.  Abbas Barut, a refugee, provides a poignant example 
of multiple identities originally from Kastrolu in Greece.  Barut talks about his journey in 
1970 with a friend back home to his old village.  Barut says the village leader's children 
invited him and his friend to dinner, and that the community received them well despite 
having lived in Turkey for so long.  Abbas says, 
 
They invited us [Barut and his friend] to dinner.  The homeowner’s family said 
‘the Turks are coming.’  We went in and were talking.  The kids came in.  ‘Dad, where 
are the Turks you invited?’ they asked.  ‘Kids, these are those Turks’ said the 
homeowner’s family.  The kids were shocked.  ‘But our guests are speaking Greek’ the 
kids said… When I was there, I felt like I was reborn (My translation of Yalçın 1998:  
204).   
 
This narrative illustrates the importance of cultural identity at birth and growing 
up.  Barut grew up speaking Greek and remembered it in Turkey.  The kids identify his 
ethnicity based on his dialect; in other words, the kids assume (albeit incorrectly) Barut 
could not be Turkish because he speaks Greek.  Furthermore, like Acar and the Yavuz 
 99  
 
family, Barut feels Greek even after over seventy years of living in Turkey (he says he 
felt “reborn” upon returning “home”).76   
To this end, Mackridge examines the importance of remembering childhood in 
refugee life, a persisting theme in Modern Greek literature.  The adult refugee idealizes 
childhood because children live new moments each day, whereas grown-ups must endure 
daily monotonous routines.  Furthermore, the migrant wants to repatriate not only to 
relive youth, but also because he or she simply misses the village or mountain where he 
or she grew up.  Thus, Mackridge writes of a “two-fold nostalgia,” “It is natural that the 
temporal nostalgia for childhood should often have been coupled with a spatial nostalgia 
for the island or mountain village that has been left behind” (1997:  75).   
İbrahim İsler’s story provides, like the Muradiye case study, an illustration of 
negative stereotypes.  İsler, an exchangee from Ptolemaida, was transferred to Samsun, a 
Turkish Black Sea town.  He remembers that upon leaving Ptolemaida, the Greek 
Christians living there pleaded for Muslims to stay.  The relationships between the two 
communities were that close.  While leaving Greece was sad, İsler reveals that he realized 
being a migrant was disgraceful when locals ostracized him in Samsun.  As many from 
Ptolemaida settled in Black Sea towns, the locals did their share of name-calling.  İsler 
recalls childhood pains, 
 
I remember very well.  The Black Sea inhabitants called us “louse-infested 
refugees!”  Wherever our names went the word “louse-infested!” followed.  We felt put 
down.  The aches of our broken prides of those days are still fresh [in my mind] (My 
translation of Yalçın 1998:  258).              
                                                 
76 Likewise, my grandmother told me that she felt a lifetime attachment to Turkey because she was born 
there.   She said, “Ben böyle Türküm.  Ben böyle de doğudum ve böyle de kaldım” (“I am Turkish in this 
way.  I was born this way and remained this way”).      
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Unlike most of Yalçın’s interviewees, İsler offers a reason why he thinks locals 
picked on him and other muhacirs. The locals, who had a strong affinity for the talented 
Greek Christian merchants, had difficulty in accepting the Greek Muslim farmers; the 
two groups were too culturally different.  In addition, the poor locals (destitute mostly 
because of war engulfing Anatolia dating back before 1912) felt short-changed by the 
Turkish Government because vast tracks of land and property were officially reserved for 
the Greek Muslims, not for them (though, as I point out in section 2.2, the Turkish locals 
did pillage and seize a good deal of leftover Rum property).   
The Cretan Muslim movement to Cunda, Turkey (Alibey Adasi in the Ayvalık 
district) also considers the effects of ethnic stereotyping.  Cunda was one of the biggest 
recipients of Cretan migrants stemming from Lausanne.  Between 1924 and 1925, 
roughly 4,500 Cretan refugees came to Cunda.  Because they were Greek speaking, locals 
sometimes labeled the Cretan Muslims “gavur fintan” (“unfaithful stems”).77  
Yalçın’s interview of İsmet Altay and her family from Crete recaps themes of 
homeland previously discussed.78  She left Crete when she was twelve, on May 26, 1924 
- she remembers the exact date because that day meant everything to her.  Her old house 
had three bedrooms, a kitchen, stairs, and a garden that produced tasty grapes.  Altay says 
she loved Crete in its entirety.  Overall, her interview presents Crete as the paragon of the 
Aegean,   
 
                                                 
77 Interestingly, Koufopoulou notes that the Cretan language has persisted in Cunda to this day. 
 
78 İsmet Altay passed away on October 29, 2003.   
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Crete is the Aegean Sea’s heaven.  Its water is plenty, its fruits are plenty, and its 
weather is very nice.  Its winters passed like springtime.  Crete’s everything is beautiful.  
Crete is very important for our people.  It was the people’s place! (My translation of 
Yalçın 1998:  270).     
 
Altay characterizes the old homeland as timeless, akin to something from a fairy-
tale.  Altay’s narrative devotes many paragraphs to contrast Crete and Turkey (and, 
sometimes more specifically, her old town and Cunda).  Whereas Crete had everything - 
work, money, water, cleanliness, warm climate, electricity, good food, beauty, happiness 
- Turkey offered little to none of these virtues or necessities.  Presented in a polar fashion, 
Altay’s story thus makes life in Turkey seem unbearable and unhappy.   
 
Figure 4:  İsmet Altay from Resmo, Crete (Yalçın 1998:  144-145). 
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For instance, Altay remarks that while she used to enthusiastically play the 
mandolin in Crete, when she arrived in Cunda she gave it up because life was too 
different.  Later, Altay says she gave her mandolin to her son in Turkey.  Due to 
psychological duress, she had no inclination to pick up the instrument again.  Given that 
other interviews also provide a stark contrast between basic life in Greece and Turkey, 
there seems to be some truth to the juxtaposition. 
Koufopoulou’s fieldwork examining the Cretan Muslim movement, nevertheless, 
serves as a counter-weight to my thesis that transfer severely disrupted the migrant’s 
sense of place and identity.  From my understanding, one of her main points is that “the 
social, physical, and psychological infrastructure or Cunda closely resembles that of the 
Cretan origin community” (Koufopoulou 1998:  5).  Having said this, she concludes, 
“Cretan refugees in Cunda never at any time expressed any desire to return to Crete” 
(Koufopoulou 1998:  6).  She thinks Cretan Muslims perceived themselves only as 
exchanged persons, not as refugees.   
Altay’s case contradicts Koufopoulou’s argument.  By extolling the virtues of her 
hometown, Altay expressed every desire to return to Crete (she indeed did so seventy-
eight years after her forced migration.  On behalf of a Greek foundation, she went to 
Crete for nine days and saw her home village of Resmo).  What is more, Altay did think 
of herself as a homeless and uprooted person, and I am willing to bet other Cretan 
Muslims did too.  Altay’s strong belief in the juxtaposition between the old “homeland” 
and the new foreign land, whether or not its factual merit is perfect, is a critical factor that 
demonstrates and clarifies her uprootedness.  I also think many social, cultural, and 
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economic dissimilarities exist between Crete and Cunda.  While Koufopoulou might 
agree with me here in some parts of her paper, her overarching thesis says otherwise.79   
Altay’s story, coupled with other interviews, raises an interesting question:  to 
avoid transfer, why not convert to Christianity?  After all, Lausanne only transferred 
Muslims to Turkey.  Altay mentions that some Cretans did convert and remained in 
Crete, but that these people were a minority.  I suspect at least two reasons why Greek 
Muslims such as Altay did not convert.  First, for many Greek Muslim muhacirs, religion 
was an important indicator of self, a concept that I had mentioned earlier in this chapter.  
Although many Cretan Muslims borrowed and incorporated customs from Greek 
Orthodoxy, they were still Muslim.  To this end, Altay says Muslims used the Aya Totori 
church in Cunda as a mosque, as the Turkish Government did not protect the church and 
allowed it to be used for whatever purpose.  Muslims carried their religious identity with 
them from Crete to Turkey (back in Crete, while both Greek Christians and Greek 
Muslims lived there and were friendly to each other, religion divided the two 
communities into different quarters).  Second, most Greek Muslim muhacirs had no 
knowledge conditions would be so trying in Turkey.  As stated previously, many Muslim 
exchangees misbelieved that when they arrived in Turkey, the Turkish Government 
would fully honor their documents declaring the goods left behind in Greece. 
 
2.4.3. Ahmet Yorulmaz’s Fictional Novel The Children of War 
 
                                                 
79 To be fair, in a later work on the same topic Koufopoulou (2003:  218) adjusts her thesis and concludes 
that “by rediscovering their past and successfully adapting it to the present, [the migrants] have formulated 
a new Cundali-Cretan identity.” 
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Millas’s analysis (1998) of Ahmet Yorulmaz’s fictional novel The Children of 
War (Savaşın Çocukları) documents another fascinating example of the Cretan Muslim 
migration and ensuing identity problems.80  The Cretan Muslim protagonist, Aynakis 
Hasan, first narrates the life of Cretan Muslims the years before Lausanne.  Later, the 
transfer takes Hasan to Cunda, where “the people of his own religion call him a ‘half 
infidel’ and ‘the seed of an infidel’” (taken from Millas 1998:  14).  To rationalize these 
hostilities against Cretan Muslims, Hasan develops the theory that Cretan Muslims are 
really Turks, basing it on two reasons:  first, while serving in the Greek Army, Cretan 
Muslims refused to fight the Ottoman Empire during WWI, and second, they refused to 
convert to Christianity.  In this way, nationalists make Anatolia to be the “fatherland” 
deserving repatriation.  Hasan sometimes feels peculiar in his nostalgia for Crete because 
he now lives in his "true" homeland:  Turkey.  However, Hasan also recognizes that 
“Turkishness” is usually associated with Anatolian origin - and of course, Crete is not a 
part of continental Anatolia, which would make Cretan Muslim “outsiders” under this 
framework.  Of course, Hasan (like many Cretan Muslims) speaks Turkish with a Greek 
accent.  To solve the dilemma, Hasan distinguishes between land/country (which is 
Crete) and fatherland/home country (which is Turkey).   
                                                 
80 Paralleling The Children of War is a literary criticism by Sabhattın Ali (1907-1948) of the Turkish 
Government’s policies during the population exchange.  Ali is a Turkish Marxist novelist critical of the 
Turkish state.   His short story “Çirkince” takes place in Çirkince, a small town near İzmir.  The 
protagonist, a local Turkish Muslim, visits the town twice - the first time when the Anatolian Greek 
Christians inhabit the town, the second time when Greek Muslim migrants dwell there.  The difference 
between the two portrayals of the town could not be more profound.  Ali portrays the town before the 
massive Anatolian Greek Christian exodus as a paradise, replete with fountains and cleanliness and gardens 
and a happy Greek community on great terms with local Turkish Muslims.  When the Greek Muslim 
muhacirs enter the town, houses are shattered, the land is marshy and the peasants have no idea what to do 
with the figs and olives.  What is worse, the town is controlled predominantly by two local chieftains.  An 
old native of Çirkince talking with the protagonist delivers the moral of the story:  state mismanagement 
created economic chaos in Çirkince and the subsequent plight of impoverished locals and Greek Muslim 
muhacirs (Millas 1998:  7-8). 
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The distinction raises uncertainty.  Ultimately, the main question for Hasan is why 
he perceives Crete as less of a home country than Anatolia.  After all, the Muradiye case 
study and Yalçın interviews have all tried to demonstrate that the Greek Muslim migrant 
farmers, more often than not, pledged a simple allegiance to their home localities, not 
necessarily a fervent nationalistic loyalty to the nation-state.  Does Hasan feel 
nationalistic towards Turkey because Anatolia is an emerging Turkish sovereignty under 
Atatürk, or because most ethnic Turks live in Turkey and Hasan considers himself (or 
rather tries to consider himself) to be Turkish, or because he is forced to feel Turkish, or 
for some other reason?  To answer this question, one must examine the context within 
which the author wrote the novel.  Andrews (1989:  35) writes that supporters of 
Anatolianism in 1924-25 foresaw the problems of complicating ethnicity and nationality.  
For them, therefore, Türk did not signal the name of a nation, but rather a race with a 
variety of homelands that could identify Anatolia as the homeland.   
Based on the above, I think Yorulmaz represents a Turkish nationalist writer 
trying to reconcile the appropriation of non-ethnic Turkish Muslims into the newly 
forming Turkish nation-state.  Turkish nationalists (like Yorulmaz and other novelists) 
seem to be suggesting that Hasan’s transfer constituted a movement to the right place, a 
Muslim central state that Anatolia had solidified for over a millennium (Millas 1998:  13-
15).81  Indeed, most Turkish novels seem to support Turkish Government policy with 
regard to Lausanne.  Few literary Turkish texts write about the Turkish state cracking 
                                                 
81 In explaining why Anatolian Greek Christian refugees might have accepted displacement and its terms, 
Petropulos discusses how Greek nationalists presented the ancient Greek homeland as a special entity.  
Thus, Greek nationalists made expulsion to Greece seem, in some sense, like a return to the native land, 
instead of what it really was:  a forced expulsion (1976:  158). 
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down on Greek Muslim muhacirs for doing things “Greek,” even though such 
crackdowns did happen.  For example, Koufopoulou notes that the Turkish State tried to 
assimilate Cretan Muslim immigrants vis-à-vis education and mass media.  She says that, 
for a while, Turkish officials prohibited the Cretan dialect (1998:  10).  
 
2.4.4. My Personal Interview of Mehmet Filiz     
My personal interview of Mehmet Filiz, a migrant who settled in the Kocaeli area, 
parallels the above stories of transfer.  Born in Bayramköy (today’s name is Paşkalya) on 
May 1919, Filiz was forced to flee his village in May 1924 with his mother, grandmother, 
aunt and a few other relatives as a result of the CEOPBGT (Filiz never knew his father, a 
soldier who died in WWI).  Leaving most everything behind in Bayramköy, the Filiz 
family was put on a wagon and sent to Turkey.  Their trip was difficult and he said he felt 
insecure.  Mehmet’s grandmother and aunt became ill during the trip, which required 
them to be hospitalized in İstanbul.  Mehmet never saw his grandmother or his aunt 
again, for they died soon after their hospitalization.  Having stayed in İstanbul 
temporarily, Mehmet and his mother and other relatives later accompanied another family 
to Darıca, where the Filiz family eventually settled down.  According to Mehmet, the 
living standards in Darica were worse than those in Bayramköy (for instance, Filiz says 
their house in Darica was “one twentieth” the size of his former house in Bayramköy).  
Filiz says he missed his old village greatly throughout his life.  Only very recently was he 
able to visit his birthplace.  Filiz could not hold back his tears during the interview when 
he described his visit to northern Greece, which he said was an emotionally powerful 
experience.  Ultimately, Filiz said that the first generation of Greek Muslim migrants 
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suffered immensely.  Filiz said that for a while he and other Greek Muslim migrants 
concealed their exchangee identity because they were embarrassed of it. 
 
2.4.5. Mithat Bereket’s NTV Documentary 
Interestingly, Filiz is in a well-made Turkish video documentary about the 
CEOPBGT that captures the human emotion behind the population transfer for both 
Anatolian Greek Christians and Greek Muslims.  The documentary, prepared in February 
2003 by Mithat Bereket of NTV, is called Kayaköy and Krifçe - Two Immigrant Towns.82  
The program is based on interviews with living migrants, and it is split into two sections.  
Section one focuses on the plight of Anatolian Greek Christians from Kayaköy to Greece.  
Section two examines the life of some Greek Muslims who were forced to leave their 
homes near the area of Krifçe in modern-day northern Greece and migrate to Turkey.  I 
want to talk about section two. 
 In part two, NTV travels on a bus with thirty-three people, comprised of certain 
Greek Muslim exchangees and their family members, from Turkey to northern Greece. 
The idea of the trip, which is organized by “The Foundation of Lausanne Treaty 
Immigrants,”83 is for the migrants to see their old homes and farms and talk with Greek 
locals who might either know the migrants themselves or their family members.  The 
                                                 
82 Another video documentary worth looking at that uses the same migrant-interview style as the NTV 
documentary is Osman Okkan’s 2003 documentary prepared for Germany’s WDR station and France’s 
ARTE TV. 
   
83 In November 2003, I attended a two-day conference in İstanbul entitled “The Compulsory Exchange of 
Populations Between Greece and Turkey:  80th Anniversary Symposium.”  Bringing in scholars from both 
Greece and Turkey, the conference was mainly sponsored by (among other organizations) The Foundation 
of Lausanne Treaty Emigrants (FLTE).  Founded in May 25, 2001, this organization’s mission statement is, 
according to a pamphlet I received at the conference, “to preserve and regenerate the cultural identity of the 
Lausanne immigrants.”  Importantly, the FLTE seeks to “register and protect all types of cultural heritage” 
resulting from the CEOPBGT.  See http://www.lozanmubadilleri.org.   
 108  
 
former migrants want to touch their “homeland” and breath its air.  Some of the former 
migrants on the bus have been waiting for the opportunity to visit their old homes in 
Greece for years.  They are thus very excited and restless, for they do not know what to 
expect.  On the bus, one of the former migrants starts singing childhood Greek songs 
(albeit in broken Greek), which demonstrates an attachment to the old homeland.  The 
trip starts in İstanbul, then goes to Selanik, then to Grevena (a city near Krifçe that serves 
as a district for the area), and finally to the village of Krifçe.  The journey takes a total of 
five days.  
 In Selanik, the migrants are taken to Atatürk’s childhood home and are 
interviewed by the Greek media, who are intrigued by the fact that some of the migrants 
remember some words in Greek.  In Grevena, the mayor of the city offers to the 
entourage a document that lists the names of all the residents of the Grevena area in 1915.  
Using the list, the migrants are able to find the names of certain family members, and 
some of the migrants are able to trace their roots to specific areas in Krifçe and elsewhere 
in northern Greece.  The bus eventually reaches Krifçe, a poor but cheerful village that 
was hurt very much by German occupation during WWII and by a 1995 earthquake.  
Former Greek Muslim transferees meet the locals of the village, some of whom are Rums 
who came to Greece from Turkey as a result of the CEOPBGT (or are descendents of the 
Anatolian Greek refugee population).  The Krifçe locals are incredibly kind to the people 
on the bus.  Both the Anatolian Greek Christian and the Greek Muslim transferees share 
their hardships of migration and their stories of their respective “homelands.”  The locals, 
by talking with the Greek Muslim transferees, help them find their old homes.     
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 One Greek Muslim migrant finds a fountain (çeşme) that his great-grandfather 
built in Krifçe, though the fountain does not work anymore due to the 1995 earthquake.  
Another one of the Greek Muslim transferees on the bus, Fehmi Yılmaz, informs the 
viewers that he was born in Krifçe and that he left for Turkey when he was three.  In the 
video documentary, we witness Yılmaz’s emotions when he discovers his old home.  He 
cries and takes a handful of soil from his former garden and puts it in a bag.  He says that 
he is going to spread the soil on the grave of his parents, who are buried in Turkey.  
Yılmaz desires to recreate a sense of the former homeland for his mother and father, who 
undoubtedly were saddened upon their forced flight to Turkey.  The soil serves as a 
metaphor for constancy and territorial rootedness.  Indeed, in their interviews with NTV, 
many of the Greek Muslim transferees speak frequently about the importance of the soil 
(toprak).  It is as though soil is one of the few things that stays relatively constant in a 
world of change and political machinations (remember, too, that most of the transferred 
Greek Muslims were farmers).84  In the video, the migrants perpetually articulate their 
sense of dissatisfaction with all the political interference in their lives.  At one point 
towards the end of the documentary, as all the former transferees are mingling in a cafe in 
Krifçe, Mithat Bereket agrees with the migrants and says of the distinction between 
politics and people, “Even if leaders are at loggerheads, the people understand each other 
through their own wishes, and they build closer bonds as a result” (büyük kafalar 
                                                 
84 These themes of nostalgia, soil and territorial rootedness are reinforced in my interview (May 7, 2004) 
with Hasan Dura, a teacher in Turkey whose family migrated from Duraköy near Selanik to Tekirdağ 
(specifically, a village called Malkara).  Hasan says that he has a burning desire to visit the homes of his 
parents in Selanik and see his family roots.  Hasan’s father was named Mehmet from Duraköy.  
Furthermore, Hasan notes that whenever he sees his uncle, who also partook in the migration, his uncle 
cries for his soil and tells Hasan, “We used to have a nice farm.  Now look at us – we have much less.” 
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birbirine yiye de olsunlar, halklar kendi arzulariyla birbirlerini anliyor ve daha da 
yakinlaşiyorlar).       
 
2.5. Final Remarks 
Chapter 2 has presented a wide range of Greek Muslim muhacir narratives, both 
real and fictional, to show similarities in experiences of migration and settlement.  
Ultimately, in light of Mach’s seven elements of a successful migration (see the 
“displacement” section of my theory), it is clear that the Greek Muslim migration was an 
unsuccessful one.  The struggle was that on the one hand, the muhacirs could not forget 
where their true home was; one the other hand, to survive they had to adapt to their new 
environment.  Most Greek Muslim refugees’ initial impressions of Turkey and Turkish 
life were disappointing.  The forcibly uprooted Muslims seemed to have a common 
experience of dislocation, of loss of home and place.  The migrants felt that they had a 
separate identity from the locals, a refugee identity; migrant/local interaction was hostile 
because both communities had to reconstruct everyday life.  Turkish natives stereotyped 
the Greek Muslim’s language and mannerisms.  The migrant Greek Muslim community’s 
entire cultural life system - getting married, having kids, raising those kids, burial, buying 
property, and so forth - was disrupted.  They thus felt marginalized and insecure.  
Preoccupied with survival and drained of energy, many Greek Muslims had little will to 
actively partake in productive social and economic realms within Turkey.  Their true 
human security was thus compromised.  Moreover, shared memories became critical for 
the displaced Greek Muslims.  Indeed, a strong sense of nostalgia (evident by poems, 
music, stories) continues among the Muslim immigrants about Greece and the old 
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homeland (Hirschon 2000:  7).  Many Muslim migrants truly held on to the hope that 
they would one day return to Greece (Yıldırım 2002:  310).  In this way, the response to 
displacement became a continual renegotiation of identity with a reference point always 
positioned towards the place of origin. 
Traditional scholarship asserts that the Turkish government was not challenged in 
any way in settling the Muslim refugees (and this view is reflected in the overall benign 
Turkish and Greek nationalist representation of the Lausanne Convention).  In truth, the 
Turkish government was heavily challenged.  Though they were not rushed into transfer 
like most of the Rums were, the Muslim refugees were doomed to disaster in that they 
were left to the mercy of a poorly funded and poorly administered Ministry of Exchange, 
Reconstruction and Resettlement.  The Turkish government was altogether unable to 
control the local seizing of abandoned properties upon which resettlement plans were 
formed (indeed, as I mentioned earlier, the Turkish Government at times also got into the 
act of taking abandoned Greek properties).  Since they were dealing with the incredibly 
difficult task of reforming and building Turkey, Turkish leaders by and large ignored the 
material and social problems of the Greek Muslims.  Indeed, Turkish authorities took it 
upon themselves to suppress separatist tendencies by, for instance, banning “anti-
government” political organizations (Yıldırım 2002:  316).  Therefore, Muslim refugees 
had really no political platform from which they could voice their discontent.  Finally, 
though I do not cover the point in my thesis, it is worth noting that government 
resettlement plans were also hindered by the Mixed Commission’s lack of cooperation 
with Turkish authorities regarding proper property liquidation and indemnification.  
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CONCLUSION:  A POPULATION EXCHANGE IS NOT A 
GOOD IDEA 
 
 
This Masters Thesis has been large and interdisciplinary in scope.  Overall, the 
focus has been on the construction of security and nationalism.  I have argued that by 
directing some much-needed attention towards the individual (a still oft-neglected unit of 
analysis in IR) and by legitimating the individual's rights and power, the idea of human 
security and its theoretical investigation offers an alternative, helpful frame of reference 
and inquiry for security studies and the IR field in general.  “Human security" is thus a 
useful analytical tool that addresses and corrects some of the deficiencies in the "state 
security" approach.  I have also shown how nationalists make their efforts of nationalism 
and securitization appear not only necessary, but also natural.  Homeland discourse made 
the “other”- in my case study, primarily the Greek Muslim immigrants - more easily 
identifiable.  I have illustrated this phenomenon by demonstrating how the out-migration 
of in-members was filtered through the lens of ethnicity and religion.  
Not only did I offer numerous examples of nationalist rhetoric and discuss 
problems with assimilation and territorialization, I have also waded through the timeless 
battle of definition waged by nationalists concerning fundamental concepts such as 
ethnicity, nationality and religion.  For example, the term “Türk” came to replace 
“Osmanlı” as Atatürk dreamed it would, but without any precise definition.  In 
examining the ethos of the Republic of Turkey, nationalists founded Türkiye upon the 
word Türk in both an ethnic and national sense, and, what is more, in Ottoman times Türk 
was generally imbued with a religious connotation.  Unsurprisingly, therefore, much 
overlap and confusion persist to this day in conveying the identities of Greek Muslim 
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migrants, who entered Turkey as the nation-building project was in its infancy.  Though 
religion was the dominant criterion at the Lausanne Convention, it ran at odds at times 
with Atatürk’s secularist vision for the Turkish nation and the means of territorial 
belonging to Turkey.     
At a macro-level, the compulsory exchange of Greek and Turkish minorities 
raised incredible problems of economic readjustment in both Greece and Turkey.  As I 
mentioned in the paper, the Turkish government sought little foreign assistance to cope 
with settlement, thinking aid would be against the political and economic autonomy of 
the new Turkish nation-state.  Though I do not talk about it in any depth in my thesis, 
Turkey’s “non-interventionist” policy did result in migrant suffering and the marginal 
productivity of economic life.  In İzmir, for instance, the economic and social vacuum 
created by the departing Greeks provoked a city breakdown.  Unemployment rose 
markedly, prices rose excessively, people plunged into poverty, and the government 
inconsistently proportioned property that formerly belonged to the Greek Christians.   
With regard to people, the paper has primarily discussed Turkish nationalists, the 
Greek Muslim muhacirs, to a lesser extent the Turkish locals, and the inter-relationships 
among the three groups.  I realize the potential problem of pigeonholing the Greek 
Muslim transferees’ experiences and feelings of security and identity as a result of 
displacement.  Hence I need to deliver a word of caution about the take-home message of 
this thesis.  The inter-relationships among identity, displacement and security are 
complicated and dynamic.  In chapter 2, I am not arguing that all Greek Muslim 
immigrants felt sad about leaving their homes, nor am I contending that all Greek 
Muslim immigrants felt unwelcome upon arrival to Turkey.  One can be reasonably 
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confident that some exchangees did have a favorable settlement process, though I have 
not yet been able to come across it in the documentary record.  After all, it is virtually 
impossible to be comprehensive and all-inclusive about an ethnic community numbering 
over 400,000 people, since feelings about place and identity are too subjective, complex 
and historically contingent.  One can of course also question the reliability of interviews - 
a person’s loyalties (religious, ethnic, national, etc.) and opinions can sometimes be 
incredibly complicated and can change with every day based on the situation on the 
ground.   
What chapter 2 is trying to do at its core, however, is at least dispel the myth that 
Greek Muslim immigrants were by in large “repatriating” to their “home” country.  In 
certain nationalist discourse, for instance, I showed in my thesis that the nationalists 
labeled the Greek Muslim immigrants under the CEOPBGT "Turks" even before they 
had arrived to Turkey.  That notion is ludicrous - in most cases, the Greek Muslim 
migrants felt they were leaving their homes and going to a foreign land.  And in many 
cases, Turkey represented the foreign land even after decades of making a life there, 
whereby many 1st generation Muslim refugees never quite felt properly settled in Turkey.  
This is not an insignificant point, and in chapter 2 I thoroughly document this sentiment 
based on the interviewees’ oral narratives.  Of course, one could interview a select group 
of Muslim migrants who did fit right in with the Turkish nation-building project taking 
place in the 1920s, found jobs, and lived a good life.  To try to overcome this problem, I 
surveyed a wide range of literature.  My conclusion is that overwhelming evidence would 
unfortunately portray a bleak and troublesome view of the forced Greek Muslim 
immigration.  Chapters 1 and 2 have shown the problematic nationalist attempt to create a 
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domination of cultural and ethnic values.  The Greek Muslim exchangees had to endure a 
nationalist policy whereby they were, at the same time, both the “other” as well as the 
Muslims who were expected to cooperate with Atatürk’s nationalization of Turkey.  
Considering how difficult the transfer was, a meaningful question to ask is:  Why 
have Turkish nationalists, or the Turkish public in general, showed little interest in 
preserving the memory of the Greek Muslim transfer?  Indeed, Hirschon notes that only 
in the 1990s did Turkish novels seek to write about the Greek Muslim displacement in 
any great length.  Moreover, Yıldırım (2002:  331) notes that of the recent Turkish 
scholarship regarding the CEOPBGT, most scholars take a traditional, mainstream view 
and pride themselves in holding relatively steadfast to Turkish nationalism and decision-
making.      
Millas (1998:  1-5, 18-23) offers many insightful reasons that could potentially 
explain the Turkish national silence regarding the CEOPBGT, and I want to go through 
them.  First, the concept of a “Modern Turkey” may have intimidated political novelists 
from writing about anything other than national identity based on “Turkishness.”  It is a 
fact that after 1925, strict censorship in the Turkish media aimed to cut down on 
complaints against Atatürk’s new government.  To be sure, the concentration of Greek-
speaking Muslim refugees in Turkey prompted suspicions among Turkish nationalists.  
For them, Greek Muslim muhacirs most likely represented a clash between the “ideal” 
and the “real.”  Instead of encountering Muslims that behaved like “Turks” or 
encountering Greeks that behaved like the Greek Christian professional traders that had 
left Anatolia, Turkish nationalists encountered primitive peasants that spoke a foreign 
language and had at best a mild curiosity for the Turkish nation-building project.   
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Second, since most exchanged Muslims were peasants, most probably could not 
read.  A low literacy may have contributed to fewer competent writers, and in turn to a 
lack of history about the Greek Muslim transfer.  Third, the orderly movement of Greek 
Muslims to Turkey was much less “sensational,” if you will, than the Anatolian Greek 
Christian exodus to Greece.  After all, roughly 90% of Greek Muslim transferees were 
moved under controlled conditions and after the Lausanne Convention was enforced 
(Millas 1998:  3).  Whereas the Anatolian Greek Christian exodus was a direct result of 
the Greco-Turkish War, the Greek Muslim transfer was a by-product of the Greek 
Christian movement.  Fourth, Anatolia had been well accustomed to immigration, a trend 
dating back well into the Ottoman days but especially during WWI.  In this way, the 
population transfer did not cause a great stir.  Fifth, in many situations Greek Muslim 
muhacirs were perceived as either “non-Turkish” or as “infidels,” leading to many 
injustices against them by locals officials.  To ensure survival, security, or moderate 
integration into Turkish society, Muslim immigrants may have had to keep a low profile.  
Their lack of publicity may have created a lack of historical knowledge about their plight.  
Finally, a silence about the transfer may have existed among nationalist and Islamist 
writers because of an insecurity of “national self assurance” (Millas 1998:  19).  Ardent 
nationalists saw displaced Greek Muslims as intruding upon ethnic Turkish soil.  Of 
course, as years passed and successive generations of Greek Muslim immigrants were 
born in Turkey, fierce Turkish nationalists may have perceived Greek Muslims as less 
threatening to Turkey.  
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In 1932, The New York Times wrote a short piece capturing the severity of the 
CEOPBGT.  Given Turkey and Greece’s long political antagonism towards each other, 
the article contends that the Lausanne Convention was worth the human suffering, 
  
 The intermigration of two million Greeks and Turks, which has come to an end, 
is, despite the incidental suffering, one of the epic experiences of the human race.  A 
mixed commission of four members, representing Turkey and Greece, and three members 
selected by the League of Nations in 1923, has at last completed its labors.  It was 
concerned not only with the transport of these men, women and children, but also with 
the removal from one land to another of their belongings and the disposal of their 
property- a seemingly impossible undertaking in the face of difficulties made almost 
insuperable by an unfriendliness that long persisted… 
 Today, as a correspondent of The London Times has reported, both Governments 
are making an honest endeavor to supplement this repatriating work…’Exchange is a 
cruel surgery,’ but the operation has been successful.   
Some international commemoration of this vast exodus in exchange of 
populations and the treatment of the remaining minorities is deserved for those who have 
patiently endured the privations and pain of it all, as also for those who have as patiently 
and sympathetically conducted the negotiations (1932:  20).  
     
The article, while persuading the reader to imagine the migrant’s hardship, 
underscores that the delegates had no choice but to remove their ethnic minorities.  
Lausanne, seen in this way, constitutes a last-minute heroic “surgery” performed by 
nationalists.  My goal in this Masters Thesis, however, has been to directly challenge 
ethnonationalist and statist rhetoric.  Nationalists made their task seem righteous; after 
all, many say, the short and long-term stability of the “ever inviolable” nation-state was at 
stake.   
A massive population exchange is a false prescription.  In truth, it is all but 
impossible to morally justify a massive uprooting, be it illegal or legal.  The 1923 
CEOPBGT was from its conception a thankless task - in no way can over 1.5 million 
people be forever uprooted from their homes and have their sense of identity and place 
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remain unscathed.  Ethnonationalists at Lausanne acted with imposition and impunity.  
By citing and acting upon a sense of urgency, nationalists manipulated place-making 
processes to separate peoples - a manifestation of the geography of power, security and 
nationalism.  The  “privations” of the migrant must outweigh the “honest endeavors” of 
the ethnonational elite, not the other way around.  Human rights must trump elite-based 
interpretations of “national security” and “national homogenization.”  We need to 
continually deconstruct nationalist rhetoric and promote human security and cultural 
awareness, not cultural antagonism.  Ultimately, a sophisticated analysis of Lausanne 
shows that it is a test case illustrating the difficulty governments undergo in incorporating 
an ethnic minority into the majority population and expecting homogeneity and cohesion 
as a result.  Leaders must actively rethink deportation as a “magic pill” for achieving 
cultural, political, and economic stability, and should instead look toward more 
imaginative ways of dealing with problems regarding place, space, identity and security.   
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APPENDIX:  THE TEXT OF THE LAUSANNE CONVENTION 
 
 
(English translation taken from http://www.hri.org/docs/straits/exchange.html) 
 
The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Greek Government 
have agreed upon the following provisions: 
Article 1  
As from the 1st May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish 
nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek 
nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory.  
These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the 
authorisation of the Turkish Government or of the Greek Government respectively.  
Article 2  
The following persons shall not be included in the exchange provided for in Article 1:  
(a) The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople.  
(b) The Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace.  
All Greeks who were already established before the 30th October, 1918, within the areas 
under the Prefecture of the City of Constantinople, as defined by the law of 1912, shall be 
considered as Greek inhabitants of Constantinople.  
All Moslems established in the region to the east of the frontier line laid down in 1913 by 
the Treaty of Bucharest shall be considered as Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace.  
Article 3  
Those Greeks and Moslems who have already, and since the 18th October, 1912, left the 
territories the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of which are to be respectively exchanged, 
shall be considered as included in the exchange provided for in Article 1.  
The expression "emigrant" in the present Convention includes all physical and juridical 
persons who have been obliged to emigrate or have emigrated since the 18th October, 
1912.  
Article 4  
All able-bodied men belonging to the Greek population, whose families have already left 
Turkish territory, and who are now detained in Turkey, shall constitute the first 
instalment of Greeks sent to Greece in accordance with the present Convention.  
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Article 5  
Subject to the provisions of Articles 9 and l0 of the present Convention, the rights of 
property and monetary assets of Greeks in Turkey or Moslems in Greece shall not be 
prejudiced in consequence of the exchange to be carried out under the present 
Convention  
Article 6  
No obstacle may be placed for any reason whatever in the way of the departure of a 
person belonging to the populations which are to be exchanged. In the event of an 
emigrant having received a definite sentence of imprisonment, or a sentence which is not 
yet definitive, or of his being the object of criminal proceedings, he shall be handed over 
by the authorities of the prosecuting country to the authorities of the country whither he is 
going, in order that he may serve his sentence or be brought to trial.  
Article 7  
The emigrants will lose the nationality of the country which they are leaving, and will 
acquire the nationality of the country of their destination, upon their arrival in the 
territory of the latter country.  
Such emigrants as have already left one or other of the two countries and have not yet 
acquired their new nationality, shall acquire that nationality on the date of the signature 
of the present Convention.  
Article 8  
Emigrants shall be free to take away with them or to arrange for the transport of their 
movable property of every kind, without being liable on this account to the payment of 
any export or import duty or any other tax.  
Similarly, the members of each community (including the personnel of mosques, tekkes, 
meddresses, churches, convents, schools, hospitals, societies, associations and juridical 
persons, or other foundations of any nature whatever) which is to leave the territory of 
one of the Contracting States under the present Convention, shall have the right to take 
away freely or to arrange for the transport of the movable property belonging to their 
communities.  
The fullest facilities for transport shall be provided by the authorities of the two 
countries, upon the recommendation of the Mixed Commission provided for in Article 
11.  
Emigrants who may not be able to take away all or part of their movable property can 
leave it behind. In that event, the local authorities shall be required to draw up, the 
emigrant in question being given an opportunity to be heard, an inventory and valuation 
of the property left by him. Procès-verbaux containing the inventory and the valuation of 
the movable property left by the emigrant shall be drawn up in four copies, one of which 
shall be kept by the local authorities, the second transmitted to the Mixed Commission 
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provided for in Article 11 to serve as the basis for the liquidation provided for by Article 
9, the third shall be handed to the Government of the country to which the emigrant is 
going, and the fourth to the emigrant himself.  
Article 9  
Immovable property, whether rural or urban, belonging to emigrants, or to the 
communities mentioned in Article 8, and the movable property left by these emigrants or 
communities, shall be liquidated in accordance with the following provisions by the 
Mixed Commission provided for in Article 11.  
Property situated in the districts to which the compulsory exchange applies and belonging 
to religious or benevolent institutions of the communities established in a district to 
which the exchange does not apply, shall likewise be liquidated under the same 
conditions.  
Article l0  
The movable and immovable property belonging to persons who have already left the 
territory of the High Contracting Parties and are considered, in accordance with Article 3 
of the present Convention, as being included in the exchange of populations, shall be 
liquidated in accordance with Article 9. This liquidation shall take place independently of 
all measures of any kind whatever, which, under the laws passed and the regulations of 
any kind made in Greece and Turkey since the 18th October, 1912, or in anyother way, 
have resulted in any restriction on rights of ownership over the property in question, such 
as confiscation forced sale, etc. In the event of the property mentioned in this Article or in 
Article 9 having been submitted to a measure of this kind, its value shall be fixed by the 
Commission provided for in Article 11, as if the measures in question had not been 
applied.  
As regards expropriated property, the Mixed Commission shall undertake a fresh 
valuation of such property, if it has been expropriated since the 18th October, 1912, 
having previously belonged to persons liable to the exchange of populations in the two 
countries, and is situated in territories to which the exchange applies. The Commission 
shall fix for the benefit of the owners such compensation as will repair the injury which 
the Commission has ascertained. The total amount of this compensation shall be carried 
to the credit of these owners and to the debit of the Government on whose territory the 
expropriated property is situated.  
In the event of any persons mentioned in Articles 8 and 9 not having received the income 
from property, the enjoyment of which they have lost in one way or another, the 
restoration of the amount of this income shall be guaranteed to them on the basis of the 
average yield of the property before the war, and in accordance with the methods to be 
laid down by the Mixed Commission.  
The Mixed Commission provided for in Article 11, when proceeding to the liquidation of 
Wakf property in Greece and of the rights and interests connected therewith, and to the 
liquidation of similar foundations belonging to Greeks in Turkey, shall follow the 
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principles laid down in previous Treaties with a view to fully safeguarding the rights and 
interests of these foundations and of the individuals interested in them.  
The Mixed Commission provided for in Article 11 shall be entrusted with the duty of 
executing these provisions.  
Article 11  
Within one month from the coming into force of the present Convention a Mixed 
Commission shall be set up in Turkey or in Greece consisting of four members 
representing each of the High Contracting Parties, and of three members chosen by the 
Council of the League of Nations from among nationals of Powers which did not take 
part in the war of 1914-1918. The Presidency of the Commission shall be exercised in 
turn by each of these three neutral members.  
The Mixed Commission shall have the right to set up, in such places as it may appear to 
them necessary, Sub-Commissions working under its order. Each such Sub-Commission 
shall consist of a Turkish member, a Greek member and a neutral President to be 
designated by the Mixed Commission. The Mixed Commission shall decide the powers 
to be delegated to the Sub-Commission.  
Article 12  
The duties of the Mixed Commission shall be to supervise and facilitate the emigration 
provided for in the present Convention and to carry out the liquidation of the movable 
and immovable property for which provision is made in Articles 9 and l0.  
The Commission shall settle the methods to be followed as regards the emigration and 
liquidation mentioned above.  
In a general way the Mixed Commission shall have full power to take the measures 
necessitated by the execution of the present Convention and to decide all questions to 
which this Convention may give rise.  
The decisions of the Mixed Commission shall be taken by a majority.  
All disputes relating to property, rights and interests which are to be liquidated shall be 
settled definitely by the Commission.  
Article 13  
The Mixed Commission shall have full power to cause the valuation to be made of the 
movable and immovable property which is to be liquidated under the present Convention, 
the interested parties being given a hearing or being duly summoned so that they may be 
heard.  
The basis for the valuation of the property to be liquidated shall be the value of the 
property in gold currency.  
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Article 14  
The Commission shall transmit to the owner concerned a declaration stating the sum due 
to him in respect of the property of which he has been dispossessed, and such property 
shall remain at the disposal of the Government on whose territory it is situated.  
The total sums due on the basis of these declarations shall constitute a Government debt 
from the country where the liquidation takes place to the Government of the country to 
which the emigrant belongs. The emigrant shall in principle be entitled to receive in the 
country to which he emigrates, as representing the sums due to him, property of a value 
equal to and of the same nature as that which he has left behind.  
Once every six months an account shall be drawn up of the sums due by the respective 
Governments on the basis of the declarations as above.  
When the liquidation is completed, if the sums of money due to both sides correspond, 
the accounts relating thereto shall be balanced. If a sum remains due from one of the 
Governments to the other Government after a balance has been struck, the debit balance 
shall be paid in cash. If the debtor Government requests a postponement in making this 
payment, the Commission may grant such postponement, provided that the sum due be 
paid in three annuities at most. The Commission shall fix the interest to be paid during 
the period of postponement.  
If the sum to be paid is fairly large and requires longer postponement, the debtor 
Government shall pay in cash a sum to be fixed by the Mixed Commission, up to a 
maximum of 20 per cent of the total due, and shall issue in respect of the balance loan 
certificates bearing such interest as the Mixed Commission may fix, to be paid off within 
20 years at most. The debtor Government shall assign to the service of these loans 
pledges approved by the Commission, which shall be administered and of which the 
revenues shall be encashed by the International Commission in Greece and by the 
Council of the Public Debt at Constantinople. In the absence of agreement in regard to 
these pledges, they shall be selected by the Council of the League of Nations.  
Article 15  
With a view to facilitating emigration, funds shall be advanced to the Mixed Commission 
by the States concerned, under conditions laid down by the said Commission.  
Article 16  
The Turkish and Greek Governments shall come to an agreement with the Mixed 
Commission provided for in Article 11 in regard to all questions concerning the 
notification to be made to persons who are to leave the territory of Turkey and Greece 
under the present Convention, and concerning the ports to which these persons are to go 
for the purpose of being transported to the country of their destination.  
The High Contracting Parties undertake mutually that no pressure direct or indirect shall 
be exercised on the populations which are to be exchanged with a view to making them 
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leave their homes or abandon their property before the date fixed for their departure. 
They likewise undertake to impose on the emigrants who have left or who are to leave the 
country no special taxes or dues. No obstacle shall be placed in the way of the inhabitants 
of the districts excepted from the exchange under Article 2 exercising freely their right to 
remain in or return to those districts and to enjoy to the full their liberties and rights of 
property in Turkey and in Greece. This provision shall not be invoked as a motive for 
preventing the free alienation of property belonging to inhabitants of the said regions 
which are excepted from the exchange, or the voluntary departure of those among these 
inhabitants who wish to leave Turkey or Greece.  
Article 17  
The expenses entailed by the maintenance and working of the Mixed Commission and of 
the organizations dependent on it shall be borne by the Governments concerned in 
proportions to be fixed by the Commission.  
Article 18  
The High Contracting Parties undertake to introduce in their respective laws such 
modifications as may be necessary with a view to ensuring the execution of the present 
Convention.  
Article 19  
The present Convention shall have the same force and effect as between the High 
Contracting Parties as if it formed part of the Treaty of Peace to be concluded with 
Turkey. It shall come into force immediately after the ratification of the said Treaty by 
the two High Contracting Parties.  
In faith whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, whose respective full Powers have 
been found in good and due form, have signed the present Convention.  
Done at Lausanne, the 30th January, 1923, in three copies, one of which shall be 
transmitted to the Greek Government, one to the Government of the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey, and the third shall be deposited in the archives of the Government 
of the French Republic, which shall deliver certified copies to the other Powers signatory 
of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.  
(L.S.) E. K. VENISELOS 
(L.S.) D. CACLAMANOS 
(L.S.) İSMET 
(L.S.) DR. RIZA NOUR 
(L.S.) HASSAN  
PROTOCOL  
The undersigned Turkish Plenipotentiaries, duly authorized to that effect, declare that, 
without waiting for the coming into force of the Convention with Greece of even date, 
relating to the exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations, and by way of exception 
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to Article 1 of that Convention, the Turkish Government, on the signature of the Treaty 
of Peace, will release the able-bodied men referred to in Article 4 of the said Convention, 
and will provide for their departure.  
Done at Lausanne, the 30th January, 1923.  
İSMET 
DR. RIZA NOUR 
HASSAN 
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GLOSSARY:  SOME POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT WORDS 
TO KNOW 
 
 
Diaspora:  “An organized ethnic community of long-term residence away from the 
historical ethnic homeland” (Yiftachel 2001:  359).      
 
Ethnic Cleansing:  “[A] policy whereby the actual aim of the combatants is to drive out 
entire populations or ethnic groups in an attempt to establish homogenous areas” 
(Barutciski 1998:  2). 
 
Ethnic Group:  “Generally endogamous groups, whose criteria for cultural self-definition 
are common traditions selected from the past” (Andrews 1989:  17).   
 
Ethnic Homeland:  “The residential territory, region, or country of an ethnic group, 
perceived as the group’s “possession” and the birthplace of its culture and identity” 
(Yiftachel 2001:  359).   
 
Ethnic Identity:  “A sense of belonging, a definition of self and one’s own group in 
relation with others” (Mach 1993:  11).      
 
Ethnicity:   “Group identity characterized by common culture and a belief in a common 
past at a specific place” (Yiftachel 2001:  359).  
 
Ethnic Minority:  “An ethnic group situated in a culturally and numerically inferior 
position within its state” (Yiftachel 2001:  359).   
 
Ethnonationalism:  “Political mobilization aimed at achieving, consolidating, or 
protecting ethnic territorial sovereignty” (Yiftachel 2001:  359).  
 
Hegemony:  “Is, in its simplest sense, the ascendancy or domination of one element of the 
system over others (from the Greek hegemonia, meaning ‘leader’)” (Heywood 2000:  
205). 
 
Homeland:  “A territory believed to be the historical region inhabited by the group in 
question and often the birthplace of its identity” (Yiftachel 2001:  359). 
 
Human Security:  “Relates to the protection of the individual’s personal safety and 
freedom from direct and indirect threats of violence.  The promotion of human 
development and good governance, and, when necessary, the collective use of sanctions 
and force are central to managing human security.  States, international organizations, 
and other groups in civil society in combination are vital to the prospects of human 
security” (Bajpai 2000:  48). 
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Identity:  “A dynamic, processual, and contextual phenomenon…resulting from 
classification of the world” (Mach 1993:  5). 
 
Individual Security:  See Human Security.   
 
Irredentism:  “An ideological or organizational expression of passionate interest in the 
welfare of an ethnic minority living outside the boundaries of the state peopled by that 
same group” (Landau 1995:  1).   
 
Nation:  “A perceived or imagined community whose members share a sense of 
belonging based on myths of common genealogical and geographic origins, and also a 
politicized and territorialized community of interest whose members have mobilized to 
gain control over their future by gaining greater sovereignty in the place they consider to 
be their homeland” (Kaiser 2001:  1).   
 
Nationalism:  “Both an ideology and a political action program… the principal goals of 
nationalism are the nationalization of land as territorial homeland, and the territorial 
nationalization of the population toward the control of the homeland” (Kaiser 2001:  2).  
 
National Security:  See State Security. 
 
National Territoriality:  “The attempt by nationalists to gain control over both the 
historical representation of the nation being constructed, and also the fate or future 
destiny of the nation by seeking to establish sovereignty in the place that they claim as 
their ancestral homeland” (Kaiser 2001:  2).  
 
Nation-State:  See State. 
 
Place:  “The networks of social relations that operate at a variety of geographic scales, 
which are constituted of locale, location, and sense of place” (Kaiser 2001:  2). 
 
Population Exchange:  “The process whereby populations are exchanged, in total or in 
part and with or without a treaty, between territories or States” (Meindersma 1997:  336).      
 
Population Transfer:  “A policy and/or practice of governments or non-State actors 
having the purpose or effect of compelling people to leave their territory or accept the 
settlement of others into that territory, without the free and informed consent of the 
transferred population and/or any receiving population” (Meindersma 1997:  336).  
 
Race:  “A vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and language, 
always of common history, traditions and impulses, who are both voluntarily and 
involuntarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly 
conceived ideals of life” (Marable, Mullings 2000:  214 taken from W.E.B. Du Bois).    
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Security:  "Freedom from risk or danger; safety; freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; 
confidence; something that gives or assures safety" (adapted on May 25, 2004 from 
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=security).    
 
Sovereignty:  “In its simplest sense, is the principle of absolute and unlimited power” 
(Heywood 2000:  37).   
 
State:  “A political association that establishes sovereign jurisdiction within defined 
territorial borders and exercises authority through a set of permanent institutions” 
(Heywood 2000:  39).   
 
Territoriality:  “The attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control 
people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a 
geographic area” (Sack 1986:  19). 
 
Transnationalism:  “The processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded 
social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Kaiser 2001:  
3, taken from Basch et al. 1994). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
